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This study attempts to discern the nature of the Chinese junk trade during the 
seventeenth century by examining social, religious and cultural ties among Chinese 
maritime traders and the influence of these ties on the organization of trade. Based on 
Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese sources, it will investigate the 
activities of the Wei brothers in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade from the 1630s to the 
1680s. In doing so, it will argue that Chinese maritime networks were developed on 
the basis of economic, kinship, religious and cultural affiliations embedded in the 
social and commercial development of the late-Ming gentry society in China, and 
therefore that the nature of the early modern Chinese junk trade was in essence private 
and informal. It will demonstrate the shifts that took place around the rim of the East 
and South China Seas in the seventeenth century and point to the Qing conquest of 
Taiwan as a watershed in the maritime history of East and Southeast Asia. Lastly, it 
intends to show that biographical study can be a useful tool for writing history, as it 
complements the limitations of the approaches defined by the modern nation states. 
 
Part One delineates the landscape of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade and 
introduces Wei Zhiyan as a key subject of this thesis. Chapter One is dedicated to a 
description of the natural, political and economic environment for trade in Tonkin 
during the seventeenth century. Chapter Two portrays the rise and fall of Tonkinese 
 vii
raw silk exports to Japan in the seventeenth century by combining the perspectives of 
Chinese junk traders with what is already known of the trade from VOC and English 
sources. This chapter intends to provide an alternative view that complements the 
hitherto Dutch-centered narrative of the early modern seaborne commerce between 
northern Vietnam and Japan. Chapter Three is a survey of Wei Zhiyan’s activities. 
Plowing through Dutch, English, Chinese and Japanese sources, it presents fragments 
of his life in a chronological sequence.  
 
Part Two is the analytical accompaniment to Part One. Existing materials on 
Tonkin are scarce. Owing to the unparalleled wealth of Japanese and Chinese 
materials, Chapters Four and Five are set in Nagasaki. Chapter Four examines the 
Wei brothers’ involvement in the Sōfukuji monastic community and illustrates the 
roles of Buddhist monasteries and monks in commerce. Chapter Five is an extended 
case in point of how informal and private connections with the local elites helped the 
Wei brothers gain the upper hand in trade at Nagasaki. Chapter Six provides a 
quantitative analysis that will show how the factors that were in operation at the time 
in Chapter Four translated into efficient trade. 
 viii 
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This study attempts to discern the nature of the Chinese junk trade during the 
seventeenth century by examining social, religious and cultural ties among Chinese 
maritime traders and the influence of these ties on the organization of trade. It will 
demonstrate the shifts that took place around the rim of the East and South China Seas 
in the seventeenth century and point to the Qing conquest of Taiwan as a watershed in 
maritime history of East and Southeast Asia. In addition, it will argue that Chinese 
maritime networks were developed on the basis of economic, kinship, religious and 
cultural affiliations embedded in the social and commercial development of the 
late-Ming gentry society in China and therefore the nature of early modern Chinese 
junk trade was in essence private and informal.   
 
Historiography of the Asian Trade 
During the first three decades following World War II, the dominant question 
for global economic history was to explain how the inhabitants of the western end of 
the European peninsula managed to subjugate all other areas of the globe. Within this 
conceptual framework, modern world history was built around the story of superior 
Western civilizations overcoming less successful civilizations. Trade was seen as an 
extension of this dominance. In search for the bases of Western superiority, researches 
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were directed at discovering which particular factors gave Europeans their superiority. 
The character of “Asian trade” as opposed to European joint stock companies was 
situated in a crucial junction in the history of early modern Southeast Asia.  
 
During the second-half of the twentieth century, scholars such as J. C. van 
Leur, M. A. P. Meilink-Roelfsz and Niels Steensgaard defined the course of studies 
on the nature of early modern Asian trade, the Dutch East India Company and the 
Portuguese Estado da India. Jacob van Leur opened up the discussion about the 
character of early modern Asian trade.  
 
Studying trade in the Indonesian archipelago during that time, he suggested 
that the equal footing of Asian and European trade organizations in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. By doing so, he liberated history of Asian maritime commerce 
from the Euro-centric view point. He stressed the peddling character of Asian trade 
and at the same time pointed out the limited influence of European trade in Asia.1   
 
Another Dutch historian M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, in Asian Trade and 
European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, 
                                                 
1
 J. C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and 
Economic History, translated by James S. Holmes and A. van Marle (The Hague: van 
Hoeve, 1955), 133, 197-201.  
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criticized Van Leur for his overemphasis on the peddling character of Asian trade. 
Based on her extensive research in the Dutch as well as the Portuguese archives, she 
argued that Asian commercial operations included merchants of great wealth, had 
sophisticated and effective credit instruments, extensive capital resources and traded 
in bulk goods across great distances. Therefore, it is inadequate to characterize Asian 
commercial operations as merely “peddling trade”. In doing so, she pointed out van 
Leur’s contradiction between his emphasis on the peddling trade and his thesis of the 
equal standing of Asian and European trade. She emphasized the modern elements in 
the organization of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and argued that with their 
economic, military and technical superiority, the Dutch East India Company 
constituted a “more highly organized form of trade than the partnership still generally 
current at that time in Asia and Europe”.2 
 
In The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, the Danish 
historian Niels Steensgaard defended van Leur against Meilik-Roelofsz’s criticism. 
He found that the Portuguese mercantile activity brought no new elements to Asian 
commerce.3 He recognized the VOC as a more rational and advanced form of 
                                                 
2
 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the 




 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: 
The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 93. 
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business organization than other contemporaries “were as profit-making institutions 
distinct from and superior to the peddlers”.4 At the same time, he acknowledged that 
European traders were not able to control every route or every market in the 
intra-Asian trade and that the peddling trade, however, survived due to the lower 
overhead costs and familiarity with local markets.5  
 
Anthony Reid took a much more holistic approach than the authors above. 
His Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680 portrayed how international 
commerce brought about profound structural changes in Southeast Asia from the 
late-fifteenth to the late-seventeenth century. He fended off the stereotypical view of 
“stagnant and autarchic” Southeast Asia, and Asia by extension, in the early modern 
era that once prevailed in the scholarship of the field.6      
 
What is striking is the dichotomy between Europe and Asia presented in the 
scholarship. Because “Asian trade” is a European invention, it is inescapable to 
discuss it without falling into the trap of the differentiation between “Europe” and 
“Asia (or non-Europe)”. Is “Asian commerce” an effective framework for a better 
                                                                                                                                            
 
4
 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, 406.  
 
5
 Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution, 410-1.  
 
6
 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Volume 
Two: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
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understanding of commerce in East and Southeast Asia? In order to avoid the 
European prism, more empirical studies with an inductive approach are necessary.   
 
Chinese Junk Trade 
During the 1970s, a new generation of historians brought the Chinese junk 
trade under scrutiny. They were better equipped with indigenous language skills, 
especially Chinese. As far as the Chinese junk trade of the eighteenth century is 
concerned, historians of Southeast Asia like Ishii Yoneo, Sarasin Viraphol, Jennifer 
Wayne Cushman, Ng Chin Keong and Leonard Blussé described further the enormous 
expansion of Chinese commercial networks in Southeast Asia and questioned the 
assumption of European superiority in trade. 
 
Ishii Yoneo introduced Japanese materials on the early modern Chinese junk 
trade in Southeast Asia to an international audience.7 Based on Japanese documents 
and Chinese sources rather than on European archival materials, Sarasin Vilaphol and 
Jennifer Wayne Cushman produced milestone researches about the early modern 
Chinese junk trade between East and Southeast Asia. In Tribute and Profit: 
Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853, the Thai historian Sarasin showed the dynamic 
                                                 
7
 Ishii Yoneo, “Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam”, 
Journal of Siam Society 59 (1971): 161-74. These documents were later translated 
into English. Ishii Yoneo, trans. he Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations 
from the Tōsen Fūestsu-gaki, 1674-1723 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1998).  
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growth, adaptability and flexibility of the Chinese junk trade between East and 
Southeast Asia and thus refuted the then dominant view of “stagnant Asia” before the 
Opium War.8 On the other hand, Cushman’s Fields from the Sea explored Chinese 
maritime policies, maritime customs administration and the pattern of the 
Chinese-Siamese trade. She highlighted the long-standing economic relations between 
China and Southeast Asia and considered the Chinese traders as major economic 
actors in Southeast Asia during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.9  
 
Since the late-1980s, a shift in the historiography of the Asian trade saw 
works being written that gave more prominence to Asia. These studies shed light on 
the roles of merchants from Fujian in maritime commerce. Ng Chin Keong’s Trade 
and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683-1735 analyzed various 
aspects of internal life in the southern Fujian province and described the 
socio-economic forces that contributed to the seafaring tradition of Fujianese people. 
He demonstrated the dynamism and creativeness in the indigenous trade during the 
late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries and pointed out that even though there 
were restrictive regulations from time to time, the direct impact of these regulations 
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9
 Jennifer Wayne Cushman, Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with 
Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1993). 
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on the trading community was minimal due to the flexible attitudes adopted by the 
officials at the provincial and local levels.10 Wang Gungwu described Fujianese 
merchants as the most successful group of Chinese overseas traders from the 
thirteenth to the eighteenth century.11 Qian Jiang explored the Fujianese overseas 
expansion from the late-sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Through comparative 
studies of the Fujianese enclaves in Banten, Batavia, Manila and Nagasaki, his thesis 
supported Wang Gungwu’s argument that Fujianese merchants were the most 
successful Chinese entrepreneurs in the pre-modern period.12    
 
In addition, Blussé’s seminal works on the VOC’s activities in the China Sea 
region underlined the enormous expansion of Chinese commercial networks in 
Southeast Asian waters after the Qing lifted the maritime ban in 1683. He stressed the 
impact of Chinese commercial expansion in Southeast Asian society from 1683 to the 
1820s. Blussé restated Anthony Reid’s claim that the period as “the Chinese 
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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 419.  
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 Qian Jiang, “Merchants and Other Sojourners: The Hokkiens Overseas, 
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Century”.13 As far as the seventeenth century is concerned, Blussé pointed out the 
decline of the VOC’s trade in the South China Sea region during the second-half of 
the seventeenth century. He asserted that “the Manchu conquest of China and the 
realization of a separate Japanese world order” around the mid-seventeenth century 
shaped the structure of international trade in the area and “the Dutch trade in the 
region was curtailed by these institutional changes of a structural nature. Furthermore, 
increased rivalry and competition by Asian traders rendered Dutch trade in the region 
unprofitable, unless it was supported by special privileges or monopolies”.14  
 
Japanese Historiography  
Japanese scholarship on early modern Chinese commerce has evolved in three 
different scholarly traditions. In pre-war Japan, scholars of Japanese foreign relations 
wrote extensively on Japanese overseas expansion during the late-sixteenth and early- 
seventeenth centuries. Works of Iwao Seiichi (1900-1988) and Murakami Naojirō 
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 Anthony Reid, “Introduction”, in The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: 
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Dordrecht, Holland and Riverton U.S.A: Foris Publications, 1986; Leonard Blussé, 




 Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and 
the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 
30, No. 1 (1996): 75-6. 
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(1868-1966) provided the scaffolding on which post-war scholarship on early modern 
Japanese foreign relations, as well as history of Southeast Asia, developed.15 Their 
depth of knowledge about the relevant European materials has been unsurpassed. 
Nakamura Takashi and Nagazumi Yōko followed their tradition one way or another 
and explored various topics on the history of Japan and Southeast Asia. They all 
contributed to translating Dutch archival materials into the Japanese language and to 
making them available for a wider audience.16 Iwao and Nagasaki recognized the 
importance of Chinese overseas commercial networks in East and Southeast Asia and 
compiled quantitative data on Chinese shipping extracted from the Dutch archives.17 
Yamawaki Teijirō focused on Chinese trade at Nagasaki during the Edo period.18 In 
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 Iwao Seiichi, Nanyō nihonmachi no kenkyū (Studies of the Japanese quarters 
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botsuraku (Decline of Fujiang merchants in Japanese-Chinese trade in the early 
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addition, historians of Southeast Asia such as Wada Hisanori made contributions 
towards a better understanding of Chinese maritime trade and its influence on the 
emergence of Southeast Asian polities.19  
 
Japanese historians of Chinese history have a keen interest in the economic 
development of China and commercial relationships between China and Japan. Shiba 
Yoshinobu’s study on Chinese commerce during the Sung dynasty provided the basis 
for studies on later periods.20 Ōba Osamu studied the Chinese junk trade with Japan 
and its ramifications for Japanese culture during the Edo period.21 Matsura Akira 
produced a series of works on the trade between the Qing and Japan.22 Liu 
Shiuh-feng examined the Qing maritime policies and Chinese junk trade at 
                                                                                                                                            
modern period)”, Tōhōgaku 12 (1956): 74-88; Yamawaki Teijirō, Nagasaki no tōjin 
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Nagasaki.23 Although there is undoubtedly a large scale accumulation of knowledge 
on Chinese commercial networks within East Asia, most of the researches focused on 
maritime trade between China and Japan, and paid little or no attention to Southeast 
Asia. Perhaps one of the biggest problems of Japanese scholarship is that these studies 
were mostly written in Japanese and are little known outside Japan. 
 
Previous Studies on the Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade 
Despite these insightful researches on the Chinese junk trade, the topic has 
been understudied or marginalized, especially in English scholarly literature, 
primarily because sources are so sparse and fragmentary. As compared to our 
knowledge on the contemporary European trading organizations, such as the Dutch 
and English East India Companies, we have very limited tangible information on 
Chinese commercial networks at work. Obviously, it is due to the lack of Chinese 
sources that most empirical researches on Chinese junk trade have focused on the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As far as the seventeenth century is concerned, 
we know even less about the way Chinese maritime traders carried out their 
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commercial activities. This thesis asks two major questions. Firstly, how did Chinese 
merchants organize trade during the seventeenth century? And secondly, given the 
decline of the VOC trade in the China Sea in the later half of the seventeenth century, 
as Blussé described, what gave Chinese maritime traders from Fujian the competitive 
advantages against the largest European trading company, the VOC? 
 
In order to answer these questions at an empirical level, this thesis looks at 
Tonkinese raw silk exports to Japan. Tonkinese raw silk played an important role in 
regional commerce of the mid-seventeenth century, when it became increasingly 
difficult for maritime traders to export raw silk from China. In search of an alternative 
supply of raw silk, foreign merchants flocked to Hanoi and Pho Hien in order to 
procure Tonkinese silk products in exchange for Japanese silver. A sizable amount of 
Tonkinese raw silk was exported to Japan every year from the 1630s to the 1680s. 
After the Tokugawa bakufu prohibited Japanese people from going overseas, the VOC 
and Chinese traders were the two major competitors in this branch of trade.  
 
There have been a handful of works on seaborne commerce between northern 
Vietnam and Japan during the seventeenth century. P. J. M. Buch studied the Dutch 
activities in Vietnam.24 P. W. Klein cast light on the Tonkin-Japan silk trade carried 
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 W. J. M. Buch, “La Compagnie des Indes Neerlandaises et l’Indochine”, 
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out by the VOC. His pioneering work demonstrated the process by which Tonkin 
gave way to Bengal as a supplier of raw silk.25 Most recently, Hoang Anh Tuan 
published a well-documented monograph on the economic, political and social 
relationships between Tonkin and the VOC from its onset in 1637 to the VOC’s 
eventual withdraw from Tonkin in 1700.26 His well-documented research 
undoubtedly set a new benchmark for future studies on Vietnamese-Dutch relations in 
the seventeenth century.  
 
In addition, Japanese historians have made important contributions to our 
knowledge of the commercial transactions between Tonkin and Nagasaki.27 
Nagazumi Yōko illustrated the intermediary roles that Japanese residents of Tonkin 
played in facilitating commercial exchanges between the two places. Yamawaki 
Teijirō’s study on Japan’s import of raw silk included information on Tonkinese silk 
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products.28 Although their researches include fine data extracted from the Dutch 
archives, they have been virtually unknown outside the Japanese scholarly audience. 
Scholars from China and Taiwan have accumulated a vast amount of scholarly 
literature on the development of the Chinese junk trade from the late-Ming to the 
early-Qing period.29 Yet, little has been written on the subject of Tonkinese silk.  
 
It is clear that a Dutch-centered approach is dominant in existing scholarship 
largely due to the fact that the Dutch archives are the single most important source of 
information. The contemporary Dutch factors keenly watched Chinese mercantile 
activities at both ends. Their concern alone would call for a closer look at the roles of 
Chinese maritime merchants in Tonkin silk exports to Japan. However, with the lack 
of first-hand accounts by Chinese people, no serious attempt has been made to 
examine how Chinese maritime traders carried out their shipping operation. Since all 
the above-mentioned scholars explicitly limited the scope of their research to the roles 
of the VOC for good reasons, it will be unfair to criticize them for not discussing 
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 15
Chinese participation in this branch of trade. It is sufficient for the present purpose to 
point out that Chinese junk traders have never been allotted a deserved and an 
appropriate position in scholarly literature on the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade.  
 
This thesis gains insights from Henriette Buggé ’s article on Chinese-Dutch 
competition in the silk trade to Japan in the seventeenth century. She proved that 
“neither Van Leur’s theories on the activities of the companies superimposed on a 
primitive peddler-trade, nor Steensgaard’s theories about the structural superiority of 
the companies are sufficient tools for the analysis of the relative weakness of the VOC 
vis-à-vis the Chinese junk merchants in East Asia”.30 With this as the point of 
departure, this thesis will explore how Chinese junk traders organized their trade in 
the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade in the seventeenth century and provide an alternative 
portrayal of the South China Seas trade during the seventeenth century.   
 
Chan (Zen) Buddhism  
 Detailed up-to-date knowledge about markets and security situations at trading 
ports were essential in a successful business operation. Only with reliable 
communication circuits at work, could merchants seek commercial opportunities at 
markets. The best way to gather intelligence was through networks of people who 
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shared common interests. Process of business transactions, where individuals 
interacted, negotiated and cut a deal with each other through various means, was far 
more complex, delicate and intimate than official records could indicate. To 
understand trade and how it really worked, it is necessary to look beyond business and 
explore different aspects of merchant lives. 
 
It is true that the European sources are the most important sources for economic 
history of Asian maritime commerce in the early modern period. However, economic 
nature of these sources hinders us from finding rationales behind mercantile activities 
of Chinese traders. In order to solve this problem, this thesis introduces new material 
that has never been used for the study of commerce. What I call the Ōbaku (黄檗) 
material is a set of records written by Chinese monks in Nagasaki. The Ōbaku sect of 
Chan (禅)(J. Zen) Buddhism was introduced into Japan by Chinese monks, merchants 
and adepts who migrated to Japan during the early seventeenth century. Their writings 
contain references to individuals whose patronage was instrumental in the formation 
of Chinese monasteries at Nagasaki and provide a glimpse into the inner world of the 
Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki during the seventeenth century. 
 
Recently, two scholars paid attention to the spread of Chan Buddhism in East 
and Southeast Asia during the seventeenth century. According to Wu Jian, “Chan 
Buddhism is by nature a missionary tradition” and therefore “the rise of Chan 
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Buddhism in China created a large-scale missionary work to reclaim the territory of 
Buddhism not only within China but also in East Asia in the seventeenth century”. 
There is no doubt that a wave of Chinese overseas emigration served as a vehicle for 
the spread of Chan Buddhism in East and Southeast Asia. Examining Yinyuan 
Longqi’s (隠元隆琦)(1592-1673) historic move to Japan that led to the spread of the 
Ōbaku sect of Buddhism in Japan, Wu aptly pointed out that being the most powerful 
fraction within the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki, the Fuqing diaspora 
played a pivotal role in facilitating the Ōbaku monks’ initial move to Nagasaki.31 It is 
no coincidence that Fuqing was the place where the headquarters of the Ōbaku sect 
Mount Huangbo (黄檗) were located and where Yinyuan as well as many other 
Ōbaku monks came from.  
 
Charles Wheeler’s study of Chan master Shilian Dashan’s (石濂大汕) 
(1633-1692) journey to Cochinchina at the end of the seventeenth century pointed to 
close connections between a missionary tradition of Chan Buddhism and the 
formation of Chinese merchant communities in East and Southeast Asia. Wheeler 
acknowledged that firstly, Chinese temples in key ports played a vital role in holding 
the diasporic communities of Chinese seafaring traders together and, that secondly, 
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Buddhist monks acted as a bridge between their merchant patrons and local elites in 
host societies.32 Both Wu and Wheeler provide important insights into the roles of 
Buddhism in commerce and diaspora in early modern maritime East and Southeast 
Asia. However, while Wu’s study does not explain why Fuqing merchants became so 
influential within the Chinese diasporic community at Nagasaki at this particular 
moment in the seventeenth century, Wheeler’s work includes little empirical analysis 
on the two issues that he brought up.   
 
This study will introduce Wei Zhiyuan (魏之瑗)(d. 1654) and Wei Zhiyan (魏
之琰)(1618-1689) and show that they were most successful in tradeing between 
Tonkin and Nagasaki from the mid-1640s to the early 1680s. Exploring the Wei 
brothers’ commercial, social, cultural and religious activities, it will demonstrate that 
most Chinese merchants who engaged in commercial exchange between Tonkin and 
Nagasaki hailed from Fuqing. “Tonkin merchants (J. Tonkin hakushu 東京舶主)” 
appeared in the Ōbaku material and the material specifically referred to this particular 
group of Fuqing traders who dominated the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade in the 
seventeenth century. The Wei brothers were the ringleaders of this group of seafaring 
traders. Their contribution to the temple both literally and metaphorically shaped the 
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early days of the Sōfukuji (崇福寺), colloquially known as Fuzhou-temple (福州寺). 
Building monasteries, inviting prestigious Chan masters from China and supporting 
public projects all required a sound economic foundation. Only the private 
commercial wealth that was accumulated from exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan 
made the Wei brothers’ vigorous patronage of the Sōfukuji possible. Their 
participation in, and financial contribution to, religious activities and financial 
contribution were factors that confirmed the strong position of the Fuqing diaspora 
within the Sofukuji monastic community. In return, monasteries stimulated trade by 
providing merchants with an “associational matrix”, as Timothy Brook described, that 
was particularly critical for the survival of the Chinese trading community in 
Nagasaki when anti-Christian persecutions stormed through Japan during the first half 
of the seventeenth century.33 
 
Methods 
This thesis applies a micro-level approach and looks at Chinese maritime 
merchants, namely Wei Zhiyuan and his younger brother Wei Zhiyan. The Wei 
brothers originally came from Fuqing (福清) county, Fuzhou prefecture in Fujian (福
建) province. They were the most successful owners-operators of most junks 
navigating between Tonkin and Nagasaki in the mid-seventeenth century. The fact 
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that their entrepreneurial activities comprised a large part of Chinese junk traffic 
between the two places provides a justification for the scope of this thesis. Based on 
Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese materials, this thesis provides 
information on the Wei brothers’ activities even though they produced no records 
themselves.  
 
There is no doubt that many people were involved in the Wei brothers’ 
business. Nevertheless, extant commercial documents, whether Dutch, English or 
Japanese, provide little information on other individuals who participated in the Wei 
brothers’ commercial enterprise. In order to solve this problem, this thesis looks 
beyond business transactions and explores social, religious and cultural aspects of 
merchants’ lives.  
 
The sources for this research were written in Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese 
and Vietnamese. Regarding trade, the Dutch records kept at the Nationaal Archief of 
the Netherlands in The Hague provide crucial information. The published materials 
such as the Generale Missiven and the Dagh-register Batavia also included useful 
data. For the period from 1672 onwards, “Tonkin Journal Registers” in the India 
Office Records at the British Library in London were consulted. Japanese official 
documents such as Kai hentai and Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku were also useful for the 
last two decades of the seventeenth century. They are available in printed form. 
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Generations of the Wei family kept family archives which include genealogical 
records and original correspondences between families in Fuzhou, Tonkin and 
Nagasaki. Although the family archives are not immediately accessible, Nagasaki 
Museum of History and Culture (NMHC) owns photocopies of some manuscripts. In 
addition, Koga Jūjirō Manuscript Collection at NMHC includes copies of letters 
exchanged between a local historian of Nagasaki Koga Jūjirō (古賀十二郎) 
(1879-1954) and one of the descendants of Wei Zhiyan during the 1920s. It contains 
valuable accounts of the Wei family. In terms of Chan Buddhism, writings of 
Buddhist monks were found in Hirakubo Akira’s edited volumes.34      
 
Part One delineates the landscape of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade and 
introduces Wei Zhiyan as a key subject of this thesis. Chapter One is dedicated to a 
description of the natural, political and economic environment for trade in Tonkin 
during the seventeenth century. Chapter Two portrays the rise and fall of Tonkinese 
raw silk exports to Japan in the seventeenth century. This chapter intends to provide 
an alternative view that complements the hitherto Dutch-centered narrative of the 
early modern seaborne commerce between northern Vietnam and Japan. Chapter 
Three is a survey of Wei Zhiyan’s activities. Plowing through Dutch, English, 
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Chinese and Japanese sources, it presents fragments of his life in a chronological 
sequence.  
 
Part Two is the analytical accompaniment to Part One. Existing materials on 
Tonkin are scarce. Owing to the unparalleled wealth of Japanese and Chinese 
materials, Chapters Four and Five are set in Nagasaki. Chapter Four examines the 
Wei brothers’ involvement in the Sōfukuji monastic community and illustrates the 
roles of Buddhist monks and monasteries in commerce. Chapter Five is an extended 
case in point of how informal and private connections with the local elites helped the 
Wei brothers gain the upper hand in trade at Nagasaki. Chapter Six provides a 
quantitative analysis that will show how the factors that were in operation at the time 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE TRADING ENVIRONMENT IN TONKIN 
 
From the first decades of the seventeenth century, Chinese merchants and later 
Portuguese traders appear in the records as exporting Tongkingese raw silk and silk 
goods to Japan. By the late 1630s, the Portuguese had been expelled from Japan and 
the Dutch East India Company (the VOC) saw an opportunity to enter the Japanese 
silk trade by establishing a factory in Tonkin in 1638. Foreign traders flocked to 
Hanoi from across the oceans to the extent that Tonkin had never experienced before. 
Japan was the biggest and the most profitable market for the products of 
Tonkin.Tonkinese silk products were exported to other destinations, and other items 
such as musk and lacquer wares were marketable elsewhere. Both the VOC and EIC 
marketed Tonkinese silken fabrics in Europe. On the other hand, the Trinh lords were 
hungry consumers of luxury exotic clothes, guns, brimstone and saltpeter.35 The last 
three items were imported to equip their naval and land forces in their warfare against 
the Nguyen. This chapter introduces the political, environmental and economic 
conditions in northern Vietnam during the seventeenth century and how it impacted 
the business dealings of the two main players in the silk trade: the Wei brothers and 
the VOC. Firstly, it will briefly discuss the political background of 
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seventeenth-century Tonkin, then the river systems at the Red River Delta and 
navigation routes to Tonkin will be laid out. Lastly, natural and human factors that 
affected economic activities in Tonkin will be discussed.        
 
The Political Background 
In seventeenth-century Tonkin, foreign trade was controlled by the Trinh rulers 
who used the emperors of the Le (V. Lê 黎) dynasty (1428-1788) as figureheads. 
Actual power rested in the hands of Trịnh lords. Europeans visiting Tonkin regarded 
the Trinh lords as “kings” of Tonkin. The areas under the Trinh were called “Tonkin” 
after its capital Dong Kinh (V. Đông Kinh 東京) meaning “eastern capital”, which is 
now called Hanoi.36 On the other hand, the Nguyen (V. Nguyễn 阮) lords secured 
their control over the central and southern parts of present-day Vietnam, also known 
as Cochinchina, with Hue (V. Huế 順化) as its capital. Although both lords, or Chua 
(V. Chúa 主), ruled in the name of the Le emperor, the figurative emperor held little 
power. The reality was that Tonkin under the Trinh and Cochinchina under the 
Nguyen existed as two independent political entities. Between 1627 and 1672, the 
Trinh and the Nguyen were at war with each other. After the first Trinh attack, the 
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Nguyen built a massive fortified wall in the north of Hue and defended these lines 
every time the Trinh army took the offensive. Eventually, peace was declared in 1673. 
However, the division between the north and the south lasted till 1775 when finally 
the Trinh army broke through the Nguyen walls.37  
 
Trinh lords faced another potentially disastrous threat on the northern border. In 
1592, the Mac (V. Mạc莫) clan was driven out of Hanoi into the northern mountains 
bordering China.38 Under the diplomatic protection of the Ming dynasty, the Mac 
clan kept the northern most province of Cao Bang (V. Cao Bằng 高平) and continued 
to watch for an opportunity to take the capital.39 They remained there until 1667 
when Trinh army defeated the Mac and remnants of the Mac army took refuge in 
China. Ten years later, the Mac’s last attempt to invade northern Vietnam was 
defeated by the Trinh Tac. 
 
The Nguyen lords coordinated foreign trade fairly effectively through Hoi An 
(V. Hội An 会安). The Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese ships gathered at this new 
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outer port from the late sixteenth century. In 1601, Dutch merchants arrived at Hoi An 
in 1601. Facing stiff competition from Japanese and Portuguese merchants, coupled 
with a series of unfortunate accidents, the VOC’s trade at Hoi An never made a profit. 
In 1638, one year after the VOC officially opened up trade relations with Tonkin, 
Dutch merchants withdrew from Hoi An. The decision to abandon trade at Hoi An 
was politically as well as commercially motivated. From 1627 onwards, Trinh Tonkin 
and Nguyen Cochinchina were in a constant state of war against one another. It was 
feared being involved in both courts could potentially put the VOC in a precarious 
position in the future.40 The Trinh rulers welcomed the Dutch largely because they 
wanted access to European weapons in order to counter the superior artillery power of 
the Nguyen supplied by the Portuguese.41 In hoping for a possible military alliance 
with a European power, the Chua welcomed the arrival of the VOC in 1637.42 
Despite their precautions, between 1642 and 1643, the reluctant Dutch was drawn into 
the Trinh-Nguyen wars.43 On the other hand, there is little information on Chinese 
merchants’ activities in Tonkin in the first half of the seventeenth century.  
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The Red River Delta and the Rise of Pho Hien 
The Red River (V. Sông Hồng 紅河) basin is an intricate complicate river 
system that was hazardous for large oceangoing ships to reach the capital and central 
market town which was Hanoi. There were two major channels that led to Hanoi. The 
contemporary Europeans called the first channel Tonkin River or “Araquaron River” 
and the second “Rockbo River”.  
 
The Dutch preferred the Tonkin River. As far back as 1636, the VOC was 
exploring the possibility of making Tonkin their main silk supplier and they mapped 
out a strategy for exporting Tonkinese silk into Japan. Nicolaes Couckebacker, who 
was at that time the chief of the Hirado Factory, wrote a report on business conditions 
in Tonkin. He examined the itineraries of Japanese ships sailing from Japan to Hanoi 
and asked Japanese merchants why they did not use the Thai Binh estuary. The 
merchants mentioned several reasons. First, one of the Japanese junks was wrecked a 
few years earlier when it hit a hard sandbank at the entrance to the Thai Binh estuary. 
Second, it was difficult for ships to navigate out of this river (the Thai Binh River) to 
the sea due to the coastline of this area which stretched from the northeast to the 
southwest. Third, the sale of Chua’s silk took place in July, or late June at the earliest. 
                                                                                                                                            




Traders from Japan faced great difficulties in their return voyage because this estuary 
was situated further north than the other rivers. It took at least twenty to twenty-five 
days, or sometimes even thirty days, from the estuary to circumnavigate Hainan (海南
) Island and come out into the South China Sea. According to Couckebacker’s 
judgement, Dutch ships would not face this difficulty because they were fitted with 
better sails than Japanese junks.44  
 
What the European seamen called the “River of Tonkin”, “Arquaron River” and 
sometimes the River of “Domea” were in fact tributaries of the Thai Binh River and 
the Red River. Dutch and English ships moved up the Thai Binh river or one of its 
branches called Van Uc river (V. Sông Văn Úc 多魚河) by entering either Thai Binh 
estuary (V. Cửa Thái Bình 太平海口) or Van Uc estuary (V. Cửa Văn Úc 多魚海口
). “Domea” was the name of the village on the sandbar where Dutch crew stayed. 
Dutch ships, which were unsuitable for sailing up shallow winding rivers, were 
moored before this town.45 From there, VOC merchants hired local barges and pilots 
to send their goods to Hanoi. The boats then turned westwards into the Luoc River (V. 
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Sông Luộc 海潮江, also known as Canal des Bambous), which eventually debouched 
into the Red River to the southeast of Pho Hien.46  
 
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that Chinese junks preferred the 
Dai An estuary (V. Ðại An大安海口), which flowed into the gulf south-westward of 
the Thai Binh estuary. In 1688, a well-known English buccaneer named William 
Dampier (1651-1715) was onboard a ship sailing towards Hanoi. He observed the 
following.  
 
One of these Rivers or Mouths is called Rokbo [sic]. It discharges it self 
[itself] into the sea near the N.W. [northwest] corner of the Bay… its 
Bottom is soft Oaz [ooze], and there for very convenient for small vessels, 
and it is the way that all the Chinese and Siamars [Siamese] do use… The 
other River or Mouth, was that by which we entered; and ‘tis larger and 
deeper than the former. I know not its particular Name; but for distinction I 
shall call it the River of Domea.47     
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Upon arrival at Pho Hien, he added that:  
 
No Europeans come up so far as this with their ships (that I could learn) yet 
the Siamites [Siamese] and Chinese bring their ships up the river Rokbo 
[Rockbo], quite to Hean [Pho Hien], and like at Anchor before it: and we 
found there several Chinese junks. They ride afloat in the middle of the 
river.48 
 
Dampier’s accounts indicate that Chinese and Siamese junks were still able to 
go up to Pho Hien via the Day River in the late 1680s. Siamese junks were 
structurally no different from Chinese junks and were operated by Chinese seamen 
and traders.49 It seems both Japanese junks in the early 1630s and Chinese junks in 
the late 1680s chose the Day estuary to reach Hanoi. Chinese junks went upstream on 
the Day River (V. Sông Đáy) to Pho Hien, passing such towns as Ninh Binh (V. Ninh 
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Bình 寧平) and Phu Ly (V. Phủ Lý 富里) on the way. From Pho Ly, junks turned 
into Phu Ly River that met the Red River at the south side of Pho Hien. Dutch and 
English traders often referred to this channel as the “Rockbo River”. It was also 
known as the “the Luc-va” among French missionaries who travelled in Chinese 
vessels.50 According to a Vietnamese scholar, the name “Rockbo” came from the 
mispronounciation of the Vietnamese name for the river, “Doc Bo” River.51 
 
 
Figure 1.1 River Systems in the Red River Delta52 
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Which estuary did Wei Zhiyan choose to navigate during his active career 
spanning from the 1650s to the early 1680s? The following incident that occurred 
between the junks belonging to Wei Zhiyan and the VOC ships illustrates that his 
junks preferred the Day estuary. The Dagh-register Batavia mentioned the event as 
follows: In 1663, the Governor General dispatched two ships, the Hoogelanden and 
Bunschoten, from Batavia to Tonkin to blockade Zhiyan’s junks en route to 
Nagasaki.53 Since the Hoogelanden was stuck and damaged on the bar of the Tonkin 
River, the Bunschoten was deployed to keep the two junks “inside the Rockbo 
River”.54 Based on this brief account, we can deduce what might have taken place 
between the two Chinese junks and the two Dutch ships. The two Dutch ships from 
Batavia first probably sailed up to the Thai Binh River mouth. There, they stayed 
around Domea, where the Dutch ships used to berth. When the news reached Domea 
that two Chinese junks bound for Japan had left Pho Hien and were sailing down the 
Day River, the Hoogelanden was dispatched to the south with the mission to close off 
the mouth of the Day River. But it hit the notorious sandbar of Tonkin and could no 
longer carry out the task. As a substitute, the Bunschoten headed to the Day estuary 
and patrolled the Day River mouth to prevent the Chinese junks from sailing out to 
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sea. This is the most probable scenario for how the Dutch could keep Chinese junks 
“inside” the Day River.  
 
There were other occasions where Chinese junks clearly used the Day estuary 
in the mid-seventeenth century. In June 1666, when a French Father François Deydier 
(1537-1698) traveled from Ayutthaya to Tonkin, he took passage in a vessel of a 
Chinese who was accustomed to traveling to Tonkin. The vessel left Bangkok and 
arrived at “the embouchure of the river of Tonkin”. According to Alain Forest, “the 
embouchure of the river of Tonkin” probably meant “the Luc-va”.55 Later, in 1674, it 
was reported that a junk of Lin Yuteng bound for Nagasaki was forced to sail “back to 
the Rockbo River”, suggesting that the vessel actually used the “Rockbo River”.56 In 
1676, English merchants heard that two junks from Japan arrived at the bar of the 
Rockbo River and came upstream to Pho Hien.57 In addition, a map drawn by the 
English in the 1670s showed the “place where the junks lie” near the place where 
“Rockbo River” branched out from the Red River. (Map 0.1) This evidence, together 
with William Dampier’s testimony, strongly suggests that Chinese junks, which were 
smaller than the Dutch ships, preferred the Day estuary to the Thai Binh estuary 
throughout the mid-seventeenth century.    
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Source: The original map is owned by the British Library, London. This map is 
adopted from Hoang, Silk for Silver, xxxiii. Indications were made by the author.  
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A review of the different routes taken by the VOC and the Wei brothers is 
important to explain the development of certain trading towns in Tonkin, in particular 
Pho Hien in the mid-seventeenth century, which previous studies have not adequately 
dealt with. The descriptions of the two different routes up to Tonkin show that each 
crosses the other strategically at Pho Hien. This will explains why Pho Hien emerged 
as the entrepot and gateway to Hanoi in the early seventeenth century.58 It was 
strategically and conveniently situated at the spot where all foreign merchants going 
up to Hanoi for business came together. Up to Pho Hien, they could come through 
different rivers. While Chinese merchants preferred to sail up the Day River, the 
Dutch and English traders chose the Thai Binh–Luoc channel. Possibly, there were 
other river mouths that small vessels could use as their entry points. From Pho Hien to 
Hanoi, it was one strait way up the Red River. Pho Hien occupied a perfect location as 
a checkpoint and customs post to control the movement of people as well as goods 
going up to Hanoi. Pho Hien became important because the Pho Hien-Hanoi route and 
villages, places, people in between affected the production of silk subsequently the 
trade of silk from Tonkin to Nagasaki. This impacted the business dealings made by 
the two key players in the trade: the Wei brothers and the VOC. The main events that 
effected the area between Pho Hien and Hanoi will be discussed.  
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Map 0.2 Gulf of Tonkin 
 
The Day Estuary  
The Day estuary served as the main embouchure for foreign vessels in the early 
seventeenth century. Most ocean going ships did not go through the present-day 
Qiongzhou Strait (瓊州海峡) between Leizhou Peninsula (雷州半島) in Guangdong 
and Hainan Island, which connects the Gulf of Tonkin in the west to the South China 
Sea in the east. Instead, as mentioned earlier, they usually circumnavigate Hainan (海
南) Island. Later on, however, it became almost inaccessible to big vessels due to 
increased deposit of silt that raised the level of the river bed.59 By the time the 
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English arrived in Tonkin in the early 1670s, Dutch ships were no longer able to enter 
the Day estuary.  
 
Two factors could be pointed out as reasons for why Chinese oceangoing junks, 
and European ships for that matter, avoided uding the Qiongzhou Strait. Firstly, the 
Strait was narrow, dangerous and not easy to navigate. This can be seen from the 
instance of William Adams’ voyage round Hainan Island on his way from Nagasaki 
to Tonkin in 1619. On his return journey, he chose to sail through the “Straits of 
Hainan”. His junk struck a rock though it was “miraculously” spared from any 
damage.60 Secondly, frequent occurreneces of piracy posed a serious security 
problem for commercial ships passing through the warters bordering between the 
northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin and Guangdong province for centuries. Several 
incidents suggest that Chinese pirates were operating along the Sino-Vietnamese coast 
in the second half of the seventeenth century. From around 1650, a Chinese “robber” 
from “Lubon” called Thun raided commercial vessels sailing between Macao and 
Tonkin. In June 1660, the Chua sent one of his sons with about forty well-armed 
galleys to capture Thun. In the end, however he managed to escape.61 Then, in the 
1680s, a small group of impoverished farmers and fishermen gathered in a place 
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called Longmen (龍門) near the Qing-Tonkin border and attacked trading ships 
making voyages between Macao and Tonkin (Map 0.2). Soon, more than a thousand 
people joined them with 100 small crafts. The Guangdong government could not 
supress the attacks and reported them to Beijing instead. In 1690, the Qing court 
dispatched an army to Longmen and, at the same time, requested the Trinh to organize 
a joint operation against the pirates. The Trinh responded to the request by 
dispatching a general with approximately 5,000 men and eighty ships.62 Based on 
these two separate acounts of attacks, it can be concluded that the area was not safe 
for commercial vessels. Rich cargoes of oceangoing junks could easily fall prey to 
piracy.63 
 
Environment and Trade 
In seventeenth-century Tonkin, production of raw silk was vulnerable to 
damages of drought, famine, epidemic and wars. In addition, the Chua and his 
mandarins’ handling of business did not provide much incentive for foreign 
merchants. In fact, one of the most important key factors behind the Wei brothers’ 
successful business operation was their decision to settle in Nagasaki that enabled 
them to accumulate wealth and capital in a secure and stable environment. For the 
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better understanding of the Wei brothers’ commercial activities, it is important for us 
to look at these issues in detail.  
 
The Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade was dependent on the harvest of raw silk. 
Tonkin produced both white and yellow silk. Trade and production essentially 
followed the changing weather conditions. Between December and February, junks 
bound for Tonkin left Nagasaki to catch the north-eastern monsoon. They sailed 
southwards along the lengthy coastline of China, passed the south of Hainan Island 
and sailed northward along the coast of northern Vietnam. They usually arrived in 
Tonkin by the end of March. Silk was produced twice a year. In villages, farmers 
reared silkworms at home. April and May were the peak of production of summer 
silk. Sales of the Chua’s silk, which foreign merchants could not avoid, started around 
late June and sometimes in July. Hence, Chinese traders normally spent from three to 
four months in Tonkin. By the end of July, junks had to leave Tonkin to catch the last 
stage of the southwestern monsoon. If they departed later than that, there was a high 
possibility that the winds would reverse on their way and, as a result, they would have 
to turn back to Tonkin. They arrived in Nagasaki in late August and early September. 
The voyage usually took about a month or little longer.  
 
Little is known about distribution system in Tonkin. Farmers cultivated 
silkworms again during the months of October and November. The production 
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volume of this silk was less than half of the silk harvested during the summer. After a 
portion of the silk was submitted to the Chua as a tax, the remainder was at farmers’ 
disposal. Japanese and Chinese residents of Tonkin might play the role of 
intermediaries, engaging in the purchase of raw silk from the silk-producing villages 
and transporting it to Hanoi. Since foreign ships were absent from Tonkin during the 
winter, there were no buyers for winter silk for export.64 Competition would have 
been less intense and, hence, prices could have been cheaper during the winter 
seasons. Japanese residents of Tonkin purchased winter silk and sold it to the highest 
bidders who were usually Chinese.65 From the 1650s, some Chinese merchants began 
to take the advantage of cheaper silk by spending winter in Tonkin and purchasing 
silk for export in the following summer when the new batch of junks would arrive.66 
Yet, Tonkin was not at all a stable supplier of silk. This pattern of silk production was 
often disturbed by various factors culminating in multipledisasters.  
 
Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters were main factors affecting the production of silk. The silk 
supply fluctuated from year to year according to the weather conditions. Farmers in 
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Tonkin were confronted with both dry and wet weather. Land was regularly ravaged 
by drought, floods and sometimes a combination of both which made conditions for 
producing silk even more difficult.   
 
The production of silk was dependent on two basic factors: a good crop of 
mulberry leaves to feed silkworms and the availability of labor to cultivate silk. In the 
Red River Delta, mulberry fields were often located on sand banks outside dykes 
along rivers.67 Because of their location, the fields were vulnerable to water damage 
caused by heavy rain, water overflowing the dykes and subsequent flooding in the 
fields.68 When mulberry trees were destroyed by floods, silk worms perished for lack 
of food. In 1653 and 1654, Tonkin produced very little silk because a flowing current 
of water swept away the mulberry trees and, since there were no mulberry leaves to 
feed the silkworms, they starved to death.69 In July 1673, the Governor of Pho Hien 
was coping with severe flooding in the region. To deal with this situation, he decided 
to cut the river to save the town, causing drowning in two provinces downstream in 
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the process.70 Although dykes were restored immediately after the water had 
subsided, this drastic measure affected the mulberry fields.71 Between 1660 and 1673 
the government issued seven orders to repair dykes which probably meant that they 
were destroyed at least seven times.72 Wet conditions were particularly 
disadvantageous for business. In Pho Hien, Lin Yuteng owned a warehouse, which 
“very seldom went [sic.] dry for it is built on a [man-]made bank in the midst of [a] 
ditch”.73 The conditions of such place were “so bad and hazardous of fire, water and 
rats”.74 
 
During winters, on the other hand, the monsoon winds blew from the northeast 
along the China coast and across the gulf of Tonkin, causing water shortage and 
consequently drought. When the area was hit by drought and large-scale famine, 
disease rapidly spread among the population. Under such circumstances, there was no 
one to take care of silk worms or to reel silk off cocoons and, hence, silk products did 
not come onto the market. For example, the first few years of the 1680s imposed 
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extreme hardship on the people of northern Vietnam. In 1681, Tonkin was hard-hit by 
a massive drought. Rice crops failed and hundreds of people died from starvation and 
wide-spread disease.75 In order to alleviate the food shortage, the Chua granted a 
Chop without any gifts or charges whatsoever to ships that would bring only rice.76 
This measure, however, was not enough to ease the seriousness of the problem. In 
March 1682, severe famine in nearly all the villages of the provinces of Kinh Bac (V. 
Kinh-Bắc 京北) and Son Tay (V. Son Tây 山西) had left more than two thirds of the 
weavers dead as well as poor people that used to spin the silk from the silkworms.77 
Samuel Baron, who at that time was an employee of the EIC, wrote that this famine 
“swept away two-thirds of the inhabitants” in the early 1680s.78 Chinese merchants 
arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin also reported that “a third of the population” 
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perished from mass famine in this year.79 According to an account by French priests, 
“the poor people piled up in troops and were going to plunder everywhere where they 
knew they would find something to eat”.80 Silk production came to almost a complete 
halt during the famine. In 1681 and 1682, no new silk products came onto the market. 
The damage of the drought was so devastating that it took more than a few years for 
the regions to recover. Until 1684, silk was rare in Tonkin.81 The country straggled 
through the lingering effects of the successive natural disasters for the rest of the 
decade. It was only in 1689 that “price of rice dropped [in the country] and the people 
of Tonkin found little ease in their lives”.82 Some of the natural disasters were in part 
caused or compounded by administrative failures on the part of the government for 
their negligence of irrigation works and slow relief.83  
 
Table 1.1 Natural Disasters in Tonkin, 1633-1696 
Year Type of Disaster Source 
1633 dry weather, insects on silk 
worms, low harvest 
DN, September 13, 1633 
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 Nguyen The Anh, “State and Civil Society under the Trinh Lords in 
Seventeenth Century Vietnam”, in La société civile face à l’ état dans les traditions 
Chinoise, Japonaise, Coréenne et Vietnamienne, ed. Leon Vandermeersch (Paris: 
École fançaise d’Extrême-Orient, 1994): 376. 
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1634 Famine DVSKTT, 3: 946 
1641 heavy rain, floods DB, 1641-1642: 65  
1649 heavy rain, floods GM 2: 389 
1653 floods  Kurihara, 17  
1654 floods  DN 21 August 1654, NFJ 67 
1657 big storm, floods DVSKTT, 3: 960 
1660 epidemic, low harvest  DB, 1661: 49-51 
1663 floods  DVSKTT, 3: 974; DB, 1663: 689-92 
1664 Drought DB, 1664: 549 
1668 Drought Taylor, 18 
1669 Drought DVSKTT, 3: 988 
1670 drought, epidemic DVSKTT, 3: 990  
1673 Floods IOR/G/12/17 pt 2: 73v 
1675 Drought DVSKTT, 3: 1003 
1679 Floods DVSKTT, 3: 1003 
1681 drought, famine DVSKTT, 3: 1010; KH, 1: 342-3, 417 
1682 famine, epidemic KH, 1: 343, 417, 420 
1683 famine, floods KH, 1: 418  
1684 Floods DVSKTT, 3: 1014; KH, 1: 418 
1685 drought, floods KH, 1: 607  
1687 drought  DVSKTT, 3: 1016 
1693 drought  KH 2: 1566 
1696 famine, epidemic  Forest, Vol. 2, 58 
Notes: Forest, Les Missionnaires Français au Tonkin, Vol. 2.   
 
 
Man-made Disasters  
In addition to natural conditions, man-made disasters impacted badly on the silk 
industry. During dry conditions, Hanoi frequently suffered from fires. While fire may 
be considered a natural disaster, in Hanoi, a fire was made worse by the way the city 
was built and by its administrative difficulties. In 1626, Giuliano Baldinoti 
(1591-1631), the first Catholic priest to visit Hanoi, noted that fires had already 
destroyed the city several times over. Once a fire broke out, it quickly spread because 
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the place was densely populated and ordinary houses were constructed from bamboo 
and covered with thatch which easily caught fire.84 William Dampier called such 
simple structures “cajan” houses.85 Although there was a “reservoir of water” in the 
city which was useful to quench fires, several thousands of houses were burned to the 
ground each time. The reconstruction of the residences was quick owing to the simple 
structures of the houses.86 Fire was a serious threat to business because commodities 
had to be kept intact in warehouses for a certain period of time. In the early 1670s, the 
English discovered that except for the Chua’s residence, the Dutch factory and a few 
Chinese houses, all houses were made of bamboo and no place was secure from the 
danger of fire.87 Once a fire broke out, all people could do was to spread wet mats on 
their valuable properties and hope the winds would blow the other direction so that 
their houses would escape the flames.88 
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Violence, robbery and theft were other problems that undermined security 
prospects for trade. In 1619, when an English navigator William Adams (1564-1620) 
led a Japanese ship to Tongking, thieves targeted his cargoes more than once.89 
During the 1630s, Japanese traders told the Dutch that, when their boats cruised 
upriver to Hanoi, they armed themselves with guns against robbers and other 
malicious people who were everywhere along the rivers, and that their merchandise 
had to be protected against theft and fire while stored in the warehouses.90 In 1645, 
Wada Risaemon witnessed a group of ninety-two brigands attack a Chinese junk 
sailing up to Hanoi and kill its crew members.91 Even under normal situations, their 
commodities could easily be targets of theft. In 1619, when the English navigator 
William Adams (1564-1620) visited Tonkin on a Japanese junk, thieves targeted his 
cargoes more than once.92 During the 1630s, Japanese traders who had business with 
Tonkin related that their merchandise had to be constantly protected against theft and 
fire while they were stored in the warehouses.93 Upon their arrival in Tonkin in 1673, 
the English merchants were warned: “the people frequently set [houses] on fire to 
                                                 
89
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90
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steal under pretense to come to help quench it”.94 Once a fire broke out, all people 
could do was to spread wet mats on their valuable properties and hope the winds 
would blow the other direction so that their houses would escape the flames.95  
 
Setting aside fires and thefts, the ongoing conflict between the Trinh and the 
Nguyen might very badly impact on the economy of Tonkin. Between 1627 and 1672, 
the Trinh of Tonkin led seven expeditions against the Nguyen to the south. The 
offensives were staged in 1627, 1633, 1643, 1648, 1655-60, 1661 and 1672.96 The 
absence of the Chua from Hanoi during these expeditions easily triggered social 
unrest around the capital which seriously affected commercial transactions. In 1643, 
Antonio van Brockhorst and Jan van Elseracq, two Dutch merchants, reported that 
while Trinh Trang (V. Trịnh Tráng 鄭梉)(r. 1623-1657) led his army to the south, 
rumor spread around the capital in their absence that the Mac was preparing for an 
attack on Hanoi. Most of all principal merchants escaped from the capital and farmers 
and merchants both complained about the inconvenience of thieves and rogues which 
disrupted trade. People could not travel the roads to Hanoi without being robbed by 
bandits. Due to the difficulties of transportation, merchandise stopped coming into 
                                                 
94
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95
 Letter from William Keeling in Hien to William Gyfford in Hanoi, 18 
November 1673, IOR/G/12/17 pt. 2: 93v. 
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Hanoi from other parts of the country. As a result, commercial transactions in the 
capital came to a halt and Dutch traders could not carry out business for five-six 
consecutive days.97 During the 1655-1660 campaign against the Nguyen, a large part 
of the inhabitants of Hanoi fled to the countryside to avoid conscription. This 
hindered trade for most business transactions conducted at the capital.98   
 
Besides the chronic state of war between the Trinh and the Nguyen until 1672 
and the Mac until 1677, internal divisions in the Chua’s court brought chaos to 
Tonkin. In 1645, while Trinh Trang fell seriously ill, his second son Trinh Tac was 
chosen to succeed his father’s lordship. This brought about a revolt by Tac’s eldest 
son Lich (V. Trịnh Lịch 鄭濼), who was joined by his younger brother Sam (V. Trịnh 
Sầm 鄭梣) and his uncle. In the midst of the revolt which took place in the city itself 
and killed 4,000 people, merchants fled to the villages and commercial activities in 
Hanoi came to standstill.99 In 1652, a plot by the Tư lễ giám (V. Tư lễ giám 司礼監) 
Hoang Nhan Dung (V. Hoàng Nhân Dũng 黄仁勇) against the Trinh court was 
exposed. In 1653, Hoang was decapitated.100 Trinh Trang passed away in 1657, and 
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18-9. DN, 26 May 1643, NFJ 57. 
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Tac succeeded his father. Fearing insurrection and great bloodshed, which normally 
followed such occasions, all the citizens of Hanoi fled to the nearby villages. As long 
as the citizens did not return, commercial transactions did not take place.101 With 
Trinh Tac firmly in control, the Canh-tri (V. Cảnh Trị 景治) years (1663-1672) 
enjoyed relative peace and political stability.102 However, in December 1672, there 
were rumors of an insurrection to the east. 5,000 starving peasants moved on to Pho 
Hien and looted the houses of strangers.103 In the summer of 1674, there was a 
mutiny of the Thanh-hoa (V.Thanh Hóa 清華) and Nghe-an (V. Nghệ An 乂安) 
troops broke out in the capital.104 Amid the political chaos, Wei Zhiyan reportedly 
lost more than 2,000 taels.105 In 1683, when the reign of Trinh Tac ended and Trinh 
Can (V. Trịnh Căn 鄭根) was installed as a new Chua, Tonkin experienced another 
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round of succession crisis, which claimed causality.106 In sum, the political situation 
of seventeenth-century Tonkin was highly unstable and unpredictable.      
 
Recurring wars and unpredictable political situation provided no incentive for 
foreign traders to settle down in the country. Given the security and stability of 
Nagasaki as compared to Tonkin, it is not too difficuilt to imagine why Itchien was so 
eager to settle down in Nagasaki and why Zhiyan was very keen to remain in 
Nagasaki as long as the magistrates of Nagasaki permitted him to do so. Their ability 
to accumulate commercial capital and to make a smooth hand over of business 
between the brothers was certainly facilitated by the fact that their wealth was kept in 
Nagasaki and not in Hanoi or Pho Hien. In Tonkin, the Chua could confiscate the 
assets of wealthy foreign merchants, as happened most spectacularly in regard to 
Wada Risaemon (和田理左衛門)(d. 1667). This Japanese merchant had once 
accumulated as much as 50,000 taels in assets, but when he passed away Trịnh Tac 
declared himself as heir to the fortune and seized the whole property, leaving Wada’s 
mother and son a mere 600 taels.107 Such arbitrary treatment of the assets of foreign 
residents by the Chúa could hardly encourage foreigners to engage in economic 
activities that might lead to capital accumulation in Tonkin. 
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Table 1.2 Fire, Wars, Mutinies, Social Unrests in Tonkin, 1643-1677 
 
Year Type of Disasters Source 
1627 Attack on the Nguyễn Cadière, 87-254.   
1633 Attack on the Nguyễn Cadière, 87-254.   
1643 
 
War against the Nguyễn, 
The Mac aggression 
Van der Plas, 22  
 
1645 Civil war Van der Plas, 22 
1648 Attack on the Nguyễn Cadière, 87-254.   
1652 Conspiracy DN, 7 August 1652, NFJ 65 
1655-1660 Nguyễn attack on 
Tongking 
Cadière, 87-254.   
1657 Social unrest  DN, 20 August 1657, NFJ 70 
1661 Attack on the Nguyễn Cadière, 87-254.   
1672 Looting in Phố Hiến IOR/G/12/17 pt 2: 60r  
1672 Attack on the Nguyễn Cadière, 87-254.   
1673 Fires at Pho Hien IOR/G/12/17 pt. 2: 93v 
1674 Mutiny in Hanoi IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2r: 118r-119r; KH, 1: 
109-10 
1677 Revolts in Cao Bằng KH, 1: 209-10  
1682 Mutiny KH, 1: 343, 417, 420 
1683 Mutiny KH, 1: 417-8 
1692 Potential succession 
crisis 
IOR/G/12/17 pt. 8: 347r 
Notes: Cadière, “Le Mur de Đồng Hới”, Tonkin 1644/45; Nguyen, “State and Civil 
Society under the Trịnh Lords”.   
 
 
A quick comparison between Hanoi and Nagasaki is rather striking. Over the 
course of the seventeenth century, Nagasaki transformed itself from a obscure fishing 
village into a busy international port with the legal, administrative and economic 
infrastracture that enabled the bakufu to promote and control foreign trade. In 
contrast, Tongking’s volatile political situation and chronic state of war too often 
induced a chain of social unrest, which compounded the already difficult natural 
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conditions to ensure the local export silk industry was vulnerable to any serious 
external competition.  
 
Foreign Traders 
The Wei brothers and the VOC were not the only foreign merchants active in 
the Tonkin market. Many other traders of foreign origin visited Hanoi seeking profit. 
Before we explore the Chinese junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki specifically, 
let us dwell on different groups of foreign merchant that contested for silk in 
seventeenth-century northern Vietnam. 
 
The traders that visited Tonkin may be divided into two general groups: Asian 
traders and European traders. Asian traders comprised mainly of the Japanese, the 
Zheng and those from Southeast Asia. When all these foreign merchants met each 
other in Tonkin, their common language seemed to be Portuguese.108 In addition, the 
knowledge of the Chinese language was considered to be an advantage. In 1675, 
finding it increasingly difficult to communicate with the “treacherous” Tonkinese 
jurebass, EIC merchants in Tonkin proposed to the Council at Banten to “get a good 
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honest Chinaman from Bantam [Banten] (if a Chinaman can be so) who writes China 
[Chinese] well, and is of a ready wit and apt for business”.109 
 
In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, Japanese traders visited 
Tonkin. Unlike other mainland Southeast Asian ports such as Cochinchina, Siam and 
Cambodia, however, they had never established sustainable Japanese quarters that 
existed till the end of the century. Nevertheless, after their own government 
abandoned overseas Japanese communities, Japanese residents of Tonkin kept 
themselves engaged in the Tonkin silk export to Japan. Wada Risaemon, also known 
under his Christian name Paolo de Vada, was one of the most influential people in the 
court of the Trinh who used his special connection to high-ranking government 
officials as well as to the Chua’s inner court to facilitate his own gain. Wada was 
instrumental in trade between Manila and Tonkin. In addition, his ships visited Siam 
and Makkasar.110 After his death in 1667, the Japanese presence was no longer 
significant in Tonkin.     
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 Letter from Tonkin to Henry Dacres and the Council at Banten, 24 July 
1675, IOR G/12/17, pt. 3: 168r. 
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 He was a native of Nagasaki who migrated first to Macao, relocated to 
Cochin China and finally settled in Tonkin. From the late 1630s to the 1660s, based 
primarily in Tonkin, he traded with Nagasaki, Makassar, Manila and Siam. Over the 
decades, he managed to correspond with his relatives in Nagasaki. The VOC ships 
carried their letters one way and the other. Tokyo University Historiographical 
Institute, ed., Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku (Official diaries of the office of Chinese 
interpreters), Vol. 1 ( Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 67 (henceforth cited 
as TKN). Through his wide network among the Japanese expatriate communities in 
the neighboring ports of Macao and Japan, he often provided the Portuguese with 
up-to-date information about recent political developments in Japan. For more details 
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Zheng junks from Taiwan visited Tonkin from 1653 to 1684. They too shipped 
Tonkinese silk to Nagasaki and, therefore, were the most intimidating competitors of 
the Wei brothers besides the VOC. The last ship from Taiwan appeared in Tonkin in 
1684. It happened to be in Nagasaki when the Qing took Taiwan.111 After the Qing 
lifted the decades-long maritime ban, Chinese junks from Ningbo (寧波) started 
appearing in Tonkin. Some of them returned to Ningbo from Tonkin, while others 
sailed directly up to Nagasaki. The last such junk to sail to Nagasaki was recorded in 
1724.112 
 
Besides those junks carrying away Tonkinese silk destined for Japan, junks 
from Southeast Asian ports such as Ayutthaya, Manila and Batavia occasionally 
showed up in Tonkin with diverse local products. It had been recorded that King 
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Narai (r. 1656-1688) of the Ayutthaya kingdom dispatched two junks to Tonkin with 
his Siamese ambassadors on board in 1670, 1671 and 1676.113 As was often the case 
with Siamese junks, these Siamese delegates were part of a commercial venture 
orchestrated by the King of Ayutthaya himself.114 In 1673, three small Chinese junks 
arrived from “Penan [Penang]”. They were reportedly laden with “drugs” for Tonkin, 
cotton wood and iron pans.115 In 1674, a small vessel from Manila arrived in Tonkin, 
laden with 60,000 catties of brimstone and twenty bales of “coast cloth”116. In the 
summer of 1676, one “Batavian junk” from Palembang and another from Malacca 
arrived. The latter was loaded with goods including pepper, saltpeter, brimstone, 
alum, cotton and betel nuts.117 Some Chinese junks from Batavia visited Tonkin en 
route to Japan.118  
 
European traders who visited Tonkin were made up of Portuguese, English and 
French. The Portuguese Macao-Tonkin route was inaugurated by Jesuit missionaries 
in 1626, following the Japanese Christians who had migrated to Tonkin via Macao a 
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few years earlier.119 The ship had a license to trade issued by Trinh Trang.120 From 
1626 to the 1660s, at least one Portuguese vessel, either a galliot or a smaller-sized 
naveta, visited Tonkin from Macao every year. Some were directly owned by the 
Jesuits and others were consigned primarily with Jesuit merchandise and capital. The 
Portuguese also freighted or consigned their goods on Chinese ocean-going junks 
bound for Tonkin.121 After direct traffic between Macao and Nagasaki was cut off, 
Japanese Christians in Tonkin conducted a triangular trade between Macao, Tonkin 
and Nagasaki. Since they were not allowed to go back to Japan, they dispatched their 
junks to Nagasaki under the command of Chinese chief merchants.122  
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During the 1620s, in the wake of the warfare against the Nguyen, Trinh Trang 
invited Portuguese merchants from Macao to visit Tonkin for trade.123 As early as 
1626, when Jesuit missionaries visited Tonkin, they took passage on a Portuguese 
vessel leaving Macao. In 1628 when a promised vessel from Macao did not turn up in 
Tonkin, the Chua ordered Catholic priests to leave his territory. Clearly, the Chua 
allowed Jesuits to propagate their faith in Tonkin so that ships from Macao would 
come to his domain more regularly.124 This strategy proved effective and the 
Portuguese kept visiting Tonkin. Between 1636 and 1638, the volume of Tonkinese 
raw silk imported into Japan by the Portuguese far exceeded that of Chinese silk.125 
In the aftermath of their expulsion from Japan, the Portuguese attempted to revitalize 
their trade with Japan by investing in Chinese junks leaving Macao for Tonkin.126 
Portuguese vessels came to Tonkin annually until 1673.127 By the early 1680s, they 
seemed to have abandoned their business in Tonkin. In 1681, a Chinese merchant 
found that all the Portuguese, who used to stay in a house at a place called 
“Raichauman (来潮漫)”, or Pho Hien, near the coast had left Tonkin.128 Only one 
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local servant remained in the house.129 Spanish merchants from Manila also 
occasionally arrived at Tonkin. They brought silver as well as brimstone and, in 
exchange, carried local goods such as silk and musk back to Manila.130  
 
In 1671, the EIC decided to set up a factory in Nagasaki, Taiwan and Tonkin. 
Their ultimate goal was to cut into the Japan trade, which they had prematurely 
abandoned in 1623 by selling Tonkinese raw silk in exchange for Japanese silver and 
copper. The EIC merchants arrived in northern Vietnam in 1672. Between 1672 and 
1676, the English merchants in Tonkin were unable to conduct trade for no English 
ships arrived in Tonkin and they were virtually left out of the rest of their far eastern 
network during this period. In 1674, the English factors in Tonkin learned from 
Chinese merchants arriving in Tonkin from Nagasaki that the bakufu ordered the 
Return to leave immediately without selling any goods.131 The English hopes for the 
resumption of the Japan trade were dashed and henceforth, the Tonkin factory was 
given a new purpose to supply finished silk for the European market.132 In 1675, the 
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Chua plainly told the chief of the English factory of Tonkin, William Gyfford, that the 
English “should be ranked as the third sort of strangers” after the VOC and Lin 
Yuteng, because the English “were not as good as our words” and failed to live up to 
their original promises of bringing their ships yearly to Tonkin and serving the Chua 
with cloth, guns, brimstone and saltpeter like the Dutch.133 The English merchants 
had never been able to pull themselves out of their third-ranked status for the 
remainder of the century. The English factory ceased operations in 1697.134  
 
French missionaries arrived in Tonkin rather early. Unlike their Portuguese 
counterparts who often invested their capital in Chinese junks, their concern was more 
straightforward: the propagation of the Catholic faith.135 In 1669, the French attempts 
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to open up trade with Tonkin failed miserably. A few years later, Trinh Tac told 
English traders that the French had promised to send a ship to Tonkin every year to 
serve him, but they had lied.136 By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, all 
foreign merchants, except the Chinese, had disappeared from the Tonkin scene. 
 
It is against this natural, political and economic environment that Chinese junk 
traders and other foreign interest groups conducted their commerce in northern 
Vietnam. They all had an eye on Tonkinese raw silk. The next chapter explains why 
Tonkinese raw silk became such a sought-after commodity at this particular time by 
narrating vicissitudes of the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade from the perspective of Chinese 
maritime traders. 
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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TONKIN-NAGASAKI SILK TRADE 
DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
For about half a century, from the 1640s to the end of the 1680s, Tonkin played a 
significant role in the maritime trading networks of the China Sea region by exporting 
raw silk at a time when it became increasingly difficult to obtain raw silk from China. 
In an attempt to cut into potentially lucrative silk trade, traders of diverse origins 
visited Tonkin’s political capital and primary market, Hanoi, both by sea and by land. 
Among them, the VOC and private Chinese traders fiercely competed for Tonkinese 
raw silk because Japan was by far the largest importer of raw silk in the region and 
they were the only commercial agents who were allowed to trade with Japan directly.  
 
Scholars such as P. W. Klein, Leonard Blussé, and more recently, Hoang Anh 
Tuan, provided detailed analyses on Dutch business dealings.137 They generally agree 
that the Dutch export of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan was at its zenith from 1641 to 
1654 and on the decline thereafter. It is fair to point out that due primarily to the lack 
of information on Chinese mercantile activities, the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade has 
been understood predominantly from the Dutch perspective. However, Henriette 
Buggé’s quantitative research proved that the Chinese maritime traders were not 
                                                 
137
 Klein, “De Tonkinees-Japnse zijdehandel”; Blussé, “No Boats to China”; 
Hoang, Silk for Silver. 
 64
inferior to the Dutch in exporting Togkingese silk to Japan.138 This chapter attempts 
to lay out the rise and fall of Chinese junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki during 
the seventeenth century. By placing the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade into the context of 
Chinese maritime commerce and relating that to the vicissitudes of the VOC business 
operations between these two places, it will shed new light on the hitherto untold 
aspects of commercial exchanges between northern Vietnam and Japan during the 
early modern period.   
 
Since the different factors that affected the Tonkinese raw silk export occurred 
at different places—and often contemporaneously—it is not entirely practical to trace 
the sequence of events in a strict chronological order. Hence this essay focuses on 
several important events that brought about changes in the dynamics of maritime 
commerce in the China Sea region and examines how each event contributed to 
shaping the course of the trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki through the seventeenth 
century. To begin with, we shall look at changes in Japan’s foreign policy during the 
1630s and how they resulted in elevating Tonkin’s position in the regional 
commercial networks in the following decades. The issues and conditions in China 
will be discussed later. 
 
The Beginnings 
                                                 
138
 Buggé, “Silk to Japan”, 34. 
 65
It is unknown how or when Tonkinese silk was initially brought to Japan. As 
early as 1619, William Adams reported in his log book that Tonkinese silk was “the 
commodity most desired” for export to Japan.139 Unfortunately, there is no record on 
the status of Tonkinese raw silk in the Japan market during the first two decades of 
the seventeenth century. Then, in February 1634, the VOC observed that the Chinese 
junks imported 250,000 catties of raw silk to Japan including some from Tonkin.140 
Until 1635 when the bakufu prohibited Japanese people from either leaving or 
returning to Japan, the Japanese merchants were active in trading between Tonkin and 
Japan. Each year the Japanese brought 25,000 to 30,000 taels of silver to Tonkin and, 
in exchange, purchased raw silk.141 In addition, Portuguese merchants including some 
Jesuits played a pivotal role in the raw silk trade. From their base at Macao, these 
merchants conducted lucrative silk-for-silver trade between China and Japan since the 
late sixteenth century. The Portuguese Macao-Tonkin route was inaugurated in 1626 
by Jesuit missionaries following the Japanese Christians who previously migrated to 
Tonkin via Macao.142 Regular trade transactions between the two places existed until 
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the 1660s.143 From 1636 to 1638, the Portuguese imported much more Tonkinese raw 
silk into Japan than Chinese raw silk.144 There is no doubt that Tonkinese raw silk 
comprised a substantial share of Japan’s import of raw silk in the mid-1630s. Chinese, 
Japanese as well as Portuguese traders were involved in transporting raw silk from 
northern Vietnam to Japan.   
 
Having failed to settle themselves in mainland China, the Dutch established 
Casteel Zeelandia on the island of Taiwan (台湾) in 1624. With no direct access to the 
Chinese market, the Company was dependent on Chinese boats traveling back and 
forth between Fujian and Taiwan for their supply of raw silk. Most of these Chinese 
ships were under the influence of Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍)(1604–1661), father of 
Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功)(1624–1662) or Koxinga.145 In 1636, in order to fully 
enforce anti-Christian measures and put down Jesuit infiltration, the bakufu 
considered the possibility of terminating their relationship with the Portuguese, who 
had been the largest exporter of Chinese raw silk to Japan. Concerned about the future 
import of raw silk, the bakufu repeatedly questioned the Dutch merchants if they were 
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capable of bringing in as much raw silk as the Portuguese had done. In 1637, the VOC 
responded to this by dispatching the Grol from Nagasaki to northern Vietnam with the 
aim of opening trade with Tonkin. Now that the Japanese merchants were out of 
overseas trade, the Dutch saw the perfect opportunity to take over the trade, which 
used to be in the hands of the Japanese.146 In the following year, the VOC officially 
inaugurated a factory in Tonkin and began exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan.  
 
In 1639, the Portuguese merchants were expelled indefinitely and no longer 
allowed to trade with Japan. Alongside the expulsion of the Portuguese, the bakufu 
sought to compensate for any shortages that might be incurred by the termination of 
the Portuguese pipeline between Macao and Nagasaki. In order to ensure a continued 
supply of Chinese raw silk yarn, the bakufu ordered the heads of the Sō clan of 
Tsushima and the Shimazu of Satsuma to increase their respective trade with Korea 
and Ryūkyū. In all likelihood, the bakufu approached Chinese merchants in Nagasaki 
with a similar request.147 If that was the case, such an official promotion of junk trade 
must have provided incentive for some Chinese merchants to expand their silk trade 
and encouraged others to start new businesses with Tonkin, which had a good record 
of exporting raw silk to Japan in the preceding years. By eliminating the Japanese and 
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Portuguese merchants, the introduction of the so-called sakoku policy created new 
opportunities not only for the Dutch but also for the private Chinese traders to 
increase the Japan trade in the following decades.  
 
Chinese Competition in Tonkin 
The 1640s saw the rise of Tonkin as a leading exporter of raw silk in the region. 
In 1641 when Zheng’s junks started trading directly with Japan, Tonkinese silk 
products grew its importance in the VOC’s intra-Asian trade.148 As mainland China 
was off-limits and the Zheng refused to cooperate, the VOC found a solution at 
Tonkin. In 1642 and 1643, the Dutch merchants found that they were the sole silk 
buyers at Tonkin and with few prospective buyers around, farmers in Tonkin 
considered abandoning sericulture and, instead, focused on cultivating rice.149 The 
Dagh-register Nagasaki confirms that no Chinese junks from Tonkin were registered 
in the 1642 trading season and a mere 580 catties of raw silk were imported from 
Tonkin to Nagasaki in 1643.150 Chinese trading activities were on hiatus during these 
years.  
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In the second half of the 1640s, Chinese maritime traders invigorated their 
commercial activities and, as a result, created intense competition for raw silk on the 
Tonkin market. In 1647, the Dutch merchants at Nagasaki mentioned that a prominent 
Chinese resident of Japan sent his junks to Tonkin with a large capital.151 In that year, 
two Chinese junks from Japan appeared at Tonkin with a sum of 80,000 taels in silver. 
Chinese merchants offered what the Dutch considered excessively high prices and 
succeeded in purchasing 40,000 catties of raw silk as well as other commodities. Only 
after their departure were the Dutch able to purchase raw silk.152 In 1648, the Chinese 
merchants arrived at Tonkin with 120,000 taels of silver. Again, by bidding the 
highest price, they bought most of the silk available on the market. The Dutch had to 
wait to enter the market until these Chinese merchants departed for Japan.153 In 1649, 
three Chinese junks bound for Tonkin sailed from Nagasaki.154 By that time, the 
Dutch factors recognized Chinese mercantile activities as foremost threat to the 
company’s operation at Tonkin.155 In 1650, a Chinese trader arrived at Nagasaki from 
Tonkin with capital worth 80,000 taels. Learning that this particular Chinese trader 
would not return to Tonkin that year, Antonio van Brockhorst, the chief of the Dutch 
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factory at Nagasaki, felt hopeful about the Company’s business prospects in the next 
trading season at Tonkin because “the Company would not be hindered as much by 
the Chinese.”156 It is clear that during the second half of the 1640s Chinese merchants 
with substantial financial capabilities began exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki 
and Chinese business transactions cast a shadow over the future of the VOC business 
at Tonkin.  
 
Different groups of Chinese merchants were involved in exporting Tonkinese 
raw silk and their arrival intensified competition for raw silk in the Tonkin market 
during the early 1650s. Ships belonging to the Zheng family competed with other 
Chinese merchants such as He Bin (or Pincqua) from Taiwan and the Wei brothers.157 
Bidding against each other, their vigorous commercial activities led to an increase in 
the purchase price of raw silk and hence obstructed the Dutch business activities in 
Tonkin. In 1650, the arrival of six Chinese junks completely thwarted Dutch business. 
Chinese merchants offered high purchase prices that the Dutch could not afford.158 
The six junks carried away more than 82,000 catties of raw silk from Tonkin. It was 
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only after their departure that the VOC managed to fetch 57,825 catties of raw silk.159 
In 1653, the arrival of five Chinese junks again spurred competition in Tonkin. While 
the Dutch factory had approximately 250,000 taels available for that trading season 
these five Chinese junks together brought a sum of 400,000 taels of silver.160 In 1654, 
the Governor General of Joan Maetsuycker (1606–1678) could not help but admitting 
that “if Chinese traders would continue to offer high purchase price for raw silk, the 
VOC would no longer be able to obtain much silk in Tonkin in the coming years.”161  
In the face of the intense competition in the Tonkin market, the VOC was forced to 
shift its primary silk supplier once again from Tonkin to Bengal in the mid-1650s.162  
 
The Qing Maritime Ban and the Zheng’s Landing on Taiwan 
In their struggle to establish control over littoral China, the Qing court issued a 
series of restrictive maritime policies, which culminated in the promulgation of a 
maritime ban in 1655. All Chinese maritime activities were now considered illegal. 
Though the ban was supposed to prevent the coastal population from supplying aid 
and provisions to the Zheng family, it was not immediately effective. From 1661 
onwards, the Qing introduced more drastic measures to eliminate any possibility of 
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collaboration between the Zheng navy and the local population. The residents of such 
coastal provinces as Guangdong (広東), Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu (江蘇), and 
Shandong (山東) were forcibly relocated inland to a distance of fifteen to twenty-five 
kilometers.163 In April 1661, gradually being cornered, Zheng Chenggong launched 
an attack on the Dutch on Taiwan. After a nine-month siege, the Dutch fortress fell, 
thus bringing an end to the Dutch rule over the island.  
 
The Qing Maritime Ban and the Zheng’s landing on Taiwan exerted a 
substantial influence on Chinese commercial shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki. 
Firstly, with the loss of Taiwan, the VOC sought to revive its position in the China 
Sea region. As part of restructuring their business in Asia, the Dutch merchants at 
Tonkin explored the possibility of overland trade between Tonkin and China by 
dispatching an expedition to the border area.164 In the meantime they adopted more 
aggressive policies towards Chinese junks sailing in high seas. In 1662, in order to 
secure the purchase of Tonkinese raw silk, the Governor General and the Council of 
the Indies in Batavia ordered the fleet leaving for China to attack the rich junks 
trading between China and Japan. In the summer of 1663, the Governor-General sent 
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a vessel from Batavia to Tonkin for the purpose of intercepting the fully laden 
Chinese junks leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki.165 Due to this procedure, two junks 
under Wei Zhiyan, who had been the most successful in exporting Tonkinese raw silk 
to Nagasaki since the mid-1650s, were blockaded by the Dutch ships and unable to 
leave Tonkin for two years. In addition, the Governor-General instructed Dutch 
merchants in Tonkin to attack the Chinese junks trading between Tonkin and 
Cambodia and Siamese junks sailing between Tonkin and Nagasaki.166 The strategy 
failed however because the magistrates of Nagasaki and other Japanese officials, who 
had a personal stake in these Chinese junks, explicitly expressed their strong 
discontent at the Dutch handling of these Chinese junks. In addition, the Trịnh 
government of Tonkin virtually protected the Chinese junks against the Dutch 
aggression.167 When it became obvious that both Japanese and Tonkinese authorities 
did not want the Dutch to intrude the Chinese commercial activities, the VOC 
conceded and gave their Chinese competitors free rein.168   
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Secondly, the Zheng’s withdrawal from the mainland intensified competition 
among Chinese maritime traders. Though Taiwan produced deerskins and sugar, 
which were in high demand in Japan, the island did not produce silk. Fujian’s export 
industry depended on the supply of raw silk from Jiangsu and Zhejiang.169 As these 
areas came firmly under the influence of the Qing, silk became scarce and expensive 
in Fujian. Chinese merchants were no longer able to find sufficient amounts of export 
items at Fuzhou, Amoy (厦門), Quanzhou (泉州), and Zhangzhou (漳州).170 Zheng 
Jing (鄭経)(1642–1681), who succeeded his father Zheng Chenggong after the latter’s 
untimely death, strove to find a way to obtain silk and other merchandise outside 
China. He approached the Spanish at Manila and the English at Banten.171 As the 
condition along China’s southern coastal regions turned against them, Zheng’s forces 
resorted to more violent acts towards other Chinese junks trading in the China Sea. In 
1673, English merchants observed that the “Chinese in Taiwan were chiefly bent on 
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attacking the Tonkin junks bound for Japan.”172 Zheng’s fleets were clearly targeting 
the rich cargoes of Chinese junks sailing from Tonkin to Nagasaki. They succeeded at 
least once during the summer of 1676: the Zheng naval vessels ambushed and 
plundered a junk belonging to Wei Zhiyan while it was en rote to Japan.173  In the 
mid-seventeenth century, whereas Japanese and Tonkinese interventions rendered the 
Dutch attempts to hinder Chinese commercial activities invalid, unavailability of the 
supply of Chinese raw silk increased competition for the purchase of Tonkinese raw 
silk among Chinese maritime traders.  
 
The Revolt of Three Feudatories, 1673–1681 
In 1673, Wu Sangui (呉三桂)(1612–1678) of Yunnan (雲南) revolted against 
the Emperor Kangxi (康熙)(r. 1661–1722), which triggered the anti-Qing movement 
known as the Revolt of Three Feudatories. Geng Jingzhong (耿精忠) in Fuzhou and 
Shang Zhixin (尚之信)(d. 1680) in Guangdong followed Wu. Initially, Geng and 
Shang, the two warlords from the coastal provinces, not only dispatched their own 
junks to Nagasaki but also invited other Chinese traders to visit their ports. They 
encouraged foreign trade and promised to protect these traders against the Qing navy. 
Yet, their initiatives soon went to naught for both Geng Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin 
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surrendered to the Qing in 1676.174 From then on, although some private junks still 
managed to slip through the Qing lines of inshore defense and sailed to Japan, the 
Chinese maritime traders found it exceedingly difficult to gather enough merchandise 
to fit out ocean-going junks at any Chinese port.175  
 
Some traders visited Tonkin because their access to Chinese ports was denied. 
In April 1675, for instance, a Chinese merchant arriving in Tonkin reported that his 
junk first “went from Batavia last year to Canton [Guangdong] where she loaded and 
went to Japan. And this year [he] went to Canton again from Japan but could not 
negotiate his affairs there by reason of the war between the usurping Tatar and the 
Chinese. Most China at present prohibits all trade even to their own people therefore 
this China man came hither [Tonkin].”176 After Shang Zhixin was arrested and 
executed in 1680, Guangdong came under Qing control.177 In 1683, a junk from 
Guangdong submitted a report to the Nagasaki authorities explaining that three junks, 
including his, were chased away from Guangdong by the Qing patrol boats, one of 
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them took shelter at Tonkin and the other two headed to Cochinchina.178 These 
accounts highlight Tonkin’s position in the China Seas trade during the seventeenth 
century. When Chinese ports became virtually inaccessible from the sea, Tonkin 
functioned as an alternative outlet for Chinese junk traders who wished to procure 
goods for the Japanese market.  
 
In addition, overland traffic between China and northern Vietnam was another 
crucial factor affecting the position of Tonkin in the commercial networks in the 
China Seas region. The Revolt in southern China also affected the Tonkin market 
trade route via land. Chinese traders from Guangxi (広西) province regularly visited 
Tonkin through overland routes connecting northern Vietnam and China. It took 
roughly thirty days to travel between Guangxi and Hanoi through the mountains.179 
The Vietnamese officials also participated in these trade transactions across the 
border. In 1672, the English were informed that “Ung-ja Hans, one of the four great 
governors of the Kingdom [of Tonkin], who commands all that part of the country 
bordering China, is a great merchant.”180 Between 1673 and 1681, Wu Sangui and, 
after his death, his grandson Wu Shifan (呉世璠)(d. 1681) were at war with the Qing. 
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As a result the import of silk goods from Zhejiang—which, as mentioned before, was 
the major center of silk production in China—was interrupted. As a result, silk 
products became rare especially in the Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou provinces. 
Guangxi merchants traveled to Tonkin on foot and procured Tonkin silk for the 
war-stricken provinces. When the Guangxi traders arrived at Hanoi, the purchase 
price of raw silk soared accordingly.181  
 
Rise of Ningbo and Demise of Tonkin 
The demise of the Tonking-Nagasaki silk trade by Chinese junks may be 
attributed to the Qing conquest of Taiwan and the consequent lifting of the Chinese 
maritime ban in the mid-1680s. From the 1650s to the early 1680s, as the Qing 
tightened control over the coastal areas, the number of Chinese junks visiting 
Nagasaki decreased gradually but steadily (Table 2.1). In 1681, this number was at its 
lowest.182 The Qing measures to strengthen coastal security were taking full effect. In 
1683, the last remnants of the Zheng regime surrendered to the Qing. In the following 
years, the restrictions that had been imposed for about three decades on the coastal 
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and overseas shipping to curtail the Zheng family’s activities were finally removed. 
Immediately upon lifting of the ban, numerous commercial junks sailed out from 
mainland China to the outer sea, which completely changed the rhythm of commerce 
in the East and Southeast Asian waters. 
 
The number of Chinese junks that arrived at Nagasaki explicitly shows the 
sudden and enormous expansion of direct shipping between mainland China and 
Japan. Although the two sets of figures presented in Table 2.1 do not exactly match, a 
common trend can be observed: a sharp increase in the number of Chinese junks 
visiting Nagasaki after 1685. Japanese sources reveal that eighty-five Chinese junks 
from various ports of China flocked to Nagasaki in 1685 alone.183 This number 
continued to increase until 1688 when a disproportionately high total of 194 Chinese 
vessels arrived at Nagasaki.184 On average, both the Dutch ad Japanese sources agree 
that more than one hundred junks visited Nagasaki every year during the second half 
of the 1680s. Consequently, Tonkin lost its relevance to commercial junks that had to 
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Table 2.1  
Chinese Shipping to Nagasaki in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century 
(Annual Average of Five-Year Periods) 
 
 Number of Chinese Junks 
Year 
According to the Dutch 
Archives 
According to Japanese Sources 
1650–1654 54.8 N/A 
1655–1659 54 N/A 
1660–1664 42.2 N/A 
1665–1669 36.8 N/A 
1670–1674 33 31.8 
1675–1679 28.6 28.2 
1680–1684 23.4 23.0 
1685–1689 118.8 119.4 
1690–1694 81 81.4 
1695–1699 81.6 77.2 
Source: Iwao, “Kinsei Nisshi bōeki”, 12–13; Arano, ““Kinsei chūki no Nagasaki 
bōeki”, 407. 
Notes: Chinese junks include those from mainland China, Taiwan, and all other 
Southeast Asian ports. 
As for the period of 1685–1689, the number includes those junks that were forced to 
leave Nagasaki without trading. 
 
 
The immediate impact of the lifting of the ban was that Ningbo 寧波 and its 
offshore island Putuoshan普陀山 reemerged as major trading centers for the Chinese 
junks heading to Japan. In the early 1690s, Ningbo clearly supplanted Tonkin as the 
hub of raw silk export to Japan. In 1691, a Chinese merchant, whose junk just arrived 
at Nagasaki from Tonkin via Ningbo, witnessed that “due to its convenient location, 
numerous junks from many different places were unremittingly gathering at Ningbo 
and therefore, to be honest, it is impossible to know exactly how many junks were 
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coming to Nagasaki.”185 This shift was clearly reflected in the itineraries of junks 
traveling between Tonkin and Nagasaki (Table 2.2). Merchant junks from Ningbo 
began to appear at Tonkin en route to Nagasaki. Moreover, even those that used to 
trade bilaterally between Tonkin and Nagasaki called at Ningbo. For example, in 
1693, a Chinese trader, who had been in the business between Tonkin and Nagasaki 
for the previous few years, arrived at Tonkin, hoping to secure the purchase of 
Tonkinese raw silk and textiles. However, when he found the supply of raw silk to be 
rare and expensive due to a drought, he decided not to purchase any raw silk in 
Tonkin. After obtaining some textiles, his junk sailed to Putuoshan where he 
reequipped the vessel with raw silk and textiles prearranged and transferred from 
Ningbo.186 From 1694 to 1696, no Chinese junk arrived at Nagasaki from Tonkin 
(Table 2.2). In 1697, a junk from Tonkin reappeared in Nagasaki. A report submitted 
by a chief merchant of this junk is indicative of dim commercial prospects in Tonkin 
at the end of the seventeenth century. Upon his arrival at Nagasaki, he reported to the 
local authorities that, “there was no junk leaving for overseas at a harbor of Tonkin [at 
the time when his junk departed from there]. Many commercial junks used to visit this 
place in order to obtain products of Tonkin. Junks from Tonkin had visited Nagasaki 
for many years. However, in recent years, no junks came to Tonkin for trade.”187 
                                                 
185
 KH, 2: 1317-8. 
 
186
 KH, 2: 1565-6. 
 
187
 KH, 2: 1933-4. 
 82
Table 2.2 
“Tonkinese Junks” as Recorded in Kai hentai, 1680–1712 
 
Year Ship No. Navigation Route 
1680 15 N/A 
 25 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1681 N/A Tonkin - (wrecked on the way to Nagasaki) 
 N/A Tonkin - (wrecked on the way to Nagasaki)  
1682 4 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1684 2 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
 4 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1686 71 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
 72 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1689 42 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
 44 Amoy - Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1690 82 Tonkin - Nagasaki  
 87 Amoy - Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1691 18 Ningbo - Nagasaki 
 85 Wenzhou (温州)- Nagasaki 
1692 59 Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1693 58 Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki  
1697 86 Amoy - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki 
1698 70 Ningbo - Tonkin - Nagasaki  
1699 37 Ningbo - Tonkin - Nagasaki 
1702 88 N/A 
1703 N/A N/A 
1708 101 Guangdong - Tonkin - Nagasaki 
 102 Tonkin – Nagasaki 
1710 52 Ningbo - Tonkin - Ningbo - Nagasaki  
1711 55 Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Nagasaki 
1712 62 Ningbo - Tonkin - Putuoshan - Wenzhou - Nagasaki  
Source: Modified from Iioka, “Ayutaya kokuō no tainichi bōeki,” 98. 




Between 1690 and 1712, the Nagasaki authorities classified fourteen Chinese 
junks under the category of “Tonkinese junk,” even though seven of them actually 
departed from Ningbo.188 Only three junks originally departing from Tonkin sailed 
directly to Nagasaki (Table 2.2). All the three junks belonged to a Tonkin-based 
Chinese trader called Lin Yuteng who had been trading between Tonkin and Nagasaki 
since 1667.189 It is not difficult to infer that Lin Yuteng was the only Chinese 
merchant carrying out bilateral trade with Japan after 1685. Lin Yuteng’s last junk 
appeared at Tonkin in 1708, which marked the end of the regular direct shipping 
between Tonkin and Nagasaki. After returning to Tonkin, he sold his junk to another 
Chinese merchant from Ningbo and retired from overseas business.190  
 
Conclusion 
The seventeenth century witnessed Tonkin’s rise and fall as an international 
entrepôt in the China Sea region. While the supply of Chinese raw silk suffered due to 
                                                 
188
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the Ming-Qing transition and the subsequent political turmoil in China, Tonkin gained 
its importance as an exporter of raw silk and silk piece goods for the Japanese market. 
Having established their bases at both Tonkin and Nagasaki, Chinese maritime traders 
such as the Wei brothers and Lin Yuteng took advantage of the void the sakoku 
policies of the Tokugawa bakufu and the maritime ban by the Qing court. Tonkinese 
raw silk was in demand so long as the Qing maritime policies prohibited Chinese 
junks from going overseas and Tonkin enjoyed privileged access to the Japanese 
market. However, when the Qing rescinded the maritime ban and silk from the lower 
Yangzi River Delta once again started flowing out into overseas markets, Tonkinese 
raw silk lost its competitive edge and Tonkin lost its relevance to commercial junks 




CHRONOLOGY OF WEI ZHIYAN’S ACTIVITIES 
 
This chapter chronologically presents the activities of the Wei Zhiyan. Before getting 
onto any critical analysis in Part Two, it is important as well as necessary to clarify 
the factual record. This is especially the case because this thesis will eventually 
develop an entire argument based on the activities of Wei Zhiyan, about which there 
has hitherto been very little knowledge.  
 
Secondly, a chronology is useful to bring together the multifarious sources, 
each of which describes one small aspect of Wei Zhiyan’s life. To construct a 
reasonably comprehensive narrative out of patchy and often inconsistent data takes 
meticulous and thorough research in the archives and a good understanding of the 
materials. This process, albeit an essential and unavoidable procedure of historical 
research, would be a digression if placed in the middle of a critical analysis. In 
addition, the second part of this thesis is not going to examine what occurred in his 
life in chronological order. By collating all the critical information pertaining to Wei 
Zhiyan’s life, this chapter attempts to serve as a platform for the rest of this thesis.   
 
Collating the various sources serves as an important check to the otherwise 
one-sided nature of each source. This thesis relies on materials that are diverse in 
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nature and dispersed in terms of geographical location. Accordingly, conditions and 
surroundings in which these materials were recorded and preserved differ from one 
case to the next. They were written to serve distinctively different purposes. For 
example, some are written by Buddhist monks and compiled by their disciples to hand 
down the masters’ words and legacy to future generations of believers. On the other 
hand, the VOC and EIC merchants kept their journal registers for mainly commercial 
purposes and later to submit summaries to their superiors. What they took note of 
were matters relating to their business operations. Having up-to-date details about 
competitors were important duties of VOC and EIC personnel. Hence, Dutch and 
English accounts include valuable quantitative data on Chinese shipping. Then, there 
are formal reports filed by the Japanese officials at Nagasaki and submitted to the 
bakufu. While the central government was concerned about controlling trade and 
ensuring security of the country, the local officials had personal interests in trade. 
They would never file a report about, for example, illicit commercial transactions that 
they themselves were involved in.191 Another type of record is family history called 
Yuishogaki (由緒書)(Figure 3.1). It sometimes provides information that no other 
source is able to. But, the difficulty in interpreting the sources is that they tend to 
glorify accomplishments of their ancestors.   
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Written by Ōga Yūgorō and submitted to the bakufu in 1808. 
            Owned by the Ōga fmily. Photographed by the author. 
Figure 1.1 (Ōgake) Yuishogaki 
 
An explanation is needed with regards to the secondary sources consulted for 
this thesis. This chapter relies heavily on Nakamura Takashi’s insurmountable work 
on “Itchien”. Nakamura read extensively in the Dutch archives and collected almost 
all accounts pertaining to Itchien.192 His article was the constant and most reliable 
guidance throughout my research inside and outside the VOC archives. W. J. M. 
Buch’s classic work on the VOC in Vietnam was also an important guide.193 In cases 
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where I am unable to cite original manuscripts, I will quote from his work. By the 
same token, I am greatly indebted to Miyata Yasushi’s studies on Chinese 
communities in Nagasaki.194 As far as English archives are concerned, Anthony 
Farrington’s introductory studies were helpful.195 Without their detailed, 
well-documented and often insightful studies, this thesis would not have been 
possible. 
 
Besides the Wei brothers, another important character is Lin Yuteng (林于騰). 
A number of scholars studied about this particular Chinese trader. Wada Hisanori 
devoted an entire article to Lin. Based primarily on Kai Hentai, Wada discussed Lin 
as a prominent Chinese merchant who frequented Nagasaki from Tonkin after Wei 
Zhiyan had ceased his shipping operation.196 In the meantime, Anthony Farrington 
talked about Chinese “Captain Nitthoe” in his survey on English East India Company 
records pertaining to Tonkin. Farrington says Nitthoe was the most important trader to 
Japan between 1674 and 1680. Referring to both works by Wada and Farrington, Qian 
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Jiang pointed out that the person called “Nitthoe” by the English was actually Lin 
Yuteng.197 This was a great discovery, considering the degree of difficulty in 
identifying Chinese names in European sources.  
 
This chapter highlights several points of particular relevance to Part TWO. It 
will point to the closely-knit family ties among the Wei family, Wei Zhiyan’s 
patronage of a Buddhist monastery, and active participation in public projects in 
Nagasaki. At the same time, his cultural resources played a substantial role in 
nourishing his relationships with Japanese officials at Nagasaki. His skills in playing 
music and composing poetry and the artistic style of his portraits indicated that he 
fundamentally adhered to the late-Ming gentry culture that prospered in China from 
the late 16th century. At the same time, Wei Zhiyan’s commercial activities and 
relationships with fellow merchants will highlight the nature of Chinese commercial 
organization.        
 
1618 
Wei Zhiyan was born in 1681 in Fuqing county, Fuzhou prefecture in Fujian 
province.198 A family source says he was a great-great-grandson of the provincial 
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administrative commissioner (C. Buzhengshisi 布政使司), Wei Timing (魏体明) 
(1523-1591). Timing was from Donghan (東瀚), Fuqing county and reached the 
highest degree of jinshi (C. 進士) or “presented scholar” degree in 1656. He later 
became the Buzhengshisi of Sichuan province and the surveillance commissioner (C. 
Anchashi 按察使) of Yunnan province.199 It seems plausible that Wei Zhiyan had a 
link to Wei Tinming one way or another. This makes Wei Zhiyan a member of a 
prominent gentry family in Fuqing.  
 
Zhiyan had at least two older brothers and one younger sister.200 One of his 
elder brothers named Wei Zhiyuan was later nicknamed the One-Eyed Chinese 
Itchien by the Dutch. It is not clear when Wei Zhiyuan, or Itchien, was born. Before 
leaving China, Zhiyan was married to Lin Zhengzong (林申宗) and had a son called 
Wei Yongchang (魏永昌) and a daughter named Dingguan (定官). Yongchang was 
called Heer (鶴児) or Hege (鶴哥) as a child.201 Zhiyan was said to have left his wife 
and children in Fujian but corresponded with them throughout the course of his life.202 
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Yongchang visited his father at Nagasaki at least once and wrote dozens of letter to 
Zhiyan during his fathers’ lifetime.203 
 
1628-1644 
Little information is available as to when Itchien appeared in Nagasaki for the first 
time. Since it was not Itchien but Zhiyan who founded the Ōga (鉅鹿) family in 
Nagasaki, the family’s genealogical records disregard Itchien. To make matters more 
complicated, they also failed to present credible information about Zhiyan. In 1768, 
one of Zhiyan’s great grandsons, Ōga Tamibe (鉅鹿民部) noted that Zhiyan left 
China during the late Chongzheng (崇禎) period (1628-1644) in order to avoid the 
turmoil in China.204 It seems reasonable to suppose that like many other Ming 
Chinese who sought refuge outside China, Itchien left home during this turbulent 
Ming-Qing transition period.205 Itchien probably appeared in Nagasaki during the 
early 1640s.206  
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By the end of the 1640s, Itchien had emerged as one of the most prosperous 
merchants of Fuzhou origin in the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki. This can 
be deduced from his extraordinary contribution to Buddhist temples in Nagasaki. 
Itchien was an active and eminent member of the monastic community of the 
Sōfukuji, which was established by Chinese merchants from the Fuzhou area. This 
year, twenty-nine supporters of the temple donated a total of 554 taels of silver to cast 
a bell for the temple. Itchien donated a substantial amount of 150 taels, which made 
him the single biggest contributor to this project (Figure 3.2Error! Reference source 
not found.).207  
 
 
Source: Miyata, Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō, 337. Courtesy of Nagasaki Bunkensha. 
Cast by Ayama Sukeueon in 1647.  
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Figure 3.2 Temple Bell at Sōfukuji 
1650  
Itchien donated a main gate to Zenrinji (禅林寺), another temple in Nagasaki.208 In 
Tonkin, in the mean time, Wei Zhiyan’s Vietnamese wife Vũ Diệu Thịnh (武妙盛) 
(1636-1698) gave birth to their first son, Wei Yongshi (魏永時) (1650-1719).209  
 
1651  
On 24 July, Itchien’s junk departed Tonkin together with another Chinese junk.210 
During the night of 26 August, two dismasted junks arrived in Nagasaki. One of them 
was owned by the one-eyed Tonkinese Chinese or Itchien (Appendix A.1).211  
 
1652 
On 1 February, Itchien’s junk departed Nagasaki for Tonkin carrying a sum of 77,000 
taels of silver in the form of chōgin as well as a vast quantity of commodities.212 On 
25 March, Itchien arrived in Tonkin. To make inroads into the court, he presented 70- 
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80 pieces of fine embroidered peling from China to the Chua.213 His junk presumably 
departed Tonkin shortly after 23 July.214 His departure from Tonkin is deduced from 
the fact that Itchien’s junk carried a letter from Jacob Kiser in Tonkin with an 
appendix dated 23 July. His junk appeared in the bay of Nagasaki in the morning of 
27 August. As it reached the roadstead by about midday, the junk loudly and showily 
fired cannon shots.215 The Dutch observed that the Itchen’s junk brought a “good” 
cargo.216 Among the three Chinese junks from Tonkin that arrived in Nagasaki that 
summer, Itchen’s junk was by far the largest.217 Meanwhile, Itchien was working to 
obtain a license from the magistrates of Nagasaki to settle down in Nagasaki.218   
 
1653 
On 23 January, junks owned by Itchien and Pincqua left Nagasaki for Tonkin. 
Itchien’s junk carried 100,000 taels of silver, 30,000 catties of gockins copper, printed 
textiles and cotton. The Dutch entrusted a copy of the letter from Frederick Coyett 
(1651-1687) addressed to Jacob Keyser in Tonkin to Itchien’s junk.219 Another 
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source says Itchien’s junk actually brought 200,000 taels to Tonkin.220 However, 
much sought-after silk was in short-supply that year. As competition heated up with 
the arrival of five Chinese junks, the price of raw silk skyrocketed. Itchien and Pinqua 
were unable to purchase as many goods as they initially intended. Itchien left unspent 
silver as much as 30,000 taels with his men in Tonkin, so that they could get their 
hands on the winter production of silk while he was away in Nagasaki.221 On 20 July, 
Itchien and Pinqua set sail for Nagasaki from Tonkin.222 Itchien did not appear in 
Nagasaki this year, however. Itchien might have headed back to his home in China to 
take his brother. In the winter of 1653, Wei Zhiyan left his family in Fujian and did 
not return since.223 
 
While Itchien was away, the Dutch managed to fetch a good price for their 
import of Tonkinese raw silk. Coyett attributed this to Itchien’s absence from 
Nagasaki.224 When the Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker in Batavia received 
news from Nagasaki that Itchien had been absent from Nagasaki, he wished for 
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Itchien’s death for the sake of the company’s smooth business operations.225 On the 




Between 20 July 1653 and 25 July, Itchien returned to Tonkin in tatters after an 
obviously tough journey.227 He brought 160,000-170,000 taels of silver.228 Around 
20 August, Itchien returned to Nagasaki. (Appendix A.2)229  
 
In Nagasaki, Itchien fell sick. In the early morning of 17 November, he passed 
away due to an illness from which he had been suffering from for a long period of 
time. Itchien left a sum of silver worth more than 200,000 taels. Itchien’s younger 
brother, “Gickouquan,” was present in Nagasaki at the time of Itchien’s death. 
“Gickouquan” immediately inherited his brother’s fortune.230 This is the first official 
appearance of Wei Zhiyan.231   
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In March, Zhiyan kicked off a business of his own with an initial investment worth 
70,000 taels of silver by dispatching a brand-new junk built in Nagasaki with his 
Tonkinese servant “Tonkin Rocquan (東京六官)” serving as nachoda, or chief 
merchant, onboard. Rocquan was to continue his master’s trade.232 On the way to 
Tonkin, however, the junk was shipwrecked by a storm and floundered off the coast 
of Hainan Island. The cargo and most of the crew were lost. Only Rocquan and a few 
Chinese crew members survived and reached Tonkin without any belongings.233   
 
Meanwhile, Zhiyan stayed in Nagasaki and was involved in the monastic 
community of the Sōfukuji. On 28 April, he was one of those who requested the 
renowned Chinese Chan (禅: J. Zen) master Yinyuan Longqi (隠元隆琦)(1592-1673) 
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to visit the Sōfukuji. When Yinyuan entered the temple on 27 June, Zhiyan was in 
attendance there to welcome the master.234  
 
1656 
In the afternoon of 19 August, a junk of the “brother of the late One-Eyed Chinese 
Itchien [Zhiyan]” arrived in the roadstead of Nagasaki. The vessel was newly built in 
Tonkin and carried costly cargoes (Appendix A.3).235  
 
1657  
At the end of 1656, it is rumored that Zhiyan was to leave for Tonkin with a total 
capital of 70,000-80,000 taels of silver. It is unknown exactly when he headed to 
Tonkin, but he certainly operated a successful business in Tonkin this year. The Dutch 
reported that two large Chinese junks came to Tonkin this summer and dominated the 
market. Zhiyan’s junk seemed to be one of the two.236 In late August, he appeared in 
Nagasaki with 41,350 catties of Tonkinese raw silk (Appendix A.4).  
 
1658 
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On 23 January, “nachoda Kouquan, Itchien’s brother [Zhiyan]” embarked on a new 
voyage to Tonkin with his junk carrying 40,000-50,000 taels of silver for trade.237 
Zhiyan appeared in Tonkin on 23 March and soon engaged in buying silk. He 
managed to procure the finest quality of silk at twelve facaar for one tael of silver.238 
By the time Zhiyan left Tonkin, no Dutch ship had arrived from Batavia. Zhiyan took 
the opportunity to buy a good amount of fine silk, which the merchants in Tonkin 
were initially holding for the Dutch, for a reasonable price.239 He managed to buy 
fine silk at nine to 9.5 facaar and, then, eleven to twelve facaar.240  
 
His large ocean-going junk left Tonkin on 22 July and sailed into Nagasaki on 
13 September. He brought rich cargoes consisting mainly of Tonkinese raw silk and 
piece goods (Appendix A.5).241 He also delivered a letter from Gustavus Hansz in 
Tonkin to Joan Boucheljon, the chief merchant of the Nagasaki factory.242  
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In November, Zhiyan and several prominent Chinese residents of Nagasaki 
such as Wang Xinqu (王心渠)(1594-1678), He Caocai (何高在)(1598-1671) and Lin 
Shoudian (林守壂)(1610-1694) requested Jifei Rui (即非如一)(1606-1671) to take 
the abbacy of the Sōfukuji.243 On the eighth day of the twelfth lunar month (31 
December), Zhiyan held a memorial service for his late brother at the Sōfukuji.244 
Zhiyan told Jifei that he had shed tears in thinking of his brother. Jifei presided over a 
special memorial for Itchien. Zhiyan donated 100 koku (fifteen tons) of rice for the 
service. The monastic community recognized that Zhiyan was supporting the temple 
much in the same way his brother Itchien did with his generosity in the founding days 
of the temple.245  
 
1659  
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On 13 July 1660, Zhiyan set sail for Nagasaki by the southern monsoon winds. His 
junk was reportedly loaded with cargoes of raw silk and silk fabrics with an estimated 
value of 180,000 taels. Yet he was prevented from completing his journey by a storm 
in which his junk lost a mast and he was forced to sail back to Tonkin.247  
 
1661 
In Tonkin, Wei Yongzhao (魏永昭) (1660-1738), son of Zhiyan, was born.248  
 
Zhiyan’s richly loaded junk left Tonkin bound for Nagasaki. On 26 August, 
however, it was caught up in a storm near the Gotō Islands. The ship lost its masts and 
sea water damaged its cargoes.249 On 10 September, the junk managed to make its 
way through to Nagasaki.250 
 
Master Yinyuan turned seventy years old. On this occasion, Zhiyan composed 
congratulatory poetry dedicated to the Master.251  
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The “rich Chinese trader Itchien alias Kouquan [Zhiyan]” suspended his journey to 
Tonkin this year. The magistrate of Nagasaki granted him permission to stay in 
Nagasaki for one year. With this official license, he was able to remain in Nagasaki 
and continue his business by sending his agent off to Cambodia on 18 February.252    
         
1663  
In late January, two junks belonging to Zhiyan were ready for a voyage to Cambodia. 
However, Zhiyan did not travel personally this time. Under the pretext of illness, he 
was granted a license to remain in Japan for another year.253 On 3 February, Zhiyan’s 
junk departed for Cambodia.254 This junk left Cambodia on 8 May and turned up in 
Tonkin in order to procure silk merchandise on behalf of Zhiyan.255 The Dutch 
merchants in Tonkin observed that the junk was equipped with 100 people including 
Koxinga’s soldiers and it was loaded with goods such as pepper, lead and rattan, 
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clearly from the booty of Taiwan (Appendix A.6).256 On 5 August, it arrived in 
Nagasaki with rich cargoes.257 Meanwhile in Batavia, the Governor General made a 
decision to intercept Zhiyan’s junks.258  
 
On 15 April, a fire broke out in Nagasaki. Blown by strong westerly wind, it 
quickly spread and totally devastated the town over night. With only 301 houses 
escaping the fire, the rest of the 2,801 houses were burnt to the ground.259 It is not 
known if Zhiyan had a house in Nagasaki before this fire. Had he already owned a 
house in Sakaya-chō (酒屋町), it was surely one of the houses that the fire destroyed. 
He built (or rebuilt) his mansion by 1665.260  
 
On 17 May, the Bunschoten and the Hoogelanden were dispatched from 
Batavia to Tonkin, with the Hoogelanden instructed to act against “the armed 
Japanese trading junk”. The Hoogelanden was stuck and damaged on the bar of 
Tonkin. Instead, the Bunschoten, equipped with four iron cannons and other arms 
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taken over from the Hoogelanden, was used to keep two junks under Wei Zhiyan 
inside the Rockbo River.261  
 
1664 
In the beginning of 1664, Zhiyan was busy fitting out his junk with weapons and 
equipment for another voyage to Tonkin. His junk set out for Tonkin, while he 
himself remained in Nagasaki.262 On 10 March, Zhiyan’s junk arrived in Tonkin with 
a large capital of 200,000 taels of Japanese chōgin.263 His junks were blockaded by 
the Dutch and were unable to leave Tonkin. In March, learning the arrival of this junk 
in Tonkin, the Dutch submitted a written request to the Chua together with two iron 
canons as a means to persuade him to prohibit Zhiyan from beginning to trade until 
the Company wrapped up its business. This preventive measure proved in vain, 
because the Chua was very explicit about his intention to give no favor to one foreign 
party over another in his domain.264 On 17 May, Joan Maetsuyker sent out an 
instruction to Tonkin to persist in attacking the junk of “Couquan [Zhiyan]”.265 
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Meanwhile, in Tonkin, there was a rumor that the Chua was planning to chase away 
the Hoogelanden from the river and free the passage for Chinese junks. The Dutch 
agents deliberately spread the rumors that they had been given an order to capture any 
foreign ships from and to Japan, the Hoogelanden cruised the river to prevent Chinese 
junks from leaving Tonkin. Zhiyan’s two junks did not dare to leave Tonkin that 
summer.266  
 
Around 1664, one of the four major patrons of the Sōfukuji He Caocai traveled 
up to the Ōbakusan Manpukuji (黄檗山萬福寺) in Uji (宇治), Kyoto.267 He 
delivered Zhiyan’s letter to Yinyuan. In his reply, Yinyuan praised Zhiyan for 
cultivating his virtues during his residence in Nagasaki and emphasized the 
importance of believing in the Buddhist teachings.268  
 
1665 
In Tonkin, Zhiyan’s two junks were at the beginning of 1665 still blockaded in the 
Rockbo River by the two Dutch ships. By late February, Hendrick Verdonck heard 
                                                                                                                                            
 
266
 Letter from Hendrick Verdonk in Tonkin to Governor General, 23 February 
1665, VOC 1252: 234-5.  
 
267
 For more on the Ōbakusan Manpukuji, see Chapter Four.  
 
268
 Nanyuan Xingpai and Gaoquan Xingdun, eds., Huangbo heshang taiheji, in 
Kokuyaku zengaku taisei (Japanese translations: collections of Zen studies), ed. by 
Kokuyaku zengaku taisei, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: Nimatsudō Shoten, 1930), 51-2, 27; 
Miyata, Tōtsūji kakei ronkō, 455. 
 
 106
that they would leave for Japan with the Chua’s passes in the coming May. In a letter 
of 14 May 1665, Maetsuyker restated the order to keep the Chinese junks blockaded 
unless the Chua ordered the Dutch to release them.269 The Governor General later 
cancelled this order and told the Tonkin factory to lift the blockade of the river in 
order to avoid angering both the Chua and the Japanese in Nagasaki.270 
In the end, the Chua provided Zhiyan’s junks protection by granting a pass and a flag 
that enabled them to depart Tonkin.271 In the following year, Zhiyan sent his junk to 
Cochinchina instead of Tonkin.272 
 
On 14 February, the Dutch at Nagasaki were informed that “Chinese Quicquan, 
the  brother of the late one-eyed Chinese Itchien”, who had a house in this town for 
about two to three years and always tried to stay with several excuses, was instructed 
to depart by the magistrate of Nagasaki. A junk was constructed swiftly to be ready 
for Zhiyan’s voyage to Tonkin. With this new ship, Zhiyan would navigate to Tonkin 
and join his other two junks that were blockaded by the VOC.273  
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On 22 July, Zhiyan’s junks departed for Nagasaki with a pass and a flag from 




On 14 January, Zhiyan dispatched a junk to Cochinchina.276 The following incident 
seems to confirm that his junk appeared in Hoian. Around July, Sumiyaa Hichirobei  
(角屋七郎兵衛) (1631-1672) wrote a letter to his two brothers in Japan. He lent five 
taels of silver to a helmsman of Zhiyan’s junk, Chang Erge (長二哥), and asked his 
two brothers at Nagasaki to collect this amount from Chang.277  
 
The ninth day of the ninth month (6 October) was the day of Chongyangjie  
(重陽節).278 On this occasion, Jifei, who was then at Kōjusan Fukujuji (廣寿山福聚
寺) in Kokura (小倉), composed a poem expressing his wish to return to China and 
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addressed it to four Chinese merchants from Tonkin, namely Gu Changqing (顧長卿) 
(d. 1679), Lin Shixiang (林石香), He Zirang (何子謙) and Wei Zhiyan.279  
 
1667 
On 13 February, “Itchien’s brother” and his “scribe” appeared in Tonkin with a large 
capital.280 On 8 October, Zhiyan’s junk came back to Nagasaki with considerable 
cargoes reportedly worth around 420,000 taels of silver (Appendix A.8).281 However, 
when the items were sold, they realised only 300,000 taels in total.282 Lin Yuteng 
appeared in Nagasaki as a chief merchant of Ship No. 28 from Tonkin. On 30 
September, he asked the Association of Chinese Interpreters (J. Tōtsūji kaisho唐通事
会所) permission to export 66,800 taels of chōgin.283 Later evidence from the Dutch 
archives indicate that Lin Yuteng was Zhiyan’s “scribe”.  
 
1668 
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At the beginning of the year, in Nagasaki, the construction of Zhiyan’s new junk was 
under way. Both the new junk and the old one that just came back from Tonkin were 
expected to leave for Tonkin shortly.284 On 26 January, it was reported that Zhiyan 
would bring 300,000 taels of silver to Tonkin.285 At the end of January, a well-armed 
junk of Zhiyan departed for Tonkin. Despite the previous report only the new junk 
embarked on a voyage to Tonkin with Zhiyan personally onboard.286 In Tonkin, his 
business was at a standstill due to the shortage of silk commodities and interference 
by the Chua. In late June, his first attempt to depart for Nagasaki failed. In July, it was 
said that he would try to leave again soon.287 Between 22 and 24 August, Zhiyan 
safely came back to Nagasaki with his junk which reportedly carried cargoes worth up 
to 280,000 taels (Appendix A.9).288 One more of Zhiyan’s junks arrived in Nagasaki 
this summer.289 On 9 September, his articles were sold with the following prices: 
peling 5 and then 5.07 taels, sommungi 4.9 taels, baa 6.8 taels per piece.290  
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Later on, Dutch merchants in Nagasaki speculated that Zhiyan would not be 
able to fit out a junk during this winter, for he was no longer allowed to export copper 
coins.291 At the end of 1668 or in the beginning of 1669, however, Zhiyan’s junk left 
for Tonkin. This can be deduced from the fact that his junk came back to Nagasaki 
from Tonkin in the next summer.292  
 
1669 
Zhiyan’s junk arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin some time between 27 and 30 August. 
It brought 35,000 catties of silk and silk piece goods. The Dutch called Zhiyan a 
“notorious trafficker”.293 By 15 November, Zhiyan managed to sign a contract with 
the magistrate of Nagasaki regarding the quantity and price of copper coins.294 
 
In Nagasaki, Zhiyan donated 500 taels to the Sōfukuji for the construction of a 
new approach to a hall dedicated to the sea goddess mazu (媽姐). The renovation was 
completed in 1671.295  
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On 21 January, Zhyan departed for Tonkin with his junk, carrying a capital worth 
21,000-22,000 taels in copper coins, koban and other commodities.296   
 
1672 
On 25 June, an English frigate, the Zant sailed into Pho Hien.297 On board were six 
EIC personnel, including William Gyfford as the Chief of the Tonkin factory and his 
subordinates.298 At Pho Hien, they met the Chinese captain called “Nitthoe 
[Yuteng]”, who was about to leave for Japan (Appendix A.10).299 Gyfford asked 
Yuteng to deliver a letter to David Stephens who had been sent by the Return to 
establish a factory in Japan. Yuteng refused to carry such a letter for it could put him 
in a difficult position in Japan but agreed to pass the news of the Zant’s safe arrival in 
Tonkin by word of mouth. Yuteng’s junk left for Japan within a few days of the 
English’s arrival.300  
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According to the Dutch archives, Zhiyan’s junk departed from Tonkin to 
Nagasaki in late June. On 14 July, Zhiyan resurfaced in Nagasaki with his junk richly 
loaded.301 Here it may be noted that the Dutch and English might have been referring 
to the same Chinese junk. That means Zhiyan dispatched a junk to Tonkin and Yuteng 
worked as nachoda for Zhiyan’s junk.  
 
Upon Yuteng’s departure, the Chua ordered the English to stay at Yuteng’s 
empty house at Pho Hien until he returned from Japan.302 In Hanoi, there was no 
place secure from fire for all the houses were “cajan” house except for those of the 
Chua, the Dutch and a few Chinese merchants.303 The Governor of Pho Hien, Ung-ja 
Lien, arranged to let out Yuteng’s house to the English.304 When Nicholas Waite 
arrived at the house on 25 July, the house required some maintenance before they 
could move in: the doors were broken and its warehouse had some problems.305 On 
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19 August, Ung-ja Lien said that the English had better stay there till Yuteng’s return 
because there was no other house that was big and secure enough for the English to 
store all their goods. Yuteng’s house was the only house in Pho Hien that was not a 
cajan but a tiled house.306  
 
Zhiyan acquired permanent residency in Japan.307 (Ōgake) Yuishogaki says that 
after he was granted permanent residency, Zhiyan was permitted to visit Kyoto and 
Osaka. During these trips, Zhiyan had occasion to showcase his skills as a musician at 
the Emperor’s court.308 During the late summer, Yinyuan at the Manpukuji composed 
a poem to express his joy for the safe return of the Tonkin merchants.309  
 
1673 
According to English sources, since early January the English merchants in Tonkin 
expected Yuteng’s return daily.310 After the English finished removing all their goods 
from Yuteng’s house on 15 January, the house was again put in the hands of the 
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Governor of Pho Hien, who immediately sent his solders to look after it.311 On 20 
March, Nicholas Waite at Pho Hien heard rumors that Yuteng’s junk was at the river 
and was expected to come up to Pho Hien within a couple of days.312 Until 5 April, 
he waited there for a Chua’s chop to be delivered.313 As soon as he arrived in Pho 
Hien he demanded Nicholas Waite to compensate for what had been lost when the 
English left his house.314 After concluding business with the Chua over the summer, 
Yuteng departed for Japan on 14 July. This time his cargoes were largely composed 
of silk fabrics such as sommungi, baa and peling.315  
 
On the other hand, the Dutch reported that Zhiyan’s junk set sail from Nagasaki 
on 14 February.316 This junk turned up in Tonkin at the end of April. It left Tonkin in 
the middle of July and returned to Nagasaki in September.317 Given the fact that only 
one junk sailed into Nagasaki from Tonkin during the summer of 1673, the above 
reports given by the English and the Dutch suggest that Lin Yuteng was on board 
Zhiyan’s junk. It is not known if Zhiyan came to Tonkin personally.318  
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On 28 March, Ung-ja Thay, the King’s mandarin inspected Nitthoe’s junk at 
Pho Hien. On 5 April, the hamon of Ung-ja Thay came down with the Chua’s chop 
for Yuteng’s junk and took what he liked in the name of the Chua.319 Before his 
departure from Tonkin, Yuteng was forced to pay an additional 700-800 taels to the 
Chua for he did not report all his copper coins in the Chua’s Roll.320 On 14 July, 
Yuteng’s junk departed for Japan loaded mostly with raw silk, sommungis, baas and 
peling. The English asked Yuteng to deliver a letter to Japan. Yuteng refused to carry 
such a letter for he did not know whether the “Emperor [shōgun]” of Japan admitted 
the English to his country.321  
 
During the summer, Wu Shunguan (呉順官), a son of Kadoya Hichirobei, 
arrived in Nagasaki from Cochinchina.322 He was entrusted with a missive from the 
“Prince of Annam (安南國太子)”, whom Sonoda Kazuki identified as Nguyễn Phúc 
Ðiễn (阮福演) (1640-1684), addressed to Zhiyan. Phúc Ðiễn was the eldest son and 
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heir apparent of the Nguyen Lord, Nguyễn Phúc Tần (阮福瀕) (r. 1648-1687).323 
Phuc Dien requested in his missive that Zhiyan loan him 5,000 taels of silver for the 
purpose of arms buildup, possibly, against the Trinh (Figure 3.3).324  
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Owned by the Ōga family. Photographed by the author. 
Figure 3.3 Letter from Prince of Annan to Wei Zhiyan 
 
1674  
On 1 January, Johannes Camphuijs in Nagasaki wrote a letter to the Governor 
General, in which Camphuijs expressed his concern over Zhiyan’s relationship with 
the local officials and merchants in Nagasaki. He advised the Governor General that 
as far as trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki was concerned, the company should not 
make an enemy of Zhiyan, because he was on good terms with machidoshiyori (町年
寄) and a number of Japanese merchants in Nagasaki.325 
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In late January, Zhiyan’s junk left Nagasaki for Tonkin.326 The Dutch noted 
that only two Chinese junks arrived in Tonkin during 1673: one was a junk of 
Zhiyan’s and the other came from Batavia. This meant that anyone who arrived from 
Japan must have come with the junk belonging to Zhiyan.327 William Gyfford noted 
that Yuteng’s junk appeared in Pho Hien on 27 February. The date seems right in 
contrast to the departure of Zhiyan’s junk from Japan on 23 January as the Dutch 
noted. According to English observations, Yuteng brought 80,000 taels of silver, 
including a few copper coins, to Tonkin.328 The Dutch reported 100,000 taels. In any 
case, the European traders were impressed with the sizable amount of Yuteng’s 
capital. 
 
By the middle of March, Yuteng’s junk was still riding at mooring off-shore. 
The Chua’s dispachadores ordered that the Chua must take half of his 80,000 taels of 
silver. On 18 March, getting tired of arguing with the dispatchadores, Yuteng went up 
to Hanoi with an intention to sambey, or pay homage, to the Chua and petition against 
the dispatchadores. He personally negotiated with the Chua and seemed to find an 
acceptable compromise: Yuteng agreed to deliver 20,000 taels to the Chua and 10,000 
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taels to the prince and he would receive the same amount in copper cash. On 21 
March, ready to fetch the money from his junk and deliver it to the King, Yuteng 
waited all day for the Chua’s license for sailing back to Pho Hien. When he received 
the license, he sent it to the Governor of Hanoi to obtain another pass from the 
Governor. The governor said he would not grant it till the next morning because it 
was already too late in the day. By 25 March, he was back in Pho Hien. On this day, 
the Chua’s dispatchadores and hamons came down to take away the money. Then, 
they fell into their old tone, saying that Yuteng had to deliver 40,000 taels to the Chua 
and 20,000 taels to the prince. Yuteng again sailed up to Hanoi to pay another visit to 
the Chua. The English merchants estimated that if the Chua did not abate, “the loss 
will be about 10 percent by the King’s [Chua’s] payment in copper coins and valuing 
the silver at less than real worth”.329  
 
On 30 May, Yuteng visited the English merchants who had been eagerly 
waiting for a chance to obtain the latest news about the Return in Japan. Yuteng 
informed them that the Return had been denied access to Japan because the Dutch told 
the magistrate of Nagasaki that the King of England was married to a Portuguese 
princess.330  
                                                 
329
 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 106v. It was customary for the Chua to take goods or 
money from foreign traders and pay them in silk or copper cashes at a dear rate.  
 
330
 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 109v, 110v-111r. Yuteng’s information was quite 
accurate. The Return arrived in Nagasaki on 29 June 1673. The bakufu refused the 
English appeal on the grounds of the marriage between Charles II (1630-1685) and a 
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In Hanoi, a mutiny of soldiers broke out in Hanoi in early June.331 Zhiyan 
reportedly lost more than 2,000 taels in the middle of the revolt.332 
 
According to the English, Yuteng’s junk departed for Nagasaki on 18 July. 
However, the adverse winds and a leakage problem on the vessel at the Bay of Tonkin 
forced his junk to return into the River. His junk came back to Pho Hien on 12 
August. The junk could no longer proceed on its journey that year for it was too late 
and the monsoon had passed.333 At the same time, the VOC merchants in Tonkin 
witnessed that the junk of Zhiyan left Tonkin on 20 July but was stranded for fourteen 
days in the waters near the mouth of the Rockbo River. They bailed out the 
waterlogged junk and made it through to Tonkin.334 The two stories are similar 
enough to indicate that the English and the Dutch were talking about the same event. 
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Luckily, his cargoes suffered little damage.335 Yuteng’s aborted voyage and return to 
Tonkin pleased the English merchants in Tonkin. William Gyfford wishfully thought 
that the price of silk would likely become cheaper in the following year because 
Yuteng would not be able to buy much in the next year.336 Another one of Zhiyan’s 
junks sailed from Tonkin to Nagasaki this year.337  
 
1675  
According to English sources, the Chua made agreements on the sale of his silk with 
his business partners. The Dutch received fifteen facar of raw silk for one tael of fine 
silver, Yuteng fourteen facaar and the English thirteen facaar respectively.338 Yuteng 
set sail for Japan on 19 May.339 These facts give us confirmation that the Dutch and 
the English were referring to the same Chinese junk from Japan. On 8 July, Zhiyan’s 
junk arrived at Nagasaki. The value of his cargoes was estimated to be worth 200,000 
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taels of silver.340 A Fūsetsu-gaki attested to the arrival of a Chinese junk from Tonkin 
on 8 July.341        
 
1676 
On 19 January, Zhiyan dispatched his junk with “Chinese captain Iethoe [Yuteng]” 
onboard.342 His junk left Nagasaki and sailed to Tonkin in the company of a junk 
under the Zheng. On 23 February, the English heard that two junks from Japan arrived 
at the bar of the Rockbo River.343 On 1 March, both junks reached Pho Hien.344    
 
The English took note of what took place between the two Chinese junks and 
the dispatchadores during this summer. According to their reports, “they [the two 
junks] brought, besides silver plates and copper coins, several medicinal drugs and 
purslane from China and Japan, all which the Chua, the prince and etc. took for their 
own use, [by] paying [at] their own prices for the same”. By 26 April, the merchants 
in the Chinese junks agreed with the silk merchants for the price of their silk, which 
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was at 15.5 facaar.345 Besides that, according to Dutch knowledge, “Iethoe” or 
Yuteng, on the junk of Zhiyan’s junk, contracted with the Chua for 1,500 taels of free 
trade every year and “dazzled” the mandarins.346  
 
On 9 June, the Chinese junks departed for Japan.347 In July, Zhiyan’s junk 
departed from Tonkin and was accompanied by the aforementioned Zheng’s junk. 
Just before reaching Macao, however, Zheng’s junk sailed ahead and waited in 
ambush for Zhiyan’s junk. A number of naval vessels from Taiwan rushed out to join 
the force and launched a surprise attack against Zhiyan’s junk. Because of the attack, 
one of the sails was damaged by cannon shots and one life was lost.348 Fortunately, 
the timely northern wind saved Zhiyan’s junk and helped it escape back to Tonkin.  
 
Zhiyan turned sixty years old. He received a congratulatory letter from his 
estranged family in Fujian.349 
 
1677 
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 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 148. “Purslane” is a name of a plant, probably 
indicating some sort of medicinal herbs in this case.    
 
346
 Letter from Albert Brevinck in Tonkin to Batavia, 28 November 1676, 
VOC 1322.  
 
347
 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 2: 149r. 
348
 DN, 5 August 1667, NFJ 89.  
 
349
 (Ōgake) Yuishogaki.  
 124
On 14 January, Dirk de Haas wrote that Zhiyan’s junk had not showed up in Nagasaki 
yet.350 On 1 June, “the Captain of Itchien’s [Zhiyan] junk named Ithoe [Yuteng]” 
procured a new batch of raw silk and left Tonkin for Japan.351 The junk was hit by a 
storm near the Pescadores. The accident killed all members of the crew except seven 
people including the nachoda [Yuteng], an accountant and the pilot.352 The EIC 
records added that Yuteng lost his junk, cargos and seventeen to eighteen crew 
members near the coast of Taiwan. Yuteng survived and put a boat, which carried as 
many survivors as possible, ashore to Taiwan where they were detained as prisoners 
by the people of the Zheng.353 
 
1678 
Towards the end of 1678, in Nagasaki, Zhiyan was preparing for another voyage. A 
rather small junk, worth less than 3,000 taels, was being built for Zhiyan, in place of 
the big one he lost in Taiwan. He planned to dispatch the new junk to Tonkin by 
catching the last breeze of the north-eastern monsoon.354  
                                                 
 
350
 Letter from Dirk de Haas in Nagasaki to Albert Brevinck in Tonkin, 14 
January 1677, NFJ 308.  
 
351
 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 3: 198v; Letter from Joan Besselman in Tonkin to Dirck 
de Haas in Nagasaki, 16 July 1677, FNJ 308.  
 
352
 Albert Brevinck in Nagasaki to Jan Besselman in Tonkin, 2 January 1678; 
DN, 17 & 18 August, 2 & 14 September 1678, NFJ 91.  
 
353
 IOR, G/12/17, pt. 4: 222v.  
 
354




On 10 March, the English reported that two junks from Japan arrived in Tonkin.355 
The said two junks headed out for Nagasaki on 15 July. Reportedly, they lost 4,000 
taels due to certain silk merchants who ran away with their money.356 Although there 
is no conclusive evidence, at least one of them might have belonged to Zhiyan. 
According to the Dutch, two Chinese junks came to Tonkin from Nagasaki. The first 
one arrived in Tonkin on 20 March and the second on 1 April. Together, they brought 
a sum of 90,000 taels. They did not inform the Chua of the 80,000 taels of silver and 
440 chests of copper. They invested this capital in silk. They departed for Nagasaki on 
the last day of July.357 Although the reported arrival and departure dates do not 
exactly match, it is likely that the English and Dutch were refering to the same two 
Chinese junks from Japan.  
 
In Nagasaki, Zhiyan and his sons became Japanese upon permission from the 
magistrate, Ushigome.358 In the same year, Zhiyan had a wooden bridge renovated as 
a stone bridge.359 
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On 21 February, Yuteng resurfaced in Tonkin with his junk loaded with Japanese 
earthen ware, beetle nuts, silver and some copper coins.360 Another junk arrived in 
Tonkin from Japan on 4 March. The Chinese traders from these two junks faced a 
typical problem in doing business in Tonkin.   
 
The King [Chua] formerly made a contract with the Chinamen that came 
from Japan not to meddle with their plate [silver] on condition that each 
junk would allow him annually 1,000 tael, and the Prince 500 tael, which 
proportions were paid them this year. Yet notwithstanding the king [Chua] 
forced from both the junks 10,000 taels and the prince 7,000 tael, for which 
they will pay silk at a dear rate, of which extortion the Chinamen made 
many unavailing complains.361  
 
On 22 May, Chinese merchants reached an agreement with the silk merchants 
for their silk: first grade of silk seventeen and second grade eighteenth tael weights of 
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silk for one tael of silver; their pelings at 2,100 copper coins with a rate of 1,550 
pieces of copper coins per one tael of silver.362 On 11 September, a junk of Zhiyan’s 
came back to Nagasaki from Tonkin.363  
  
Zhiyan donated the main gate to the Matsunomori shrine (松森神社).364 
 
1681 
Three appointed commissioners visited Nagasaki in order to gather information on the 
current situation of foreign trade and to uncover any illegal activities engaged in by 
the magistrates and other officials. Zhiyan was assigned to host Okada Hahirouemon (
岡田八郎右衛門), the highest ranking official among the three, along with thirty-five 
members of his entourage.365 
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Also this year, Zhiyan had the main hall of the Sōfukuji refurbished. It had a 
single-layered roof since 1646 when the temple hall was initially constructed. At this 
time, by means of Zhiyan’s donation, the roof was upgraded to a two-tiered roof.366 
 
In light of the following two accounts, it is clear that Zhiyan and Yuteng fitted 
out two junks and departed from Tonkin for Nagasaki in late summer of that year. 
Zhiyan took passage on one junk and Yuteng on the other.   
 
The chief merchant of Ship No. 4 Tonkin in 1682, whose name was not 
mentioned in the Fūsetsu-gaki, related the events of his unsuccessful venture in the 
previous year [1681]. On 1 August 1681, his junk departed from Tonkin to Nagasaki 
along with Lin Yuteng’s junk. When they reached Xiamen on 14 August, the wind 
turned against them. On 19 August, for want of favorable winds, they decided to 
return to Tonkin. Both junks were back in Tonkin on 16 September. The aborted 
voyage caused them to sustain losses. They spent a winter in Tonkin and his junk 
departed again from Tonkin on 9 June 1682 and so did Yuteng’s junk.367 The chief of 
the English factory in Tonkin, Thomas James, also noted that the junks of Captain 
Neitthoe [Yuteng] and Quo Quan lost their voyages in 1681.368  
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“Quo Quan” in Thomas James’ statement was another variation of Zhiyan’s 
name. Therefore, Zhiyan was the nachoda of No. 4 Tonkin Ship. These Chinese junks 
brought with them no less than 150,000 taels of silver besides Japanese copper coins 
and other products to Tonkin.369  
 
1682 
In May, the two junks mentioned above departed Tonkin for Nagasaki earlier than 
they did in the previous year so that they would not lose another voyage. The large 
part of their cargoes was comprised of raw silk but also included some peling, baas, 
sommung, hockins and refuge silk. In the same month, about ten days before their 
departure, Yuteng and Zhiyan presented a joint petition to the Chua, asking the Chua 
to consider how greatly they have suffered by losing their voyage in the previous 
year. They requested the Chua to dispose of raw silk at a certain pre-fixed price in the 
following years. They proposed sixteen facaar for first-grade silk and seventeen 
facaar for second-grade. The Chua took a few days to consider the proposal, during 
which time he sought the opinions of the EIC merchants on this matter.370  
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On 29 June, Zhiyan’s junk from Tonkin arrived in Nagasaki.371 Yuteng’s junk 
followed shortly.372 Because of a severe famine, new silk did not come on the Tonkin 
market.373 Zhiyan and Yuteng brought the stock of old raw silk to Nagasaki, which 
they had bought in Tonkin one or two years before.374 At the end of 1682, Yuteng 
and Zhiyan left Nagasaki for Tonkin again.375 
         
1683 
On 7 February, two Japanese junks appeared in Tonkin. The nachoda of the two junks 
came up to Hanoi on 23 February. They met William Hodges at the English factory 
and informed him of a famine that had killed many people in Japan since the previous 
year.376 On 25 February, they sambeyed to the new Chua [Trinh Can] and presented 
lavish gifts congratulating the Chua on ascending to the throne. The two junks 
brought 205,000 taels of silver.377 Nonetheless, they were unable to purchase any silk 
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due to the terrible famine and wide-spread epidemic. Neither Yuteng nor Zhiyan 
could fit out their junks. Both stayed in Tonkin and waited for a new harvest of silk in 
the following year.378  
 
1684 
From 19 May to 20 August, another bakufu commissioner Toda Matabei (戸田又兵
衛) stayed at Zhiyan’s mansion.379 During Toda’s stay, a fire broke out in the 
neighborhood. Although it happened in the daytime and was soon extinguished, it 
scared Zhiyan’s household.380  
 
Around the lunar New Year, a portrait of Zhiyan was drawn by a painter 
called Xie Zhongyan (謝重燕) from Quanzhou (Figure 3.4).381 In the same year, 
renowned Ōbaku portraitist Kita Genki (喜多元規) (active 1664-1709) drew his first 
portrait of Wei Zhiyan. On 10 December, Qiankai Xingan (千凱性安) (1626-1705), 
who was the then abbot of the Sōfukuji, gave a eulogy for the portrait (Figure 3.5).382  
                                                 
378
 KH, l: 418; DVSKTT, 2: 1010. See Chapter Two for more details on the bad 
crop in the early 1680s. 
 
379
 For details on their visit, see Chapter Five.  
 
380
 Ōoka, Kiyō gundan, 89; Morinaga, Kanpō nikki, 269-70. 
 
381
 No further information is available on the identity of the painter. Miyata, 
Tōtsūji kakei ronkō, 971. 
 
382
 Miyata, Tōtsūji kakei ronkō, 970. For more on the Ōbaku portrait painting, 




By Xie Zhongyan from Quanzhou. Dated 1684. 
Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 144.5 x 64.1 cm. 
Owned by the Oga family. Photographed by the author. 
Figure 3.4  Portrait of Wei Zhiyan on Outing 
 
 
By Kita Genki. Dated 1684. 
Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 121 x 51 cm. 
                  Photographed by the ahtour. 
Figure 3.5 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan by Kita Genki, 1684 
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On 27 August, Zhiyan and Yuteng came back to Nagasaki with their respective 
junks. Theirs were the only ones that left Tonkin for Nagasaki this year. Zhiyan was 
on Ship No. 2 from Tonkin. According to his Fūsetsu-gaki, it was a bad year in 
Tonkin again. While Tonkin had not fully recovered from the famine, the mutiny 
against the new Chua claimed casualties and silk production failed. Yuteng could 
purchase only half the amount of silk that he used to be able to purchase before. He 
entrusted 10,000 taels of silver to a nachoda Lin Ershou (林爾受) in Tonkin for the 
purchase of new production of raw silk in the following year”.383 Another source said 
that Yuteng actually left 40,000 taels in Tonkin.384 During the winter, Yuteng again 
put up sail for Tonkin.385 
 
1685 
Early in 1685, Yuteng arrived in Tonkin. He made some profit from selling his 
cargoes. Despite his intentions of sailing back to Japan, he was unable to gather good 
exportable raw silk. He spent the reminder of the year at Tonkin having his junk 
repaired and running errands.386  
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Yuteng managed to buy a small amount of yellow silk and departed from Tonkin on 
19 July. Although his junk was hit by a storm and nearly foundered during the 
voyage, it made its way back to Nagasaki and registered as Ship No. 72.387 Having 
been away from Nagasaki since 1684, Yuteng did not know about the new trade 
restrictions.388 Yuteng asked permission for trade by stressing the following:  
 
We were people of the Ming. After eventually the Qing took over the Ming 
some of us did not go back home. Hence, we went back and forth between 
Japan and Tonkin. I stayed in Japan for such a long time that I strongly feel 
as though I were a subject of Japan. I am very grateful that the country 
[Japan] has been kind to me for more than a few decades.389  
 
On the occasion of his seventieth birthday, letters from his relatives in Fujian 
were delivered to Nagasaki.390 Liu Xuanyi wrote a congratulatory letter to Zhiyan 
(Figure 3.6).391  
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Zhiyan held a memorial service for the thirty-third anniversary of Itchien’s 
death at the Sōfukuji.392 Qiankai offered a reburial service for Itchien. 
 
 
Hanging Scroll. Dated in 1686. 
Owned by the Ōga family. 
Photographed by the author.   
         Figure 3.6 Congratulatory Words from Liu Xuanyi to Wei Zhiyan  




Zhiyan stayed in Nagasaki. Yuteng’s business in Tonkin did not go well. He decided 
to suspend his voyage to Japan and stayed in Tonkin.393   
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Zhiyan passed away because of illness during the early hours of the morning on 6 
February. His death was immediately reported to the Tōtsūji kaisho.394 Qiankai 
presided over a Buddhist funeral ceremony for Zhiyan at the Sōfukuji.395 He was 
buried alongside Itchien (Figure 3.7).  
 
 
Chinese-style tombs for the Oga family.  
Address: 2-36 Nishiyama-chō, Nagasaki-shi Nagasaki, Japan.  
Photographed by the author. 
Figure 3.7 Tombs of the Wei Brothers 
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After Zhiyan’s death, his son Yongzhao asked Kita Genki to draw another 
portrait of Zhiyan. At the end of August, Master Qinkai put a eulogy on the portrait 
(Figure 3.8).396   
 
 
By Kita Genki. Dated 1689. 
Hanging scroll. Color on silk. 111.2 x 48.9 cm. 
Source: Kyoto National Museam, Ōbaku no bijutsu, 83. 
Courtesy of Kyoto National Museam. 
Figure 3.8 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan by Kita Genki, 1689 
 
After staying in Tonkin for three years, Yuteng left Tonkin on 15 June and 
arrived at Nagasaki on 16 July.397 During his stay in Nagasaki, he had his junk 
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reconditioned. However, the repair work was done in haste and the junk departed 
without the full being fixed properly. On its way back to Tonkin, water started leaking 
in from the hull. After a rough voyage, Yuteng returned to Tonkin and spread the 
news of Zhiyan’s death among members of the Chinese community.398   
 
1690  
Yuteng could not have his leaky junk repaired in Tonkin because Tonkin was a place 
where both sides of the river bank were too high to pull the junk onto. Considering the 
danger of navigating a leaking junk, Yuteng thought about abandoning the vessel.     
 
But if we can not sell our merchandise, crew members of the ship would be 
impoverished. Our sailors discussed the matter and decided to sail to Japan 
even though water was coming in. During the voyage, the sailors kept 
bailing water from the ship day and night. Since the ship was laden mostly 
with light cargo, I [Yuteng] told them that we could possibly make it 
through to Japan as long as we did not change our mind…. adverse winds 
made our journey even more difficult. Nonetheless, because we sincerely 
pursue a profit, we came here [Nagasaki] at the risk of our lives.399  
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Yuteng’s leaky junk eventually arrived at Nagasaki.400 Yuteng brought a deed written 
in Chinese together with 1,100 catties of raw silk from some Chinese merchants in 
Tonkin. The deed said:  
 
                Zhiyan was in Tonkin before he moved to Japan. Back then, he 
lent silver [to other traders in Tonkin]. Since Zhiyan lived in Japan in his 
last years, he had no opportunity to collect some of the silver [from the 
borrowers]. The borrowers were in a bad shape and unable to repay their 
debts. Zhiyan had no way to recover the money. Years passed and Zhiyan 
no longer pursued their debt. The borrowers came to know of his death from 
the junk coming back to Tonkin from Japan last year. They thought that 
they should return the money even though Zhiyan had already passed away, 
especially because they had been doing well recently. Although Zhiyan 
passed away, he had two sons. The borrowers asked Yuteng to deliver the 
raw silk to the sons as a repayment.401  
 
Yuteng’s junk set sail from Nagasaki on 29 November.402  
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After leaving Nagasaki, his old junk started leaking from the bottom of the hull. It 
was obvious that the junk was unable to complete the voyage to Tonkin. Yuteng 
decided to call at Wenzhou and check the hull. The junk was found too old to repair 
thus Yuteng gave up the vessel and had a new one built. Hearing that a new junk was 
under construction, some traveling merchants from Wenzhou and Ningbo gathered 
with their raw silk and silk textiles. With new cargoes onboard, Yuteng’s junk left 




Yuteng’s junk left Tonkin on 9 July and reached Nagasaki on 16 August.404  
 
1698 
In Hanoi, Vũ Diệuthịnh, Zhiyan’s Vietnamese wife, was not feeling well since the last 
winter. Neither medication nor prayer worked. In the morning of 17 May, she passed 
away at the age of sixty-three. Prior to that, Vũ Diệu Thịnh was remarried to Lê 
Thống CNn (黎統謹) from Cổ Đô town, Đông Sơn district, Thiệu Thiê prefecture, 
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Thanh Hóa province (清華道紹天府東山縣古都社) and, with him, she had a son Lê 
Đình Tương (黎廷相) and a daughter Công Thị (玜氏).405 
 
1699 
On 27 May, the magistrate of Nagasaki appointed Zhiyan’s Tonkinese servant Wei Xi 
(魏喜)(1659-1711), now called Gi Goheiji (魏五平次), as Tonkin-cum-Quangnam (
廣南) interpreter.406   
 
1702  
Following his father’s [Lê] order, Đình Tương held a funeral for his mother. On 10 
October, Vũ Diệu Thịnh was peacefully put in the ground in Thanh Hóa.407 
Afterwards, Lê Đình Tương wrote a letter to their half-brothers, Wei Yongshi and 
Yongchao in Nagasaki to inform them of their mother’s death.408  
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Owned by the Oga family. 
Photograhed by the author.   
Figure 3.9 Portrait of Wei Zhiyan and Vũ Diệu Thịnh 
 
1703  
Lin Yuteng was in Nagasaki this year. On 23 September, he testified about the usage 
of a particular kind of Chinese incense in front of the Chinese interpreters.409 
 
Around mid-autumn, Yongshi and Yongchao wrote back to Lê Đình Tương. 
They expressed their gratitude to him for telling them about when and how their 
mother passed away and for taking care of her burial ceremony. Thirty taels of silver 
were enclosed for Lê Đình Tương to be able to set up a proper altar for their 
mother.410 Yuteng probably delivered this letter to Tonkin.  
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Yuteng arrived in Nagasaki onboard of Ship No. 21 from Nanjing.411  
 
1708 
Yuteng’s junk left Tonkin on 22 July and sailed into Nagasaki on 10 September.412 
This marks Yuteng’s last appearance in the historical record.  
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THE FUQING NETWORKS 
 
The previous chapter illuminated a variety of activities that the Wei brothers carried 
out in their life times. Apart from their commercial enterprise in the Tonkin-Nagasaki 
silk trade, their social, cultural and religious activities in Nagasaki were highlighted. 
Previous studies that were dependent in a large part on Dutch and English sources 
failed to pay enough attention to Chinese merchants’ conduct outside the economic 
sphere. This chapter intends to show Chinese junk traders as people whose lives were 
not simply defined by their economic undertakings and examines how these religious 
and cultural factors could have help hem facilitate trade. 
 
Chapter Three included accounts of Wei brothers’ involvement in the Sōfukuji 
monastic community. This signifies not only that the Wei brothers were Buddhist but 
also that they had means to patronize the Buddhist monastery. However, that does not 
explain why they chose this particular Buddhist monastery as their object of 
patronage. In order to understand their patronage of the Sōfukuji and the rationale 
behind it, this chapter will explore the roles of Buddhism in seventeenth-century 
Nagasaki. The first part of this chapter delves into the evolution of Chinese Buddhist 
monasteries in Nagasaki from private gathering places for Chinese merchants to 
full-fledged Buddhist temples during the first-half of the seventeenth century. The 
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second part will explore the involvement of the Wei brothers in the monastic 
community of the Sōfukuji.  
  
The Origin of Chinese Buddhist Temples in Nagasaki 
Since the second decade of the seventeenth century, the Chinese expatriate 
community was divided into three sub-communities according to native places or 
dialect lines. Each group, which was comprised of merchants from the same regional 
area, had its own small makeshift shrine (proto-temple) that later developed into a 
Buddhist temple.413 The oldest Chinese temple in Nagasaki was the Kōfukuji (C. 
Xingfusi 興福寺) founded in 1623 by immigrants from the so-called sanjiang (三江) 
region including Zhejian, Jiangxi and Jiangnan (江南) areas. The temple was known 
as Nankindera (南京寺) after the largest city of the region, Nanjing (南京). Merchants 
from the Fujian province were spilt into two groups according to their distinct 
linguistic features. In 1628, the migrants from the southernmost part of Fujian 
province established the Fukusaiji (C. Fujisi 福済寺). In the beginning, a main group 
of supporters were from the Quanzhou area and, therefore, the temple was 
colloquially called Senshūji (泉州寺) or Quanzhou temple. Later on, it extended its 
                                                 
413
 Before the establishment of these three Chinese temples, Goshinji (悟真寺) 
catered services to the Chinese people staying in Nagasaki. Established in 1598, it is 
the oldest Buddhist temple in Nagasaki. The Goshinji International Cemetery contains 
some of the oldest tombstones belonging to early Chinese settlers in Nagasaki. 
Takeuchi Mitsuyoshi and Shorota Masayoshi, Nagasaki bosho ichiran: Goshinji 
kokusai bochi hen (List of cemeteries in Nagasaki: Goshinji international cemetery) 
(Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1990).  
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service to those from Zhangzhou as well as Yongchun (永春) and was often refered as 
Shōshūdera (漳州寺) or Zhangzhou temple.414 At first, the Chinese temples served 
only the most basic religious needs of the Chinese expatriate community, mainly 
conducting funeral and memorial services. At this early stage, the religious identity of 
émigré monks was often obscure. For example, some of the monks came to Nagasaki 
as traders and then became monks to fill the needs of local Chinese communities.415  
 
Sōfukuji and the Wei Brothers 
In 1629, Sōfukuji was inaugurated by a group of Chinese people from Fuzhou 
area as the third Chinese religious institution established in Nagasaki. Hence, it was 
known popularly as Fukushūji (福州寺) or Fuzhou temple. The majority of its 
supporters were the migrants from Fuqing, Changyue (長楽) and Minhou (閩候) 
counties.416 Similar to the other two Chinese temples in Nagasaki, the origins of the 
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 For the origins of the Chinese temples in Nagasaki, see Li Hsien-chang, 
“Nagasaki santōji no seiritsu (Foundations of the Three Chinese Temples in 
Nagasaki)”, Kinsei bukkyō: Shiryō to kenkyū, 6 (1962): 9-26; Nakamura, “Kinsei 
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 Yoshinaga Setsudō, “Ōbakusō no torai ni tsuite”, in Kōfugaiu, ed., Miura 
Jitsudō (Nagasaki: Fukusaiji, 1924), 2; Jiang, “Orthodoxy, Controversy and the 
Transformation of Chan Buddhism”, 274.     
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 Uchida, Nihon kakyō shakai no kenkyū, 51-66; Nakamura, “Kinsei nihon no 
kakyō”, 233-9.  
 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, Fuqing natives comprised a large part of 
the Chinese community in Nagasaki. In the early 1980s, scholars conducted field 
research at the Sōfukuji cemetery and collected data from the inscriptions of Chinese 
tombstones. Among 225 tombstones surveyed, ninety-six belonged to those from 
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temple probably dates back further to when merchants of Fuzhou origin first 
enshrined and revered statues of the sea goddess mazu (媽祖). In 1632, the temple 
was officially recognized as a Buddhist monastery with the Chinese monk Chaoran  
(超然)(1567-1644) as its designated founder. As soon as its authorization as a 
Buddhist monastery was granted by the bakufu, an independent hall dedicated to mazu 
worship, called Masodō (媽祖堂) was constructed.417 Through the generations, the 
abbot of the Sōfukuji gave the highest priority to looking after this tutelary deity of 
seafaring people.418  
 
As natives of the Fuqing county, which is located northeast of Fuzhou, the Wei 
brothers were one of the most active members of the Sōfukuji monastic community in 
its early days. The Wei clan was counted as one of the four biggest patrons (J. danotsu 
檀越) in the early days of the Sōfukuji, alongside Wang (王), He (何) and Lin (林) 
clans.419 After Itchien passed away in 1654, his contribution to the temple was 
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well-appreciated and remembered through Zhiyan’s constant participation in various 
religious activities at the temple. In 1682, for example, Zhiyan requested the temple to 
hold a ceremony to commemorate the thirty-year anniversary of Itchien’s death.420  
 
 
Photograph by the author. 
Figure 4.1  The Masodō at the Sōfukuji 
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 Junshin joshi tankidaigaku Nagasaki chihō bunkashi kenkyūjo ed., 
Nagasaki zushi (Nagasaki: Junshin joshi tankidaigaku, 1991), 113. The original 
manuscript by a Nagasaki local Suitsū, aka Nagasaki Kunjo, was compiled in 1715.     
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 Hirakubo Akira ed., Sokuhi zenshū: shinsan kōtei, Vol. 1, 52-3. 
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Photograph by the author. 
Figure 4.2  Junpūji 
 
Photograph by the author.  
Figure 4.3  Senrigan 
 
 
The Wei brothers played notable roles in the construction of the masodō (Figure 
4.1). The stone-paved approach to reach the masodō was constructed with funds from 
donation by Zhiyan.421 Inside the hall, the mazu is seated on the central alter of the 
hall. She is accompanied by other subsidiary deities. In front of them are two 
colorfully painted guards protecting the goddess. The red guard standing on the right 
side is Junpūji (C: Shun feng er 順風耳), “favorable wind ears” (Figure 4.2), while 
the blue guard on the left was called Senrigan (C: Qian li yan 千里眼), “thousand 
leagues eyes” (Figure 4.3). The two statues of the demon guards were said to have 
been carved in China.422 Apart from these two statues, two panels and a pair of ren (J. 
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 Miyata, Nagasaki Sōfukuji ronkō, 526. See also Chapter One.  
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聯) are related to the Wei brothers.423 A horizontal panel “Hai bu yang bo (海不揚波
)” is above the alter for the mazu. It was written by Itchien and literally translates to 
“the sea that does not wave”. A pair of wooden ren donated by Zhiyan can be found 
on the columns above the altar for the mazu (Figure 4.4). The second panel, “Wan li 
an lan (萬里安瀾)” (Figure 4.5), is attached to the outer wall of the entrance of the 
masodō. It says “peaceful waves prevail thousands of miles”. These ornamentations 
of the building physically attest to the sea-oriented nature of the Wei brothers.  
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Photograph by the author. 
 




Photograph by the author. 
Figure 4.6  Daiyūhoden 
 
After the hall of the mazu, the first gate for the temple Daiippōmon (第一峰門) 
was set in place in 1644. All the structural components of this gate were measured and 
cut in China before they were transported to Nagasaki.424 The construction of the 
main hall, Daiyūhōden (大雄寶殿), was completed in the early spring of 1646 with 
donations by He Gaocai as well as Wei Zhiyan. Plates and hangings were donated by 
Zhiyan (Figure 4.6). Although we are unable to assess the original dates when they 
were set up in the hall, they reveal strong connections between the Wei brothers and 
the Sōfukuji. In addition, in 1647, Itchien donated 150 taels for the casting of the 
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temple bell. His name is engraved on the surface of the bell.425 Their influence on the 
Sōfukuji is evident up until the present day.  
 
The Importance of Being Buddhist 
It is evident that the Wei brothers were instrumental in the foundation of the 
Sōfukuji. While their involvement could be attributed to sheer religiosity on their part, 
this was but one of the reasons for them close associated to this Buddhist monastery. 
Firstly, it was critical for them to prove that they were not Christians to be able to 
remain and trade in Nagasaki. Throughout the Edo period (1603-1867), the core of the 
bakufu’s policy towards religion was strictly “No Christianity”. In December 1637, a 
Christian uprising broke out in Shimabara (島原) and Amakusa (天草) Islands nearby 
Nagasaki. There has been a longstanding discussion among historians of Japanese 
history about whether the nature of the rebellion was essentially religious or not. It is 
enough to point out that from the very beginning the bakufu regarded it as a Christian 
rebellion.426 After the rebellion, adamant about eradicating Christianity from 
Japanese soil, the bakufu launched a storm of anti-Christian persecution. In 1639, all 
Portuguese people and their local families were expelled indefinitely. When a 
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 Many studies have been done on the rebellion. For this thesis, I refer mainly 
to Irimoto Masuo, “Shimabarano ran to kirishitan ikki (Shimabara rebellion and 
Christian ‘uprising’)”, in Sakoku, eds., Katō Eiichi and Yamada Tadao (Tokyo: 
Yūhikaku, 1981), 223-71; Kanda Chisato, Shimabara no ran: Kirisnitan shinkō to 
busō hōki (Shimabara rebellion: Christian belief and armed uprising) (Tokyo: 
Chuōkōronsha, 2006).     
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Portuguese embassy arrived from Macao in the next summer with the hope of 
reopening trade in Japan, sixty-one Portuguese members of the embassy were 
executed. Their galliot was burned and subsequently sunk at the Nagasaki harbor. In 
the aftermath of this incident, the bakufu was wary of possible Portuguese 
retaliation.427 Regardless of the bakufu’s stern anti-Christian policy, however, Jesuit 
priests continued to set foot on Japanese soil. In August 1642, a group of Jesuit priests 
and their servants were arrested on one of the Ryūkū Islands (琉球諸島).428 Again, 
less than a year later, a group of ten Christians was taken prisoner on a small island 
off the coast of Hirado. It turned out that a Chinese junk gave them passage to 
Japan.429 The point is that the bakufu had reason for concern about an impending 
Portuguese retribution and about continuous Christian infiltration via Chinese junks 
during the 1640 which impacted its dealings with Chinese traders.430  
 
In 1639, Inoue Chikugo no kami Masashige (井上筑後守政重) (1585-1662) 
was appointed to the Shūmon aratame yaku (J. 宗門改役) (the office of Grand 
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Inquisitor of Religious Affairs).431 A system of religious surveillance (J. Shūmon 
aratame 宗門改め) was designed to prove that all persons on Japanese soil were 
non-Christian by affiliating people with authorized Buddhist temples. Since around 
the 1620s, it had been carried out by some local lords (J. daimyō 大名) in an 
inconsistent manner.432 In the wake of the Shimabara rebellion, the bakufu developed 
it into a nation-wide religious surveillance system. This was achieved through 
institutionalizing danka seido (檀家制度) or the patron system. Under the the danka 
system, the entire populace was required to register at a Buddhist temple within a 
certain geographical and social area.433 By means of an annual examination of 
religious beliefs, a Buddhist temple issued household members a surety to the effect 
that none of them was Christian. In this way, all Japanese were administratively 
incorporated into the existing Buddhist structure and being a Buddhist became the 
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only way to prove one’s non-Christian identity.434 Chinese residents of Japan were no 
exception to these measures.  
 
The ostensible evolution of the mazu hall into a Buddhist monastery was a 
unique phenomenon in seventeenth-century Nagasaki. Apart from the Sōfukuji, the 
two older Chinese temples also had their roots in shrines where Chinese traders 
gathered and venerated the mazu. The three temples simultaneously transformed into 
Buddhist monasteries in the 1640s. Scholars of Japanese history have not agreed on 
the extent to which the anti-Christian persecution by the bakufu prompted the geneses 
of Chinese Buddhist temples in Nagasaki.435 However, we should keep in mind that a 
temple for the mazu did not necessarily have to be annexed by a Buddhist temple in 
such places as Malacca, Pho Hien, Hoi An, Batavia, Banten and Taiwan where 
Chinese traders settled and from where they fitted out junks to Nagasaki during the 
seventeenth century.436 Apart from that, the absence of temples for Taoist, Confucian 
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and clan worshipping in seventeenth-century Nagasaki was obvious.437 Together, 
these factors suggest that the bakufu’s anti-Christian policy seared upon the evolution 
of the mazu halls into full-fledged Buddhist temples in Nagasaki.  
 
Institutionalization of the Chinese Temples 
As mentioned earlier, it was the custom for a Chinese vessel to carry an image 
of mazu and other deities onboard during the voyage.438 Chinese mariners believed 
the goddess could control water and give divine protection through their journey 
across the sea. The veneration of mazu was a very important part of their seafaring 
life. Shipboard organization of a Chinese junk included a honggong (C. 香工), a crew 
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member whose exclusive duty was to pay homage to the mazu and make offerings 
every morning and evening during the voyage.439 When a vessel entered a port, the 
mazu was carefully disembarked and transferred to a special place where she was 
housed until the junk’s next voyage.440 The three Chinese temples were established 
during the 1620s based on such a shrine dedicated to the worship of the mazu. In the 
1640s, as mentioned earlier, these shrines rapidly evolved into temples with a more 
explicit Buddhist color. It is no coincidence that this decade was the height of 
anti-Christian persecution.  
 
Since 1639, the bakufu repeatedly issued anti-Christian orders to crew members 
of Chinese junks. At the same time, the authorities began utilizing the Chinese 
temples as a medium for disseminating its anti-Christian orders among the Chinese in 
Nagasaki.441 On 2 September 1639, the special envoy from the bakufu, Ōta Bicchū no 
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kami Sukemune (太田備中守資宗)(1600-1680) personally gave the final deportation 
order to the Portuguese. On the same day, chief merchants and skippers of Chinese 
junks, who were present in town, received a summons from the office of the 
magistrates. In the early morning of 3 September, all gathered before Ōta Bicchū no 
kami. He read out an order from the shogun.  
 
The prohibition of bringing Catholic priests and their Christian followers 
into Japan has been reinforced. From now on, if priests, their followers or 
Christian objects as well as books are discovered onboard a junk, regardless 
of what is written or who is aboard, the vessel will be sent to the bottom of 
the sea along with all of its cargos and crew members. In the meantime, any 
informant will be richly rewarded.442  
 
Afterwards, a copy of the order was handed to those in attendance. The Chinese were 
excused after they pledged to obey the order.443 Similar orders were issued in 1640 
and 1641 respectively.444 Besides these repeated orders, a new process of cargo 
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inspection (J. niaratame 荷改) was probably introduced around this time. Before 
anyone onboard was permitted to set foot on the ground, official inspectors checked 
the cargoes and crew members’ belongings for any possession of Christian related 
objects.445  
 
Chinese monks and temples were supposed to play a role in the screening of 
crew members’ religious backgrounds. In the spring of 1642, a magistrate of Nagasaki 
Baba Toshishige (馬場利重) (d. 1657) issued an order specifically to the 
aforementioned three Chinese temples and asked for their cooperation. The shogun 
requested the abbots of the Chinese temples examine the religious affiliations of junk 
crew members. In particular, the monks were requested to observe cargo handling 
operations and to observe crew members when they brought their mazu into a Chinese 
temple.446 This was because an image of the female deity of the mazu could have 
resembled to the Virgin Mary and the local Japanese officials, who were unfamiliar 
with foreign objects, had difficulties in distinguishing between the two. The 
magistrates needed Chinese monks, who had crossed the sea personally and were 
acquainted with seafaring customs, to help examine and identify the female figure as a 
Chinese sea goddess and, consequently, a non-Christian deity. After the monk assured 
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of the non-Christian nature of the figure, the mazu was installed safely at one of the 
Chinese temples. A visit to the temple became an integral part of the religious 
screening and Chinese temples functioned as an official surveillance mechanism for 
ensuring that there were no Christian influences on Chinese junks.447  
 
During the early 1640s, the bakufu’s persistent investigations uncovered more 
than a few incidents in which Christian objects were uncovered on Chinese junks.448 
These incidents sparked fear among the Chinese on the other junks. “They [the 
Chinese] have sold very little of their cargo and are sitting around very sad and 
worried about how the matter will be solved”, wrote the chief of the Dutch factory at 
Nagasaki, Jan van Elserack.449  
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Daghregisters Volume XI 1641-1650, 68-9, 178-9. For more cases about Christians 




 Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé, eds., The Deshima Daghregisters, 
Volume XI 1641-1650 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 
2001), 179-80. 
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Chinese merchants from Tonkin had particular reason to worry about their safe 
business conduct in Nagasaki because of ongoing trade between Macao and Tonkin. 
The Portuguese in Macao did not easily give up their trade with Japan. In the first half 
of the 1640s, the Portuguese made every effort to continue their trade with Japan.450 
The handsome profit derived from the Macao-Nagasaki trade was not easy to dismiss. 
When Zheng Zhilong sent his men to Macao to purchase merchandise in 1641, the 
Portuguese refused to sell any with the hope that they would be accepted in Japan 
again.451 The abrupt termination of trade in 1639 left the Portuguese with too much 
stock of expensive silken fabrics that could only be sold in Japan.452 In 1640, 
François Caron (1600-1673) reported to his superiors in Batavia that “they [the 
Portuguese and Chinese] help each other mutually, for otherwise it would not have 
been possible for the Portuguese to carry on”.453 In 1641, the Dutch encountered 
junks of Cambodian Chinese bound for Japan, which carried silken fabrics belonging 
to the Portuguese.454 The Portuguese managed to hold on to their Japanese business 
through Chinese and Japanese merchants in Tonkin and Cambodia during the fist half 
of the 1640s.455 
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In the first half of the 1640s, therefore, the bakufu’s suspicion of finding 
Christians and Christian objects on board junks from Tonkin and Cambodia in 
particular was not entirely groundless. On 15 November 1641, an Oranda tsūji 
Namura Hachizaemon (名村八左衛門) (d. 1674) confided to van Elserack that 
various goods belonging to priests and the Portuguese were discovered on board junks 
from Tonkin and Cambodia. While both junks were forced to leave immediately with 
all their cargoes unsold, the authorities made it clear that much more severe 
punishments would be waiting for them in case they returned to Nagasaki. After this 
incident, the Nagasaki authorities considered banning Chinese junks from Tonkin and 
Cambodia specifically.456 It seemed that this kind of speculation had spread in 
Nagasaki even earlier. Carel Hartsingh (d. 1663), who had left Nagasaki on 19 
December 1640, had already been acquainted with the same rumor at the time of his 
departure.457  
 
Taking such situations into consideration, it is not difficult to infer Itchien’s 
reasons to play a role as the biggest patron of the Sōfukuji as a Buddhist temple. 
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Being a merchant who regularly traveled abroad, he had to be careful and sensitive 
about the bakufu’s skeptical eyes towards seafarers whose overseas conduct the 
authorities had no capacity to control, especially since he wished to settle down in 
Nagasaki.458 His obvious connections with Tonkin could pose him as an additional 
concern. As an owner and operator of junks, he had to make sure that nothing and 
nobody suspicious could be discovered on his vessels. His acquaintance with the 
abbots of the Sōfukuji fostered by his large donations to the temple could have helped 
secure his position in Nagasaki.  
 
The Fuqing Networks 
In the first three quarters of the seventeenth century, the monastic community 
of the Sōfukuji was a particularly influential faction of the Chinese community in 
Nagasaki and it produced several high ranking Chinese officials.459 Within the 
Sōfukuji monastic community, however, those who migrated from Fuqing county 
were particularly influential. Out of the four founding fathers of the temple, three of 
them, namely Itchien, He Caocai and Lin Shoudian, were from Fuqing.460 Another 
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influential Chinese Lin Gongyan (林公琰)(1598-1683) whose son Lin Daorong (林道
栄)(1640-1708) came to prominence as daitsūji was also from Fuqing.461 In reality, 
the Sōfukuji was founded by these merchants from Fuqing. Besides these big 
founders, another example of a member of the temple was Wei Zhiyan’s long-term 
business partner Lin Yuteng. It is known that a merchant called Lin Yuson (林于尊), 
who passed away in Nagasaki in 1691, was from Donghan town, Fuqing county.462 
According to the second letter of his name, it was highly likely that he was a brother 
or cousin of Lin Yuteng. If that was the case, Yuteng and Zhiyan were from the same 
town in the same country.  
 
It was through this Fuqing network that Chinese monks were recruited from 
Fuqing to Nagasaki. The year 1654 was the turning point in the history of the Chinese 
Buddhist temples in Nagasaki as well as in the development of Zen Buddhism in 
Tokugawa Japan.463 In as early as 1652, leaders of the Nagasaki Chinese community 
wrote to rrenowned Chan Master Yinyuan Longqi (隠元隆琦)(1592-1673) to visit 
Nagasaki. After several refusals, Yinyuan finally accepted the invitation and left his 
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monastery, Wanfusi (萬福寺) at Mount Huangbo (黄檗山) in Fuqing county. 
Yinyuan accompanied by twenty of his disciples, finally set foot in Nagasaki in May 
1654.464 Yinyuan himself was a native of Fuqing and many of his disciples who 
accompanied the master to Nagasaki were from the same place. Yinyuan first settled 
in the Kofukuji.465 Then, upon request from a group of Chinese lay believers, 
including Wei Zhiyan, Wang Xinqu (王心渠)(1594-1678), He Gaocai and Lin 
Taiqing (林太卿) (1572-1645), Yinyuan proceeded to the Sōfukuji on 27 June. Wei 
Zhiyan was among those who greeted and welcomed Yinyuan at the temple.466 One 
of Yinyuan’s disciples, Jifei Ruyi (即非如一) (1606-1671) arrived in Nagasaki in 
1657. He was also a native of Fuqing. He soon forged close friendships with the 
Fuqing merchants. In the winter of 1658, Jifei officially became the abbot of the 
Sōfukuji.467  
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Another point to note is that Chinese merchants were often related to one 
another. For example, a merchant called Yu Weihe (兪惟和) (1605-1674), who was 
also an important patron of the Sōfukuji in its early days, left Fuqing for Japan 
following his uncle Lin Taiqing.468 Wang Xinqu’s first daughter (d. 1682) was a wife 
of Lin Daorong.469 One of Zhiyan’s sons Yongzhao married to a daughter of Liu 
Yinyuan (C. 劉宣義) (1633-1695). Liu Yinyuan was second generation migrant from 
Changyue county. He served as daitsuji from 1650 till his death in 1695 and was one 
of the most respected Chinese residents of Nagasaki of his time.470 Moreover, there 
were blood relationships between monks and merchants. Jifei was related to Lin 
Gongyan.471 Yinyuan himself had mercantile connection. In 1669, a merchant called 
Lin Rumo (林汝黙) (d.1675) arrived in Nagasaki. He claimed that he was Yinyuan’s 
nephew.472 Networks among the Fuqing diaspora, or the Fuqing network, were 
instrumental in the foundation of the Sōfukuji. In other words, these Chan masters and 
Chinese merchants were from the same social group in China. 
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Tonkin Merchants in the Sōfukuji Monastic Community 
Yoshinaga Setsudō, in his article published in 1929, pointed out the important 
roles which Tonkin merchants played in the Sōfukuji monastic community. Since 
then, the place of Tonkin merchants in the founding of the monastery has been 
virtually forgotten.473 However, if we carefully look at various writings by prominent 
Ōbaku monks such as Yinyuan and Jifei, it is evident that Wei Zhiyan and other 
merchants from Tonkin had close ties to Yinyuan and Jifei.474 In 1664, He Gaocai 
went up to Ōbakusan Manpukuji (黄檗山萬福寺) in Uji (宇治), Kyoto, which was 
established by Yinyuan in 1661 and was named after the Huangbo Monastery in 
Fuqing. There He had a chance to meet the Masters Yinyuan and Jifei.475 On this 
occasion, He presented a letter and gifts from Zhiyan to Master Yinyuan. The content 
of Zhiyan’s letter is not known, but we do know Yinyuan’s reply to Zhiyan. In his 
letter addressed to Zhiyan, Yinyuan praised Zhiyan for cultivating his virtues while he 
lived in Nagasaki and emphasized the importance of believing in the Three Treasures 
(三宝).476  In the summer, Yinyuan composed a poem to express his joy for the safe 
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return of the “Tonkin merchants” to Nagasaki.477 It should be noted that as far as 
Hirakubo Akira’s editions of Yinyuan’s works is concerned, “Tonkin merchants 
(Tonkinhakushu 東京舶主)” was the only term appeared in the writings of Yinyuan 
that referred to a specific category of merchants. This indicates that there was as 
particular group of merchants who engaged in trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki.  
 
As for Jifei, Zhiyan personally visited Jifei at the Sōfukuji and discussed the 
matter relating to his belief although it is not possible to determine exactly when their 
meeting took place.478 In 1657, a group of nine “Tonkin merchants” visited Jifei at 
the Sōfukuji on the day of the winter solstice. This group was composed of Wei 
Zhiyan, Lin Ershou (林爾受), Gu Changqing, He Junteng (何君騰), He Zhirang (何
子譲), He Kunmei (何崑嵋), Pan Xuereng (潘雪仍), Lin Shixiang (林石香) and Yue 
Meichu (薛梅初).479  
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Some of these “Tonkin merchants” appeared in Jifei’s writings more than once, 
suggesting they bonded over several decades. In the fall of 1657, Lin Ershou 
consulted Jifei with their compositions of poetry.480 In 1666, Jifei, who at that time 
resided at Kōjusan Fukujuji (廣寿山福聚寺) in present Fukuoka (福岡), expressed 
his desire to go back to China in his poem addressed to Gu Changqing, Lin Shixiang, 
Lin Ershou and He Zhirang.481 There are further references to Tonkin merchants in 
Jifei’s writings, but they were not dated. For example, Jifei edited Japanese-style 
poetry composed by Lin Yuteng, Gu Changqing and Lin Ershou.482 Jifei composed a 
mournful poetry for Yue Meichu who died after twenty years being away from his 
home in China.483 On one occasion, Jifei presented a poem to Gu Changqing, Lin 
Ershou and He Kunmei respectively.484  
 
On the business side, these merchants were involved in Zhiyan’s trade. In 1675, 
Gu Changqing, who also hailed from Fuzhou, arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
onboard one of Zhiyan’s junks.485 We have no information as to whether he left 
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Nagasaki since that visit. In the end, he passed away in Nagasaki in 1679.486 In the 
case of Lin Ershou, we have a little more concrete evidence showing that Lin Ershou 
worked closely with Lin Yuteng. As mentioned earlier, Lin Ershou’s first appearance 
in Nagasaki was recorded in 1657. In 1682, Lin Ershou resurfaced in Nagasaki 
onboard Lin Yuteng’s junk. Ershou returned to Tonkin that year. In 1684, while 
Yuteng’s junk departed from Tonkin to Nagasaki, Yuteng entrusted 400 teals of silver 
to Lin Ershou who remained in Tonkin that summer.487 We have no information 
about other Tonkin merchants. Yet, due to the fact that they visited the temple with 
Zhiyan and that most Chinese junks coming from Tonkin around this time were under 
Zhiyan, it can be assumed that these “Tonkin merchants” were either working for 
Zhiyan or traveling merchants from Tonkin who took a ride on Zhiyan’s junks.488  
 
In addition, it might be the case that He Gaocai, one of the four founding 
fathers of the Sōfukuji who was also from Fuqing, came to Nagasaki via Tonkin as 
was the case with the Wei brothers. Nakamura Tadashi once mentioned that He 
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Gaocai was a “Tonkin merchant”.489 According to Miyata Yasushi, Watanabe 
Kuranosuke regarded He Gaocai as a “Tonkin merchant”. Miyata said that he could 
not find anything that supported Watanabe’s claim.490 With the lack of references, I 
was not able to verify either Nakamura or Watanabe’s claims. Nonetheless, judging 
from the above-listed names of Tonkin merchants such as He Junteng, He Zhirang 
and He Kunmei, I believe there is a high possibility that He Gaocai once lived or, at 
least, had relatives in Tonkin.  
 
The Chan masters were recruited and invited to Japan though networks among 
the Fuqing merchants. Wei Zhiyan and the “Tonkin merchants” patronized the 
Sōfukuji because of their linkage to Fuqing. The Sōfukuji was established by this 
group of Fuqing merchants and “Tonkin merchants” was an integral component of it. 
In other words, Fuqing network was the backbone of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade.  
 
In terms of fiscal matter, Chinese temples in Nagasaki were completely and 
exclusively dependent on donations from their lay patrons.491 Therefore, their 
congregations’ economic status directly reflected upon the temples’ financial 
well-being. From the 1660s to around 1688, the Sōfukuji flourished under the abbacy 
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of Master Jifei. In fact, this period is regarded as the heyday of both the Sōfukuji and 
the Fukusaiji, which was established by emigrants from southern Fujian.492 On the 
other hand, as mentioned earlier, the congregation of the Kōfukuji was comprised of 
Chinese migrants from the Nanjing area. Under the Qing’s maritime ban, few junks 
managed to sail out from the region and, as a result, the temple faced serious financial 
difficulties in the second half of the seventeenth century.493 This confirms that 
merchants from Fuzhou area were a major force in commercial exchange in the China 
Sea region in the mid-seventeenth century.  
 
As far as the Sōfukuji is concerned, Nakamura Tadashi pointed to two factors 
that contributed to the prosperity of the Sōfukuji in the later-half of the seventeenth 
century, namely, the monopoly of the Japan trade by the Zheng regime until 1683 and 
the subsequent increase in the number of junks coming from Fujian to Nagasaki after 
the lift of the Qing maritime ban in 1684.494 However, it is doubtful that these two 
factors played any part in bringing about the heyday of the Sōfukuji. First of all, as 
described in Chapter Two, most Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki after 1685 were 
from Nanjing area. Secondly, Zheng Zhilong hailed from Quanzhou and accordingly 
the Zheng clan belonged to the congregation of the Fukusaiji. This is confirmed by 
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the fact that the Zheng’s trustee in Nagasaki Chen Daolong (陳道隆)(d. 1676) was the 
most powerful patron of the Fukusaiji from 1640 till his death. Chen Daolong was a 
son of Zhangzhou native. The Zheng family had many junks under their influence but 
they were mostly from southern Fujian. The existence of the Sōfukuji and the 
Fukusaiji as two separate religious institutions suggests that merchants from southern 
and northern Fujian were two distinct sub-ethnic groups and they did not mingle well 
with each other. Thus, the Zheng’s commercial activities had no immediate link to the 
Sōfukuji. The pinnacle of the Sōfukuji was attained due to the successful commercial 
undertakings of the Fuqing merchants. It is no doubt that Wei Zhiyan and other 
“Tonkin merchants” played an important role in this development. The golden age of 
the Sōfukuji ended in the late-1680s when Tonkinese raw silk lost its place on the 
Japan market as a result of Qing’s new maritime policies. 
 
Music, Poetry and Portraits 
Apart from patronages of the Buddhist monasteries, another interesting aspect 
of merchants’ life in Nagasaki was their cultural activities. As has been mentioned, 
Tonkin merchants, including Zhiyan, consulted with the Ōbaku masters about poetry. 
Merchants and monks presented poems to each other on several occasions. Poetry 
worked as a communication media both within and outside the Chinese community in 
Nagasaki.  In 1676, at the height of the mid-autumn season, the magistrates of 
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Nagasaki Ushigome Chūzaemon invited Liu Xuanyi and Lin Daorong to a poetry 
party at his residence. Alongside two of the most respected and influential Chinese 
residents of Nagasaki, three “Ming Chinese” from Tonkin, Gu Changqing, He Qianfu 
(何倩甫) and Lin Shangzhen (林上珍) joined the party and each of them composed a 
poem about the mid-autumn.495 Around the same time, Ushigome introduced He 
Qianfu and Lin Shangzhen to a young Japanese scholar Ōtakasaka Shizan (大高坂芝
山) (1647-1713) who was keen to learn Chinese poetry.496 He Qianfu was a Fuqing 
native. This makes that except for Lin Shangzhen who was from Zhangzhou, this 
group was comprised of northern Fujian diaspora.497  
 
Besides poetry, music was another important cultural medium through which 
Chinese migrants and Japanese people interacted with each other. Apparently, Zhiyan 
was a musician of some sort. During the Edo period, two types of Chinese music were 
imported to Japan via Nagasaki. One was Mingaku (明樂), meaning “Ming-styled 
music” and the other was Shingaku (清樂), which was supposed to be the music of the 
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Qing period.498 Zhiyan is widely considered as the founder of the mingaku in 
Japan.499 There is graphic evidence illuminating musical aspect of his life. One of his 
portraits depicts Zhiyan playing a type of Chinese flute called changxiao (長簫) 
(Figure 4.7). Zhiyan’s grand son Ōga Tamibe (鉅鹿民部)(1728-1774) chose not to 
succeed as the head of the family and instead pursued musical career as a Mingaku 
master in Kyoto.500 According to Tamibe’s account, Zhiyan fled from China with his 
musical instruments and brought them to Nagasaki.501 His Wei shi yue qi introduced a 
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set of instruments including changxiao (Figure 4.7). After Wei Zhiyan was granted 
permanent residency in Nagasaki, he requested permission from the magistrates of 
Nagasaki to travel up to Kyoto and Osaka. Apparently, the permission was granted as 
around the end of 1672 or the beginning of 1673 he visited Kyoto. In Kyoto, Zhiyan 
had occasion to showcase his mastery of Mingaku at the court of the emperor.502 The 
only possible way that this could be arranged was through the good connections 
between the emperor’s court and the Obaku monks at the Manpukuji.503   
 
 
Color on silk. Not dated. 
Source: Miura, Kōfūgaiu, 51. 
Figure 4.7  Wei Zhiyan and His Two Sons Playing Music on a Boat 
                                                                                                                                            
musicology, see Hayashi Kenzō, Ming yue ba diao yan jiu (Studies on the eight 
musical scores of mingaku) (Shanghai: Yueyun chubanshe, 1957).      
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Figure 4.8 Changxiao and Other Musical Instruments Depicted in Wei shi yue qi 
 
 
Mingaku was composed of instrumental and vocal parts. According to a scholar 
of Chinese music who examined the Mingaku scores, the songs bear remnants of 
southern Song culture.504 A reading of the lyrics suggests that it contained elements 
of court, religious and literati music, which was dissimilar to popular folk music.505 
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Besides being performed and enjoyed privately, Mingaku was performed at Chinese 
temples during religious ceremonies and festivals.506 It is not surprising that a scholar 
indicated the similarity in pronunciations between the Ōbaku chants and Mingaku 
phonetics.507 On the other hand, Shingaku, which is said to have been brought into 
Japan in the first-half of the nineteenth century, was folk music from the Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces.508 The difference between Mingaku 
and Shingaku might suggest that the social and cultural backgrounds of the merchants 
coming into Nagasaki had changed greatly from the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
century. However, to argue this point would carry us too far away from the purpose of 
this thesis. It should be underscored that Wei Zhiyan played Mingaku which was a 
mixture of court, religious (both Buddhism and Taoism) and literati music in the 
Fujian area in the early-seventeenth century. 
 
Lastly, I shall mention a legend regarding the origin of “lion (J. 獅子)” in 
Nagasaki. Every year, the city of Nagasaki holds an autumn festival called the 
Nagasaki Kunchi festival (J. 長崎くんち). During this festival, dances and parades 
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were performed by representatives of each district in front of the Suwa Shrine (諏訪
神社). The origin of the festival dates as far back as 1634. Around 1655, a dance 
performance called “Karako shishi odori (唐子獅子踊)” was added in the repertoire 
of performances.509 What makes it particularly interesting for us is that people of 
Nagasaki believe this particular “lions” of “Karako shishi odori” came not from China 
but from Tonkin. The music played, with which the lions dance accordingly, is 
believed to be one of the Mingaku tunes that Wei Zhiyan brought into Nagasaki.510  
The year 1655 was when Zhiyan began his own business after Itchien’s death. Lions 
from Tonkin dancing in tune with Mingaku could have been a suitable celebration for 
launching his career in the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade.    
 
There are five remaining portraits of Wei Zhiyan (Figure 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 3.9 and 
4.7). There portraits were a blend of painting, poetry and calligraphy, drawn in the 
style that were popular among the literati in the end of the Ming period. Two of them 
were drawn by a Japanese portrait painter Kita Genki (喜多元規) (active 1664-1709). 
Kita was a prolific painter who worked exclusively within the confines of the Ōbaku 
monastic community. His portrait subjects included Chan masters and other Japanese 
Ōbaku monks. Although he produced hundreds of portraits during his career, he drew 
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only a handful of portraits of laypersons.511 The fact that Genki drew Zhiyan’s 
portrait is yet another implication that Zhiyan was an important figure in the Ōbaku 
monastic community in Nagasaki.  
 
Unfortunately, we have is no information on Chinese merchants’ religious or 
cultural activities in Tonkin. However, the following episode gives us a glimpse of 
what might have occurred between Tonkinese officials and Chinese traders alongside 
business. In 1673, the English traders at Pho Hien recorded a peculiar behavior of 
Ung-ja Thay, one of the Chua’s disppachadores. In the evening of 8 March, Ung-ja 
Thay visited English factors at their new house in Pho Hien. Ung-ja Thay told 
William Gyfford that he came with his musicians and singers to be merry with the 
English. Ung-ja Thay and his men stayed with the English at the house until midnight. 
In the interim, his men took, or “stole” as Gyfford bitterly remarked, a small silver 
cup. When Gyfford complained about it to Ung-ja Thay, Ung-ja Thay just told 
Gyfford that he promised to do great things for the English at the Chua’s court if they 
gave the cup to his singers.512 Although Gyfford seemed to be unappreciative about 
Ung-ja Thay’s offer, this is a telling incident. It is unlikely that Ung-ja Thay treated 
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the English as such without a preceding practice. One can only guess that Vietnamese 
officials might have visited Chinese merchants at their lodgings to spend a joyful time 
together and yet at the same time to make a deal with each other.  
 
Late-Ming Literati Culture 
Blood relationships and homeland affiliations were the essential factors that 
bound Chinese emigrants in Nagasaki together. However, in order to secure their 
place in a potentially volatile foreign country, networks and cooperation among 
merchants and monks were not enough. For their survival and success, it was 
important to be able to extend their influence beyond the closely-knit Chinese émigré 
community. Late-Ming high culture represented in music, poetry and painting 
provided means to communicate with elite members of the local Nagasaki 
community. 
 
Wu Jiang, who studied the transmission of Chan Buddhism to Japan in the 
seventeenth century, aptly pointed out that “from the perspective of cultural exchange, 
the transmission of Chan Buddhism in Japan was not simply a religious event. Along 
with the transmission of the Buddhist dharma, various associated cultural elements 
were introduced into Japan. In addition to their religious teachings, Chan Buddhists 
reconfigured various cultural elements and presented themselves as representative of 
 184
Chinese high culture. In this sense, the Ōbaku monks were not only messengers of a 
new Buddhist teaching, but they were also the transmitters of high culture”.513  Louis 
Jaque Berger, in his study on the Chinese émigré community in seventeenth-century 
Nagasaki, observed that “Chinese monks played a social and political role in the 
creation of a network of international intellectual exchange based upon shared 
spiritual beliefs and intellectual ideals: respectively Buddhism and Chinese secular 
literati culture”.514 He continued that “Interactions between Chinese monks and 
leading Japanese scholars paved the way for the beginnings of an elite, multi-ethnic 
intellectual society in late-seventeenth century Tokugawa Japan…. It was only 
possible for these Chinese and Japanese intellectual elites to share these cultural 
media because they shared knowledge of literary Chinese, the high-status language of 
Japan as well as China at this time”.515 Because Chan Buddhism was an integral part 
of late-Ming Chinese literati life, as Timothy Brook vividly illustrated, it is safe to say 
that it was Chinese literati culture that provided common ground for Chinese monks 
and Japanese elites to develop mutually beneficial relationships. Both Wu and 
Berger’s observations were right about the important roles that Chinese monks played 
in religious, cultural and intellectual exchanges between the Chinese émigré 
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community and elite members of the local society in Nagasaki. It is no doubt that high 
culture, or more specifically late-Ming literati culture in this case, helped the monks 
make inroads into the upper echelons of the local society in order to achieve their 
religious and, perhaps, political goals.  
 
However, what Wu and Burger missed was that it was not only the monks that 
participated in and contributed to such transmission of high culture. A handful of 
monks newly migrated from China without any backing could not have achieved 
much. Firstly, the monks needed financial means that enabled them to enact the lives 
of high culture and to keep their religious allure alive. Secondly, the existence of lay 
believers was crutial since it was only through these individual patrons that cultural, 
religious and social life could be played out in front of the local audience. For these 
two reasons, it is no exaggeration to say that it was Chinese merchants’ commercial 
success that prompted the expansion of the Ōbaku sect and its emergence as the third 
biggest sect of Zen (Chan) Buddhism in Japan in the course of the seventeenth 
century. Chinese residents of Nagasaki invited monks from China to serve not only 
their spiritual but also their secular needs. On the other hand, accepting invitations 
from the Chinese community in Nagasaki, Chan monks took the opportunity to spread 
their lineage overseas. It was a natural course of action for the Chan monks because 
Chan Buddhism was essentially a missionary religion.516   
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Describing connections between Buddhist monasteries and secular powers, 
Brook pointed out that “the [late Ming] gentry’s patronage may be regarded as a 
proactive undertaking designed to create an associational matrix through which they 
could negotiate common concerns and represent their joint identity both to the state 
and to those outside the elite”.517 Buddhism “played a significant role in the cultural 
construction of the late-Ming gentry, helping to illustrate their status and define their 
autonomy at a time when status was contestable”.518 A similar process can be seen in 
the patronage given by Chinese merchants to Buddhist monasteries in Japan. Chinese 
merchants’ patronage to Chinese Buddhist temples at Nagasaki could be considered 
as a site where Chinese settlers related to each other, negotiated their common 
concerns, which included economic interests, and represented their identity to the 
authorities and the people of Japan. In this regard, the construction of Buddhist 
temples and other philanthropic activities such as the construction of bridges could be 
recognized as social and cultural projects that served to define the status of the 
Chinese émigré community in Nagasaki and reaffirm their joint identity as Chinese 
and residents of Nagasaki. 
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Just as the local gentry of late-Ming China enjoyed the privilege of calling upon 
the magistrate on matters which concerned them personally, leaders of the Nagasaki 
Chinese community established their friendships with the magistrates of Nagasaki and 
exerted informal influence on decisions affecting their own interests. Such traits also 
suggest a connection between the late-Ming gentry class and overseas commerce. 
While there is no conclusive evidence to reinforce this connection, Chinese 
merchants’ public behavior indicate that Chinese junk traders, who migrated from 
China amid the chaotic Ming-Qing transition, were members of the gentry families of 
the late-Ming period. The Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki was in fact a 
reenactment of the late-Ming gentry life. This was the key for their success at 
Nagasaki as their high culture was something that the Japanese elites appreciated. 
This cultural package enabled them to communicate with the magistrates of Nagasaki 
at a level that the Dutch factors could not. The VOC surely tried to reach out to 
influential persons by presenting exotic gifts and giving them opportunities to view 
modern arms. But, no matter how impressive they might be, objects themselves were 
insufficient to get them into the inner circle of the local commercial elites.  
 
Conclusion 
Merchants from Fuqing, Changye and Minhou counties established the 
Sōfukuji. Among them, those from Fuqing constituted the most influential faction of 
the Sōfukuji monastic community. Their strong position within the congregation was 
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derived from the fact that Fuqing merchants dominated the lucrative Tonkin-Nagasaki 
silk trade. Wei Zhiyan successfully organized his business between northern Vietnam 
and Nagasaki as a ringleader of the Fuqing traders. The wealth they accumulated from 
the Tonkin silk export to Japan contributed to the realization of the golden age of the 
Sōfukuji in the second-half of the seventeenth century. Because donations were the 
only source of income, Chinese monasteries’ financial standings exclusively 
depended on their patrons’ commercial success or failure. Chinese monks had reasons 
to promote trade for their own benefit. Besides protecting patrons from the 
anti-Christian persecutions, Buddhist monks played intermediary roles and the 
monastery provided a platform for Chinese merchants to form and cultivate 
relationships with the authorities. Religion and culture became the medium for 
communication and partnerships with elite members of the local ocommercial 
community. Therefore, the reality of the Chinese Buddhist temples in Nagasaki was 
economic as much as religious and cultural.  
 
In a broader Chinese social and cultural context, Chinese merchant’ patronage 
of Buddhist institutions should be examined against the backdrop of the formation of 
gentry society and the revival of Buddhism in the late-Ming China. Chinese monks 
and merchants brought literati culture that was peculiar to the late-Ming gentry 
society. Wei brothers’ undertakings such as their patronage of a Buddhist temple, 
intimate relationships with the magistrates of Nagasaki and contribution to the public 
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reveal that they acted upon a code of conduct typical of late-Ming gentry. The nature 
of Chinese maritime commerce during the seventeenth century was in essence private 
and informal, a pattern embedded in the socio-economic developments of the 
late-Ming gentry society in China. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WEI ZHIYAN AND THE SUBVERSION OF THE “SAKOKU” 
 
 
This chapter explores the question of how Wei Zhiyan managed to carry on with his 
overseas trade at Nagasaki despite increasingly restrictive Japanese foreign and trade 
policies. Nagasaki was the only port of trade that Chinese junks were allowed to 
access from the mid-1630s onwards. Studies of the Chinese junk trade with 
Tokugawa Japan under the so-called sakoku policy fall, in general, into two categories 
-- namely studies of institutions and studies of quantities. The first focused on 
administrative institutions, regulations and procedures that the Tokugawa authorities 
installed one after another over the years. The latter made great and almost heroic 
efforts to quantify imports and exports carried by Chinese junks as opposed to those 
by the Dutch ships. Yet, such approaches inherently conceal and gloss over more 
“human” aspects of trade and the fact that trade often took place outside the law. This 
is to say that individual traders and their networks among the local Japanese 
community have never been studied in any real depth.  
 
Chinese merchants exerted their influence over local officials at Nagasaki by 
mobilizing their social and cultural assets. This chapter first lays out the regulatory 
frameworks placed upon Chinese people in Nagasaki and the way they were put into 
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practice. Regardless of all the official rules and regulations, Wei Zhiyan resided in 
Nagasaki from the 1650s onwards and continued to trade until the late-1680s. 
Previous studies, which did not acknowledge the existence of such Chinese 
commercial operation originating from Nagasaki under the sakoku, were not able to 
explain how the Wei brothers maneuvered around the restrictive Japanese policies and 
pursued their commercial ventures. By examining Wei Zhiyan’s relationships with the 
local commercial elites, the nature of relationships between Chinese traders and the 
local elites in seventeenth-century Nagasaki will be highlighted.         
 
The “Sakoku” Edicts and Chinese Residents in Japan 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, thriving trade between China and 
Japan created the conditions whereby Chinese residents could be seen everywhere in 
Japan. Chinese junks were allowed to call at any port and people of Chinese origin 
were free to settle anywhere in Japan or to leave there again for other overseas 
venture.519 However, during the 1630s, the Tokugawa bakufu issued five directives 
successively to the magistrates of Nagasaki. The so-called “sakoku” edicts gradually 
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changed the landscape of maritime East and Southeast Asia, including the legal 
position of Chinese junks and residents in Japan.520 The main objectives of these 
directives were to prevent Christian infiltration into Japanese soil and suppress arms 
export from Japan. The Portuguese were eliminated from Japanese soil. Japanese 
people were prohibited from going overseas or even repatriating. As a consequence, 
Dutch and Chinese traders became the sole agents of foreign trade through Nagasaki. 
The following section will outline the contents of the edicts concerning Chinese 
activities at Nagasaki and their effects.  
 
The first series of sakoku edicts was installed in April 1633 and forbade 
Japanese people to go abroad except for those onboard the ships with the rōjū’s 
permits. In addition, for the first time, it placed restrictions on the duration of stay by 
Chinese junks in Japan. It stated that foreign ships had to leave Nagasaki no later than 
the twentieth day of the ninth month each year and, should they arrive later than that, 
they had to depart within fifty days after their arrival at the port.521 This directive was 
designed to limit the duration of foreigners’ stay in Nagasaki, and those visiting 
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Nagasaki were now forced to leave after a stipulated period of time. Chinese traders 
were not exempt from the restriction. This suggests that it was the bakufu’s intention 
that no new immigrants were to be permitted to settle in Japan from 1633 onwards. In 
the meantime, the edict put no restriction on the activities of Chinese residents already 
residing in Japan.  
 
The second and third edicts were similar to the first, but they imposed further 
restrictions on Chinese residents. In 1634, the second decree added an appendix, 
stating that this interdiction was being extended to foreigners living in Japan.522 
Chinese residents were hence prohibited from fitting out their own junks and from 
boarding visiting vessels. 
 
Subsequently, in July 1635, the bakufu issued the third set of directives in 
which overseas trade via Japanese ships was completely suspended. Apart from 
restricting Chinese access exclusively to Nagasaki, the bakufu intended to end 
outbound shipping operations originating from Japan altogether. Without exception, 
Japanese ocean-going vessels were forbidden from departing Japan. All commerce 
with Chinese junks was confined to Nagasaki and the Chinese junks were not to enter 
other Japanese ports along the way to or from Nagasaki.523  
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In August 1635, the head of the Dutch factory at Hirado, Nicolaes 
Couckebacker, was informed that neither Japanese vessels nor Japanese people were 
allowed to leave or return to Japan and the same applied to the Chinese residents in 
Nagasaki.524 Resident Chinese were no longer permitted to leave Japan.  
 
The fourth and fifth ordinances issued in the next few years placed further 
restrictions on the activities of foreigners. In 1636, the fourth ordinance revised and 
reinforced the contents of the third. It included deportation for the offspring of 
Portuguese and Spanish fathers as well as their Japanese wives. These persons were to 
be immediately deported to Macao.525 Following that, in February 1639, the 
magistrates of Nagasaki ordered the Dutch to transfer the offspring of Dutch and 
English men with Japanese women to Batavia, along with their mothers.526 
Concurrently, a prohibition was imposed on the arranging cohabitation of Dutch men 
with Japanese women. In the autumn of 1639, it was prohibited to facilitate marriages 
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between visiting Chinese traders and Japanese women.527 The fifth and final edict, 
which was introduced in the summer of 1639, delivered the death blow to Portuguese 
trade with Japan. It completely barred Portuguese ships from entering Nagasaki. As a 
result, Chinese junks and Dutch ships became the sole agents that were granted direct 
access to the Japan market through Nagasaki.528   
 
The freedom which Chinese residents used to enjoy were gradually restricted 
over the course of the 1630s with each successive edict being issued. In the initial 
phase of the establishment of Tokugawa foreign policy, it was essential to divide 
Chinese people into permanent residents and transient visitors, in order for the bakufu 
to exercise effective control over the movement of people. From 1634, as we have 
seen, the bakufu prohibited Chinese residents from departing Japan. Facing this ban, 
some Chinese residents expressed their discontent by submitting a joint-petition to the 
magistrates to seek permission to go back to China. It is unclear exactly when this 
plea was presented to the magistrates. However, on 2 February 1639, Couckebacker 
received a report from Edo (present-day Tokyo) that:  
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Many Chinese people live in Nagasaki. Some of them are married and have 
children here [in Nagasaki]. For a long time, they have been requesting that 
they would like to go back home to China. But their plea has not yet been 
presented to the council of rōjū, and members of the council have not even 
been informed of the existence of such a plea. Consideration of this appeal is 
to be postponed till the next occasion arises.529  
 
Later on, in May 1639, the authorities granted permission to the Chinese to leave 
Japan. Those who chose repatriation to China were still free to visit Nagasaki for 
trade, but were no longer allowed to reside in Nagasaki in the future.530 On the other 
hand, those who remained in Nagasaki were called “jūtaku tōjin (住宅唐人),” literally 
meaning “resident Chinese”. They were free to make their homes anywhere in the 
town. With their language abilities and familiarity with overseas affairs, many worked 
for the Nagasaki authorities, helping them take care of matters pertaining to Chinese 
junks and people during their stay in Nagasaki. Hence, these resident Chinese were 
incorporated into the local administrative system.  
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Enforcement of the Edicts in Practice 
According to the government policies detailed above, no subject of Japan, 
including Chinese residents, was permitted to leave Japanese soil. But enforcing the 
restrictions was another matter altogether. The question here is how strictly the 
Nagasaki authorities were able, or even willing, to enforce the interdictions. An 
incident, which occurred off the coast of Tonkin between a junk under the VOC and a 
junk under a Chinese allegedly residing in Japan, is illustrative of Japanese officials’ 
attitudes towards Chinese residents in the late-1630s and their laxness in enforcing the 
edicts on investigation when an edict might have been disregarded. The event seems 
to have unfolded as follows.  
 
In the summer of 1638, Carel Hartsinck, the inaugural chief factor of the VOC 
factory in Tonkin, hired a Chinese junk and fitted it out with raw silk and silken 
textiles for the Japan market. On 8 August, the Zantvoort and the chartered junk 
departed together from Tonkin for the Penghu Islands. While Hartstinck was onboard 
the Zantvoort, the chartered junk was in the hands of a Chinese captain, with 
thirty-five Chinese crew and nineteen Company men serving onboard. Shortly after, 
the two vessels parted company near the Gianh River. However, the Chinese crew 
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members who were armed launched a surprise attack on the Dutch ship. The Chinese 
killed all the Dutchmen on board, captured the junk and sailed away with its cargo.531  
 
News of this event reached François Caron, the head of the Hirado Factory, on 
30 July 1639. Somehow, Caron came to believe that the Chinese captain, skipper and 
the main members of this chartered junk were inhabitants of Nagasaki, with wives, 
children and houses in town.532 A month later, Caron visited the governor of 
Nagasaki, Suetsugu Shigefusa (末次茂房), and requested the Nagasaki authorities to 
inquire into the case and find out who committed the assault. He also asked that the 
Chinese offenders be prosecuted and that the assets that belonged to their families be 
seized to compensate for the lost Dutch junk. Suetsugu promised that he would have 
the matter investigated and assured Caron that the magistrates of Nagasaki would take 
the matter seriously if the allegation had reasonable grounds. This is because a 
Chinese resident of Japan who had a wife as well as children, was forbidden from 
setting sail from Japan.533 Suetsugu conveyed the Dutch request to the magistrate but 
no action was taken with regard to the Chinese residents in Nagasaki.534 
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On 4 October 1639, Caron dispatched an interpreter to the magistrate of 
Nagasaki, Ōkouchi Masakatsu (大河内正勝), to enquire as to the progress of the 
investigation. Four days later, Caron received a reply, in which the magistrate insisted 
that:  
 
It is impossible to collect compensation from families of the said Chinese who 
attacked the junk under the Dutch, because his wife and children do not live in 
Nagasaki. This can be proved by the fact that according to the order from the 
bakufu, a resident of Japan is not allowed to set sail from Japan whether a 
foreigner or a Japanese. Therefore, there is nothing the Dutch can do with this 
matter and they are not to demand their rightful compensation here [in 
Nagasaki]. They must seek a fair justice at the place where the murderers’ 
houses are located.535 
 
It was clear that the magistrate had no intention of taking up this matter. Once again, 
on 20 October 1639, Caron brought the issue up for discussion when he personally 
went to Nagasaki for a meeting with the magistrate. Having heard the same story 
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many times, all Ōkouchi did was to repeat the same old mantra: Chinese inhabitants 
who had wives, children and houses in Japan were not allowed to leave the country.536  
 
The magistrate’s words make it clear that the authorities were of the opinion 
that those who did have wives, children and houses in Japan were considered 
“residents” of Japan and thus were forbidden from going abroad. In responding to the 
head of the VOC factory in Japan, they stood firmly on the premise that no illegal 
activities were being conducted by the residents, be they Japanese or Chinese. In 
practice, however, it appears some of the Chinese “residents” of Nagasaki carried on 
their overseas activities during the late-1630s. The Nagasaki authorities were 
undoubtedly aware, or at least informed, of such illegal conduct but were determined 
to turn a blind eye to it.       
 
Itchien’s Failed Attempts   
By the end of the 1640s, Itchien had become one of the most prosperous 
merchants of Fuzhou origin in the Chinese émigré community at Nagasaki. This can 
be deduced from his extraordinary contribution to Buddhist temples in Nagasaki. 
While these contributions were indicative of his wealth, Itchien was not simply being 
generous. He had his own agenda. On 1 May 1652, the chief of the Dutch factory in 
Nagasaki, Adriaen van der Burgh, and his entourage went for an outing around the 
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town of Nagasaki. During the excursion, they paid visits to several temples in town 
and found one particularly beautiful and large temple built by the “One-eyed” Chinese 
not long before: 
 
The Chinese nachoda, whom we call One Eye and who left [Nagasaki] for 
Tonkin on 1 February with excellent capital, had built [this temple] for the 
improvement and adornment of this place [Nagasaki]. But he has not been 
able to obtain a license for a permanent abode in Nagasaki. Notwithstanding 
that he has offered a large sum of silver to this end, he is forced to return to 
Tonkin every year, because he is considered a bandit in China whence he 
returns [to Nagasaki] every year with large capital.537 
 
It was the Sōfukuji that impressed Van der Burgh with the glamour on that 
afternoon. Apparently, Itchien was eager to settle down in Japan and his donations 
were intended to coax the Japanese authorities into granting him permanent residence. 
More tellingly, the Nagasaki authorities were well aware that Itchien’s active 
donations were meant to “buy” a license to reside in Japan. Besides that, this episode 
reveals several important aspects of Itchien’s life. Firstly, by that time, he had been 
travelling between Nagasaki and Tonkin for some time. Secondly, going back to 
China was not an option for him.  
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Zhiyan’s Residence in Nagasaki 
We noted above that if a person had a house or family in Nagasaki, the 
Nagasaki authorities considered him to be a resident of Japan and thus forbade him 
from leaving or returning to the country. Therefore, if we take the sakoku directives at 
face value, it was illegal, if not impossible, for someone who owned a house in 
Nagasaki to personally conduct overseas trade. Zhiyan was such a person who should 
have been limited by the edicts. Because he had a mansion in Nagasaki, he could be 
considered a resident. Zhiyan owned a large mansion at Sakaya-chō. It is not known 
exactly when he settled in the ward. The mansion would have been built or rebuilt 
after the massive fire that totally devastated Nagasaki on 15 April 1663.538 As early 
as 1665, the Dutch reported that Zhiyan owned a house in Nagasaki.539 Nevertheless, 
there is undeniable evidence that Zhiyan continued engaging in foreign trade and 
travelled between Tonkin and Nagasaki from the 1650s to the 1680s.  
 
He made no effort to hide his wealth and overseas connections. The mansion 
had a distinctive Chinese style. It is said that his wooden mansion was in part built 
with timbers shipped from China. Likewise, the garden was decorated with stones 
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brought from overseas.540 He owned a coloured statue of Buddha presented to Zhiyan 
by “the King of Tonkin”, meaning the Chúa. The Tonkin Buddha was carefully 
placed in a special shrine dedicated to it in the mansion’s compound and remained 
there until 2 April 1775, when the Ōga mansion suffered an accidental fire and was 
burned to the ground.541  
 
During the late-eighteenth century, prior to the fire, the household was famous 
for its Chinese-styled interiors and possession of exotic foreign items and they 
received visitors from outside Nagasaki. These possessions were indications of wealth 
accumulated from foreign trade. Apparently, the mansion was an attraction to those 
who were interested in foreign cultures and had a chance to visit Nagasaki. A good 
example would be the Lord of Kagoshima, Shimazu Shigehide (島津重豪) 
(1745-1833), whose passion for Western as well as Chinese learning was quite 
well-known. On 31 August 1771, during his stay in Nagasaki, he paid a visit to the 
then head of the Ōga family Tazaemon (鉅鹿太左衛門) (1734-1803), at his mansion 
and viewed its Chinese garden.542 In 1782, even after the mansion itself was lost in 
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the fire, a geographer Furukawa Koshōken (古河古松軒) (1726-1807) visited 
Nagasaki and took note of the curious art works of the Ōga family.543 A little later, in 
1788, a famous scholar-painter Shiba Kōkan (司馬江漢) (1747-1818) also called on 
the family.544  
 
During his lifetime, Zhiyan entertained a different groupof visitors. By the late 
1670s, the bakufu was aware that unlawful activities were going on in Nagasaki and 
that many officials were involved in the contraband trade.545 In March 1681, 
following the installation of the fifth shōgun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (徳川綱吉) 
(1646-1709), the bakufu appointed eight teams of special commissioners and 
dispatched them to different areas of the country. Their primary objective was to 
investigate local administration and check on coastal defense.546 As for Nagasaki, 
however, the bakufu was especially interested in investigating any misconduct 
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committed by officials with regards to unlawful trading activities. On 7 June, the 
Dutch were informed that three appointed commissioners, Okada Hahirouemon (岡田
八郎右衛門), Togawa Mokunosuke (戸川杢之助) and Shibata Hichirobei (柴田七左
衛門), were to visit Nagasaki so as to gather information on the current situation of 
foreign trade. In truth, they were entrusted with the mission of uncovering any illegal 
activities engaged in by the magistrates and other officials.547 On this occasion, Wei 
Zhiyan was assigned to host Okada, the highest ranking official among the three, 
along with 35 members of his entourage.548 After that, Zhiyan and his son regularly 
served the lodging needs of the bakufu commissioners. Between 19 May and 20 
August 1684, Toda Matabei (戸田又兵衛) and Odagiri Kibei (小田切喜兵衛) visited 
Nagasaki during another round of these inspection tours. Zhiyan provided Odagiri and 
his 36 attendants with a temporary abode during that visit.549  
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Zhiyan and Nagasaki Officials 
It is intriguing that Zhiyan was hosting these high-ranking officials dispatched 
by the bakufu with the particular mission of investigating on-going illicit trade in 
Nagasaki when he himself was still actively engaged in trade and even personally 
ventured out to high seas. This unlikely scenario could be beneficial to Zhiyan if it 
was assumed that Nagasaki officials deliberately placed the bakufu commissioner 
with Zhiyan so as to keep him outside of suspicion. This would have been done in 
their own self interest since local officials themselves benefited financially from 
Zhiyan’s trade.  
 
This can be implied from the positions of two prominent Nagasaki officials in 
Zhiyan’s business. In Nagasaki, Yamaguchi Ichizaemon (山口市左衛門) and Murata 
Iuemon (村田伊右衛門) helped Zhiyan with his business transactions.550 
Unfortunately, it is not clear in what way these two men actually provided Zhiyan 
with assistance. But there are a number of clues as to who they were. Both of them 
were wealthy chōnin in Nagasaki. When the bakufu inspectors visited Nagasaki in 
1667, Yamaguchi served one of the inspectors as one of his local purveyors.551 
Yamaguchi had a residence in Motokōya-chō, located a street away from Zhiyan’s 
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mansion. Between 1689 and 1704, while conducting his own trade, he carried out 
business for the domain of Uto as the domain’s designated merchant in Nagasaki.552  
 
Murata was a money changer and resided in Sakaya-chō as a neighbour of 
Zhiyan.553 At the end of 1698, when the two bakufu commissioners again visited 
Nagasaki, Ōga Seibei (鉅鹿清兵衛) (1661-1738), a son of Zhiyan who succeeded his 
father, provided the envoys with accommodation, as did Murata.554 Murata became a 
Tōjin yashiki otona (唐人屋敷乙名) some time between 1699 and 1704.555 
Previously, in 1689, in order to house all the Chinese visitors to Nagasaki, a secluded 
Chinese quarter known as Tōjin yashiki (唐人屋敷) had been established in a corner 
of the harbour. Tōjin yashiki otona was the mayor of this Chinese quarter and thus 
responsible for all matters concerning the Chinese people throughout their stay in 
Nagasaki. Due to the fact that Tōjin yashiki otona was chosen from among 
seventy-seven otona (ward headman 乙名), Murata must have been the otona of the 
Sakaya- chō district before he took up the post of Tōjin yashiki otona.556 It is clear 
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that the local officials, consisting of upper-class chōnin, were involved in Zhiyan’s 
trade.  
 
The Dutch were also aware of Zhiyan’s unholy alliance with the local officials. 
In 1674, Johannes Camphuijs in Nagasaki expressed his concern over Zhiyan’s 
relationship with the local officials and merchants in Nagasaki. He advised Batavia 
that as far as the Tonkin trade was concerned, the company should not make an 
enemy of Zhiyan because he was on good terms with the machidoshiyori and a few 
Japanese merchants in Nagasaki.557 Machidoshiyori were top local administrators of 
Nagasaki. While the magistrates were assigned by the bakufu and stationed at 
Nagasaki only for a limited time, the posts of machidoshiyori were succeeded 
hereditarily and they exercised strong control over the administration of Nagasaki. 
Practically speaking, it was the machidoshiyori and otona of each ward who 
supervised and carried out all business transactions in Nagasaki, making Zhiyan’s 
close relationship to them particularly beneficial to his interests.558 
 
The local officials seemed to have a tacit agreement that they were not to speak 
or give too much information to the commissioners. In 1681, while Zhiyan hosted 
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Okada, an interpreter of Dutch, Shizuki Magouemon (志筑孫右衛門) took care of the 
other commissioner, Shibata. Shizuki “discovered many things” and reported them to 
Shibata, which apparently upset some of the people in town. After the commissioners 
left, Shizuki was attacked and beaten up by a mob.559 In the case of the 1684 
inspection, both Toda and Odagiri took up lodgings in the Sakaya-chō for three 
months. During their unexpectedly long stay, residents of the district were “bored” 
and complained about their day-and-night guard duties.560 The boredom prevailing 
the otherwise usually busy street implies that the residents of the Sakaya-chō had to 
put their “regular” flow of business, whether legal or illegal, on hold and behave 
themselves in the presence of the bakufu commissioners.    
 
On top of that, in all likelihood Wei Zhiyan colluded with the magistrates of 
Nagasaki. His overseas trips had to be approved by the magistrates. The magistrates 
gave Zhiyan permission to stay in and to leave Nagasaki. In 1662 when the 
circumstances around Taiwan did not allow Zhiyan to sail personally, the magistrate 
gave him permission to stay in Nagasaki for one year under the pretext of illness. 
Using several excuses, he managed to stay in Nagasaki until February 1665 when, 
eventually, the magistrate ordered him to depart. In 1664, whereas the Dutch 
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blockaded the river in Tonkin to prevent Zhiyan’s junks from leaving for Nagasaki, 
the Dutch aggression towards these two junks obviously upset the “emperor’s” men in 
Nagasaki. The “emperor” in this context meant the shōgun. In Nagasaki, the ones 
directly appointed by the shōgun were the magistrates. Hence, the Dutch came to 
know that the magistrates had substantial shares in Zhiyan’s junks. Eventually, 
Batavia ordered the Tonkin factory to end the blockade of the river to avoid strong 
discontentment from the Japanese.561  
 
Zhiyan’s relationship to the magistrates of Nagasaki went further than mere 
business transactions. A relationship of give and take between Zhiyan and the 
magistrates was instrumental in Zhiyan and his sons acquiring permanent residency in 
Japan. Zhiyan worked on acquiring permanent residency in Japan by submitting a 
private petition to a newly-installed magistrate of Nagasaki, Ushigome Chūzaemon.562 
On 15 October 1672, a Japanese translation of his petition together with a 
recommendation by the magistrate reached the council of the rōjū in Edo. 
Commenting on Zhiyan’s request, the magistrates noted that:  
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A Chinese called Wei Zhiyan and his two sons hoped to reside in Nagasaki 
permanently. This man has visited Nagasaki for business for the last thirty 
years. He has been very dutiful about all matters. For these reasons, it 
should not be difficult to permit him to reside in Nagasaki.563 
 
The rōjū told the magistrate that the decision was to be made by the shōgun 
himself. Later on the same day, the rōjū consulted personally with Tokugawa Ietsuna. 
Ietsuna granted Zhiyan’s wish.564 On 1 November 1672, the Dutch in Nagasaki were 
informed that Zhiyan was granted “a license to live in Nagasaki as a subject of 
Japan”.565 
 
The timing of Zhiyan’s various donations seems to have coincided with the 
process of his seeking residency. In 1669, Zhiyan donated 500 taels of silver to the 
Sōfukuji for the reconstruction of its stone-paved approach to the Masodō (hall for 
mazu). The restoration was completed in 1671.566 Subsequently, in 1679, Zhiyan and 
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his sons, Wei Gao and Wei Gui, became Japanese upon permission from the 
magistrate, Ushigome. To celebrate this occasion, Ushigome presented Zhiyan’s sons 
a Japanese family name Ōga after their ancestral homeland in China. Henceforth, 
Yongshi and Yongzhao became Ōga Seizaemon (鉅鹿静左衛門) and Ōga Seibei (鉅
鹿静兵衛) respectively. Besides changing their names, the two sons also changed 
their Ming-styled clothing to Japanese ones. Zhiyan was permitted to keep his 
Chinese name and wear Ming attire on the grounds that he had served the Ming 
before. Congratulating him on this occasion, the magistrate presented five gold tablets 
to Zhiyan and a wakizashi (short sword 脇差) to the sons.567 This year, Zhiyan had a 
wooden bridge between Motofurukawa-chō (元古川町) and Motokōya-chō (元紺屋
町) rebuilt as a stone bridge. The new bridge was called Furukawa-bashi (古川橋).568 
In 1680, when Ushigome initiated a reconstruction of the Matsunomori shrine, Zhiyan 
responded by donating the main gate to the shrine.569 In addition, in 1681, Zhiyan had 
the main hall of the Sōfukuji renovated. It had been a single roof since 1646 when the 
temple hall was initially constructed. At this time, by means of Zhiyan’s donation, the 
temple roof was upgraded to a double-layered roof.570 It appears that Zhiyan’s 
donations coincided with his acquisition of permanent residency and naturalization, as 
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though they were meant as returns to the magistrate for his favour of granting him 
permanent residency. After almost a quarter of a century, by means of his wealth and 
local connections, Wei Zhiyan finally obtained what his brother, Itchien, dreamed of. 
 
It should be noted that the period between 1672 and 1684 was the time when 
Nagasaki flourished under the Shihō shōhō. Ushigome Katsunari, who served as the 
magistrate of Nagasaki from 1671 to 1682, was instrumental in implementing the 
Shihō shōhō. It is known that Ushigome gave Chinese merchants higher purchase 
prices in order to encourage more Chinese junks to come to Nagasaki. In return, the 
Dutch factors despised Ushigome for his commercial greed and overbearing approach 
to business.571 During this period, profit from foreign trade was widely and 
generously distributed among the officials and merchants of Nagasaki.572 The 
thriving port city attracted many merchants from other parts of Japan. The residential 
population of Nagasaki increased by more than 30 percent from 40,025 in 1672 to 
52,702 in 1681.573 Apart from the residents, crew members of Chinese junks and 
Dutch ships seasonally sailed into the port. In 1679 alone, for example, thirty-two 
Chinese junks brought a total of 2,965 traders and seamen. They scattered around and 
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stayed in the town, whereas 416 crew members of four Dutch ships were confined in 
the artificial island of deshima.574  
 
As Chinese junk trade brought prosperity to the town, the magistrates of 
Nagasaki, sitting at the top of its administrative system, enjoyed cosy relationships 
with the jūtaku tōjin and behaved “as though they had become themselves 
merchants”.575 Wei Zhiyan certainly contributed to and benefited from the flourishing 
commercial community of Nagasaki.  
  
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the so-called “sakoku” edicts prescribed the economic 
and social milieu in which the Chinese merchants conducted their business at 
Nagasaki. Yet, while Chinese traders were free to mingle with the locals, what 
regulated and facilitated trade at the port was not simply a set of impersonal codes 
enforced by the bakufu. When people met, the boundaries between what was legal and 
illegal blurred. The processes of business transactions, where individuals interacted, 
negotiated and cut deals with each other through various means, were far more 
complex, delicate and intimate than the policies officially allowed. Even after the 
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implementation of the sakoku policies during the 1630s, the Japanese officials and 
merchants invested in Chinese junks and provided them with support and protection 
against the VOC and the Tokugawa bakufu both directly and indirectly. Taking full 
advantage of their personal connections with the upper echelon of the local 
commercial community, Chinese traders managed to find a way around the restrictive 
regulations, and hence to defy state control.  
 
What characterized the mid-seventeenth century was that Qing, Tokugawa and 
Trinh governments were in the process of gaining control over the independent local 
powers who hold fast to vested interests. In 1677, Trinh Tac pacified the last members 
of the Mac army along the Tonkin-China border. Zheng Jing died in Taiwan in 1681. 
The rest of the Zheng family surrendered to the Qing navy in 1683. Wu Sangui’s 
grandson and successor Wu Shifan (呉世璠)(d. 1681) committed suicide in Yunan in 
1681.576 In the same year, Ushigome Chūzemon resigned abruptly from his post as 
the magistrate of Nagasaki due to a mysterious “illness”. At last, in 1685, the Qing 
finally lifted the maritime ban and numerous junks rushed out of the China coast to 
the East and South China Seas. In the face of uncontrollable force of private 
commercial activities at the last turn of the seventeenth century, East Asian states 
began to reshape the seventeenth-century commercial networks that were in essence 
private and informal.  
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE PATTERN OF CHINESE TRADE 
 
The previous chapter illustrated how the Wei brothers used their informal 
relationships with the local officials and merchants of Nagasaki in order to facilitate 
their trade. Regardless of a series of restrictive legislations enacted by the bakufu, the 
Wei brothers managed to carry out their business through the mediation of their local 
acquaintances as long as they could bring profit to those who unofficially invested in 
their business enterprise. 
 
This chapter concerns the efficiency of Chinese junk shipping. It examines 
different aspects of the junk trade between Tonkin and Nagasaki during the 
seventeenth century from a quantitative perspective. The previous chapter showed 
that the Wei brothers were the most formidable competitor of the VOC as well as the 
Zheng in terms of the volume and value of Tonkinese raw silk they exported to 
Nagasaki. By providing quantitative data to buttress that quantitative analysis, this 
chapter will argue that Wei Zhiyan, and his later successor Lin Yuteng, were the most 
active and successful agents of exchange between Tonkin and Nagasaki through the 
second-half of the seventeenth century. This entails quantifying the size and 
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efficiency of the Chinese shipping operation and comparing the operation to that of 
their primary competitor, the VOC.    
 
In order to provide a quantitative analysis, this chapter relies on various types of 
contemporary accounts written by the Dutch, the English as well as the Japanese. The 
lack of first-hand documentation by Chinese merchants themselves is evident. As a 
result, it is not entirely possible to gather uniform and consistent data for different 
periods. In most cases, data on Chinese junk shipping quoted here were collated from 
various sources and presented in this chapter for the years where data was available. 
Nevertheless, even this fragmentary statistical evidence provides us with substantial 
insight into the state of the Chinese shipping operation in East and Southeast Asia.   
 
This chapter focuses exclusively on the volume of raw silk, even though silken 
fabrics were important export commodities to Japan as well. Various kinds of silk 
products were exported from Tonkin to Nagasaki. Ryukyu and Korea played 
significant roles in importing Chinese raw silk into Japan, though this thesis does not 
focus on the raw silk trade between these two places and Japan. Besides raw silk, 
silken fabrics such as hockin, peling and baa were important commodities as well. 
However, it is difficult to aggregate data on these textiles as they were too diverse in 
kind. Even though this chapter does not specifically address silken fabrics, it should 
be kept in mind that from the 1640s onwards, Chinese junks consistently brought 
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more silken fabrics from Tonkin to Nagasaki than the VOC and that Japan was the 
single most important market for these Tonkinese silk products during the seventeenth 
century.577 Only small quantities of raw silk and silken fabrics were exported to 
Europe by the VOC and later by the EIC.  
 
This chapter first illustrates the overall trend of Japan’s raw silk import from a 
quantitative perspective. This will help clarify the position of Tonkinese raw silk in 
view of the fluctuations in the Japan market over the seventeenth century. Then, the 
size of Chinese junks arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin will be examined as it is one 
of the key factors that explain the efficiency of the Chinese junk trade. Lastly, using 
the purchase and sale prices of Tonkinese raw silk in Tonkin and in Nagasaki 
respectively, an attempt will be made to estimate how much profit the Chinese junk 
operation could generate from a return voyage. Wherever possible, comparisons will 
be made between the Chinese junk trade and VOC shipping. Highlighting the 
differences in their efficiency of trade, this chapter argues that Chinese junks traveling 
between Tonkin and Nagasaki were more efficient than the VOC since they were 
usually operated by a smaller crew than VOC ships, yet they carried larger capital 
than Dutch ships.   
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The Size of the Japan Market 
In order to understand the position of Tonkinese silk in the Japan market and 
how its position changed over the course of the seventeenth century, it is important to 
examine the size of the Japan market and the overall trend of Japan’s import of raw 
silk via Nagasaki. In 1615, a Spanish merchant named de Avila Giron reported that 
Japan annually purchased 300,000 to 350,000 catties or more of raw silk.578 Between 
1585 and 1638, the Portuguese imported between 100,000 and 250,000 catties of raw 
silk into Japan.579 Iwao Seiichi calculated that during the eras of Genna (1615-1624) 
and Kanei (1624-1643), Japan imported between 200,000 and 400,000 catties of raw 
silk every year via Nagasaki.580 The volume imported by the VOC was not at all 
significant prior to the establishment of the Taiwan factory in 1624. We have little 
information regarding the Chinese shipping. Katō Eiichi estimates that Chinese junks 
annually imported around 150,000 catties of raw silk into Japan during the 1630s.581  
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Figure 6.1Error! Reference source not found. shows the division by supplier 
of the total of 334,000 catties of raw silk that Japan imported in 1634. Out of this 
total, Tonkinese raw silk had a significant share in the Japan market. A Japanese 
shuinsen returning to Nagasaki from Tonkin was loaded with 100,000 catties of 
Tonkinese raw silk, accounting for at least 30 percent of Japanese raw silk imports via 
Nagasaki that year.582 As mentioned in Chapter Two, Tonkinese silk comprised the 
bulk of cargo imported into Japan by the Portuguese during the last few years of their 
operations in Nagasaki. In 1636, the Portuguese brought 25,027 catties of Chinese 
raw silk as well as 53,343 catties of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan.583 In 1637, six 
Portuguese galleons imported a total of 124,727 catties of raw silk which comprised 
of 87,431 catties from Tonkin and 37,296 catties from China.584 In 1638, 15,908 
catties of Tonkinese raw silk and 19,632 catties of Chinese raw silk were imported by 
two Portuguese galleons.585 Hence, Tonkinese silk accounted for 65 percent of the 
total volume of raw silk imported into Japan by the Portuguese between 1636 and 
1638. The geographical proximity between Macau and northern Vietnam should be 
taken into account to explain the large share of Tonkinese raw silk in Portuguese 
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cargoes. This large amount of Tonkinese silk imported by the Macao-based 
Portuguese suggests that an active seaborne traffic existed between northern Vietnam 
and Macao during the 1630s. In brief, the Japanese and Portuguese were the two 
major exporters of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan in the first half of the 1630s. 
Japanese overseas shipping operations were completely abandoned in 1635. Then, 
faced with the looming possibility of the Portuguese expulsion from Japan in the 
second half of the 1630s, it was of urgent importance for any party interested in the 
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Source: Iwao, Shingan shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū, 301.  























































Figure 6.2 indicates that the total volume of raw silk imported by Japan 
fluctuated between 100,000 to 300,000 catties during the 1640s and then, 200,000 to 
400,000 catties during the 1650s. The 1650s seemed to be the pinnacle of Japan’s raw 
silk imports. Under the pancado pricing system in Japan, Japanese itowappu 
merchants were required to buy the whole amount of Chinese raw silk brought into 
Nagasaki at fixed prices no matter how much or little raw silk was brought in. 
Because the sale prices were reviewed only once every year, Zheng Zhilong was able 
to manipulate sale prices of raw silk in Nagasaki by sending only a small portion of 
Chinese raw silk to Nagasaki around the time when the review was taking place. This 
resulted in the setting of high sale prices for Chinese raw silk for one year forcing the 
itowappu merchants to bear a considerable loss. In 1655, having borne a considerable 
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loss, the itowappu merchants petitioned the bakufu to suspend the pancado system for 
the following year. The bakufu decided to abandon the fixed price completely and the 
pancado system was abolished.586  
 
The aitai shōhō, which allowed buyer and seller to directly negotiate prices of 
all imports including raw silk, was introduced in 1655 to replace the pancado system. 
Nagazumi Yōko suggested that direct trade was advantageous to Chinese merchants 
based on the fact that Chinese traders welcomed the new regulations.587 In the late 
1650s, Chinese junks imported a larger amount of raw silk into Nagasaki than the 
VOC ships. In 1659, a total of 406,870 catties of raw silk was imported into Japan via 
Nagasaki, of which Chinese junks carried 245,123 catties and the VOC 161,747 
catties (Appendix B). Scholars agree that in the era of the aitai shōhō, sale prices of 
import commodities in Nagasaki skyrocketed because of greater competition among 
the domestic buyers, thus expanding the profit margins of foreign suppliers. Chinese 
traders maximized revenues and profits by importing a large volume of merchandize. 
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Accordingly, Japan’s silver outflow hit its peak during the 1660s as it was used to pay 
for the raw silk.588  
 
In order to control the increasing outflow of silver at a time when Japan’s silver 
production began to show signs of decline, the bakufu restricted the outflow of silver 
from Nagasaki. In 1668, the VOC was prohibited from exporting silver. From the 
1670s on, it is evident that Japan’s total import of raw silk via Nagasaki gradually 
decreased as a result of the bakufu’s efforts to curtail the export of Japanese silver.589 
At the same time, the bakufu strongly encouraged domestic silk production from the 
late-seventeenth century. The declining trend in the importation of raw silk continued 
towards the end of the century. According to Yamawaki Teijirō’s study, the VOC 
imported an annual average of 86,000 catties of raw silk from various origins between 
1641 and 1684. In 1697, Chinese junks and Dutch ships together imported 
approximately 100,000 catties of raw silk into Japan. By 1710, the amount further 
diminished to 55,000 catties.590 With the advance of sericulture technology and 
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reeling techniques, the quality of domestic raw silk slowly improved. Domestic raw 
silk gradually replaced imported Chinese raw silk and Japan almost completely 
stopped importing foreign raw silk by the mid-eighteenth century.591 Tonkinese raw 
silk exports to Japan have to be examined against this background of the rise and fall 
of Japan’s foreign silk imports.   
 
The Place of Tonkinese Raw Silk on the Japan Market 
During the 1640s, most raw silk imported by Chinese junks came from China. 
It is believed that the majority of the junks coming to Nagasaki around this time were 
under the control of Zheng Zhilong. His junks supplied Chinese raw silk to the VOC 
on the island of Taiwan until the beginning of the 1640s. In 1641, Zhilong initiated 
direct shipping between Fujian and Nagasaki, thus bypassing the Dutch. With the lack 
of supply of raw silk from China, the VOC was heavily dependent on Tonkin as an 
alternative supplier of raw silk to the Japan market.592 From 1641 to 1649, more than 
half of the raw silk imported by the Dutch originated from Tonkin. In 1649 
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specifically, Tonkin accounted for seventy-nine percent of the raw silk import by the 
VOC (Appendix B). The 1640s was the boom period of Tonkinese raw silk exports to 
Nagasaki by the VOC.593 By contrast Chinese junks did not bring much raw silk from 
Tonkin until 1646. This probably suggests that Zheng Zhilong, whose active maritime 
career ended in 1646 with his defection to the Qing, was not interested in Tonkin as a 
source of supply for raw silk. As long as he was able to obtain exportable 
merchandize from mainland China, it was not necessary to send his junks to Tonkin. 
Having learned that the Dutch made a significant profit from bringing Tonkinese silk 
into Nagasaki, however, an “established Chinese of Japan” dispatched his ship 
directly from Nagasaki to Tonkin in 1647.594 Although extant evidence is 
circumstantial rather than conclusive, this “established Chinese of Japan” may well be 
Itchien’s first appearance in the historical record.    
 
During the 1650s, Tonkinese raw silk comprised 27 percent of the total silk 
imports into Japan.595 Both Chinese junks and Dutch ships brought more raw silk into 
Nagasaki than they did during the previous decade (Figure 6.2). However, in the 
second-half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch deliberately moved away from 
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using Tonkin as a silk supplier and instead switched to Bengal. Hoang Anh Tuan 
identifies the 1650s as the first phase of decline in the Tonkin trade of the VOC. The 
switch from Tonkinese to Bengali silk by the VOC has been taken by Hoang as an 
indication of the low marketability of Tonkinese silk and the increasing popularity of 
Bengali silk in the Japan market during the second-half of the seventeenth century. He 
points out that the profitability of Bengali silk, which he attributed to its supposed 
popularity in the Japan market, caused a rapid decline in the export volume of raw silk 
from Tonkin into Japan from the mid-1650s.596 
 
Insofar as trends in Dutch shipping are concerned, our data supports his view. 
However, his assumption about the better marketability of Bengali silk is difficult to 
corroborate. The high profitability of Bengali silk for the VOC did not necessarily 
indicate the poor marketability of Tonkinese raw silk on the Japanese market. Indeed, 
it is doubtful that the popularity of Tonkinese silk in general fell on the Japan market 
during the 1650s. In 1660, the chief of the Nagasaki factory commented: “The 
Bengali bariga silk has been weight [sic]. Because the [local] merchants keep looking 
for the arrival of Kouquan [Zhiyan] from Tonkin, we [the Dutch] have decided to 
offer most of the Bengali silk for sale as soon as possible. For [sic] if this Chinese 
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[Zhiyan] appears, he might harm our sale of the [Bengali] silk”.597 This note was 
written in the middle of their sale of Bengali silk, which had been in progress for 
more than a week. In other words, Japanese merchants anticipated the arrival of 
Tonkinese silk that Zhiyan would bring into Nagasaki. This implies that the 
marketability, or popularity, of Tonkinese raw silk was as great as that of Bengali silk, 
if not greater. Zhiyan’s junk, loaded with Tonkinese raw silk valued at 180,000 taels, 
was hit by a storm on its way from Tonkin to Nagasaki and was forced to return to 
Tonkin that year. Bengali silk fetched an “unexpectedly” high price because 
Tonkinese raw silk was missing from Nagasaki. 
 
Figure 6.3 
Volume (in catties) of Tonkinese Raw Silk  
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The VOC’s switch from Tonkinese to Bengali raw silk can be explained by a 
different set of factors that did not concern the marketability of Tonkinese silk. The 
VOC, in fact, had difficulties sustaining their trade with Tonkin. The arrival of 
Chinese merchants in Tonkin in the late 1640s intensified the competition on the 
Tonkin market. The VOC struggled to procure as much raw silk as they used to as 
Chinese merchants were able to offer local silk merchants higher prices than the VOC 
since they operated with lower overheads. For example, unlike the VOC, Chinese 
junk traders did not have fortresses or naval vessels to maintain their commercial 
networks. As highlighted in Chapter Four, their commercial networks were founded 
on the basis of social and cultural connections among individual traders. Thus, the 
VOC needed a higher profit margin and could not afford to pay as much for silk as 
their Chinese rivals.598 In the face of stiff competition from the Chinese merchants, 
the purchase price of raw silk in Tonkin increased dramatically during the 1650s also 
pushed by his higher sale price on the Japan market. Because of the stiff competition, 
the VOC decided to switch suppliers because they were able to buy Bengali silk at a 
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Table 6.1  
Prices (in taels) of Raw Silk Imported by the VOC into Japan, 1641-1670 Annual 
Averages of Five-Year Periods 
 














1641-1645 1.43 2.84 98% 1.26 2.76 119% 
1646-1650 1.44 2.97 107% 1.24 3.00 142% 
1651-1655 1.24 2.70 118% 1.68 2.51 48% 
1656-1660 1.52 2.57 69% 1.89 2.44 29% 
1661-1665 1.45 1.75 21% 1.58 1.92 22% 
1666-1668 1.06 2.22 110% 1.53 2.57 68% 
Ave. 1.35 2.60 92% 1.36 2.51 84% 
Source: Klein, “De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel”, 170 (Table 2).  
 
 
The data in Table 6.1 comparing the purchase and sale prices of Tonkinese and 
Bengali raw silk bears out the assertion that Tonkinese silk did not decrease in 
marketability. This can be seen by its high sale price on the Japan market and larger 
profit margins. According to Table 6.1, from 1641 to 1668, the average purchase 
prices of Tonkinese and Bengali raw silk were 1.36 and 1.35 taels per catty 
respectively. They were sold at an average sale price of 2.51 and 2.60 taels per catty 
in Nagasaki. On average, the profit margin for Tonkinese raw silk was 84 percent and 
for that of Bengali silk was 92 percent. However, given that Bengali silk incurred 
higher transportation costs, the difference in profit margin seems diminished. If we 
look at each period, it is clear that during the second-half of the 1640s, Tonkinese raw 
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silk brought more profit to the VOC than Bengali raw silk with its wider margin 
between purchase and sale price.  
 
From 1651 to 1660, on the other hand, the VOC achieved higher profit margins 
on Bengali silk due to its lower purchase price and higher sale price than on 
Tonkinese raw silk. This suggests that the volume of raw silk available in Tonkin was 
limited, causing great competition among foreign traders and an increase in its 
purchase price. This shortage was caused by the Trinh’s costly military expeditions 
against the Nguyen from 1655 to 1660, which also compromised the quality of the 
silk available. Nonetheless, from 1661 to 1668, Tonkinese raw silk was sold at higher 
prices than Bengali silk, suggesting that contrary to assertions by Hoang of the VOC 
trade, Tonkinese raw silk remained competitive and marketable on the Japan market 
during the 1660s. This could also explain why the VOC repeatedly made attempts to 
expand its trade in Tonkin from 1660 to 1670, even though Bengal turned out to be a 
more stable supplier of raw silk.599   
 
The inability of the VOC to sustain and expand their trade in Tonkin points to 
weaknesses in their business operations which were not observed in the Wei brothers’ 
business. Between 1670 and 1699 when the VOC finally decided to close down the 
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Tonkin factory, the Dutch exported Tonkinese silk to Japan on an irregular basis 
which could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, from 1671 onwards Tonkinese 
products were first shipped to Batavia and then from there they were transported to 
various destinations. This was a preventive measure to curtail private trade by the 
Dutch factors in Tonkin. As a result, the profit margin of Tonkinese silk cargoes in 
Nagasaki further decreased after 1671.600 Secondly, in 1673, Trinh Tac made a truce 
with Nguyen Puc Tan, marking the end of the decades-long Trinh-Nguyen war. Given 
that the Trinh rulers accommodated the VOC in their domain primarily because they 
were keen to obtain modern weapons and military assistance from the Dutch, it is not 
at all surprising that the Trinh Lords no longer found a compelling reason to favor the 
VOC’s commercial activities in their realm after the end of the war.   
 
On the other hand, that the Wei brothers did flourish under the same difficulties 
experienced by the Dutch indicates efficiencies in their operation. The lack of 
consistent data for the 1660s and the 1670s makes it difficult for us to identify trends 
during the second-half of the seventeenth century. Yet, it seems that Japan’s overall 
imports of raw silk via Nagasaki decreased during this time. Between 1662 and 1664, 
only a small volume of raw silk was imported from Tonkin. Chinese junks were not 
able to leave Tonkin because the Dutch were blockading them to prevent them from 
leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki. In 1663, the VOC succeeded in assembling and 
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transporting silk cargoes worth 136,000 taels to Japan.601 In 1665, Japan took in more 
than 600,000 catties of raw silk of which 23 percent originated from Tonkin. This 
surge in imports could be explained by the fact that Japan did not import much raw 
silk in the previous years.  
 
Japan’s total import volume of raw silk was on the decline during the 1660s and 
1670s. In the 1670s, the VOC’s export of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki was reduced 
to a minimal level.602 However, Chinese merchants continued to bring substantial 
amounts of Tonkinese raw silk into Nagasaki till the mid-1680s. As a result, 
Tonkinese raw silk sometimes comprised an even larger share on the Japan market 
during the 1670s and the early 1680s than previous decades. In the first few years of 
the 1680s, Japan’s import of Tonkinese raw silk increased. Chinese junks exported to 
Nagasaki 89,065 catties in 1680 and 114,000 catties in 1682 respectively. Tonkinese 
silk comprised 47 percent and 67 percent of the total raw silk imported into Nagasaki 
by Chinese junks in those two years.603 The increased volume and share of Tonkinese 
raw silk on the Nagasaki market was presumably due to the fact that Chinese junks 
could not sail out from mainland China under the strict maritime security controls 
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enacted by the Qing court. Figure 6.3 shows that Tonkinese silk maintained its secure 
place on the Japanese market throughout the seventeenth century. While overall 
Japan’s import of raw silk via Nagasaki was on the decline in the second-half of the 
seventeenth century, there was no significant sign of decline in terms of the volume of 
Tonkinese raw silk imported by Chinese junks into Nagasaki from 1640 to 1683.  
 
Therefore, the declining marketability or popularity of Tonkinese silk on the 
Japanese market was not the reason for the decline in the Dutch trade of Tonkinese 
raw silk. Rather, the VOC stopped dealing in Tonkinese raw silk because it was less 
profitable for them than trading in Bengali raw silk. This was due to hikes in the 
purchase price of raw silk on the Tonkin market as a result of aggressive bidding by 
Chinese merchants. The VOC switched its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to 
Bengal in a deliberate attempt to avoid stiff competition on the Tonkin market and to 
maximize profit by taking advantage of a higher profit margin on Bengali silk.  
 
The Effect of Shipboard Organization: Calculating the Number of Crew Members on 
Tonkin Junks  
Having observed the position of Tonkinese raw silk on the Japan market, let us 
turn to the efficiency of Chinese junk shipping. In order to discuss the efficiency of 
the Chinese junk trade, it is crucial to understand the transport capacity of a junk, 
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which can be calculated in three ways. The first way to look at the transport capacity 
of a junk is to examine the size of its crew. Next, transport capacity could be 
calculated as the value of capital that Chinese merchants shipped out of Japan to 
Tonkin for each voyage. Lastly, the value of cargoes that a junk exported into Japan 
may also be taken as an indication of its transport capacity. We know that at one point 
in his career, Wei Zhiyan operated three junks at the same time. The efficiency of his 
operation can thus be measured using those three ways.  
 
In terms of the size of crew, ship-by-ship data are available only from the 1680s 
onwards from Japanese sources. Between 1674 and 1727, the number of crew on a 
Chinese junk varied between fifteen and 120 people depending on the size of the 
vessel.604 Around 1680, the average number of crew members found on Chinese 
junks visiting Nagasaki was between eighty-five and ninety-five people per vessel  
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The Number of Chinese Junks and Crew Members Visiting Nagasaki, 1679-80 
Year 
Total Number of 
Chinese Junks 
Total Number of 
Chinese People 
Visiting Nagasaki 
Average Size of 
Crew per Junk 
1679 31 2,965 95.6 
1680 29 2,483 85.6 
Source: Nakamura Tadashi, “Sakokuka no bōeki: bōeki toshiron no shiten kara (Trade 
under the sakoku: from the perspective of a port city)”, in Sakoku, ed. Katō Eiichi and 
Yamada Tadao (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981), 318. 
Notes: Chinese junks include those from mainland China, Taiwan and all other 
Southeast Asian ports. The number of crew members includes non-Chinese members 
such as Siamese on junks from Ayutthaya.   
 
 
Japanese sources contain more solid data on Tonkin junks regarding the last 
few decades of the seventeenth century (Table 6.3). From 1684 to 1708, Lin Yuteng 
used three different junks, meaning he changed his vessel twice for several reasons. In 
1690, the first ship started leaking from the hull on its way back from Nagasaki to 
Tonkin (Ship A). The vessel was obviously too old to repair. Lin Yuteng abandoned it 
and had a new ship (Ship B) built in Wenzhou in 1691 as a replacement.605 Japanese 
sources also indicate the presence of a third junk (Ship C). Considering that Lin 
Yuteng served on the both junks and Ship B and Ship C were manned by more or less 
the same number of crew members, the two junks could possibly be identical but it is 
impossible to prove. The average number of crew members onboard these three 
                                                 
605
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it produced good timber. During the 1680s, most junks coming from Ningbo were 
built in Wenzhou. KH, 3: 1691.    
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vessels every time they arrived at Nagasaki was fourty-nine. In terms of the size of its 
crew, Tonkin junks during the 1680s fell into the category of small-sized junks. In 
Zōho kai tsūshōkō, Nishikawa Joken (西川如見) (1648-1724) divided Chinese junks 
into three groups according to the number of ordinary sailors they carried (C: 
shuishou 水手 or gongshe 工社). Around ten to twenty people were assigned to a 
specific duty position. In addition to these officers, “large ship(s) were staffed by 100, 
medium-sized ship(s) were staffed by sixty to seventy, and small ship(s) were staffed 
by thirty to fourty” ordinary sailors.606 Tonkinese junks fell into the third category.   
 
Table 6.3 Number of Crew Members onboard a Tonkin Junk 
Year Ship No.* Ship Crew** Chief Merchant Source 
1684 No. 4 from Tonkin A N/A Lin Yuteng KH, 1: 343-4 
1686 No. 72 from Tonkin A N/A Lin Yuteng KH, 2: 1113 
1689 No. 42 from Tonkin A 66 Lin Yuteng KH, 2: 1113 
1690 No. 82 from Tonkin A 53 Lin Yuteng KH, 2: 1390-1 
1691 No. 85 from Wenzhou B 51 Lin Yuteng KH, 2: 1390-1 
1692 No. 59 from Tonkin B 51 Lin Yuteng KH, 2: 1471-2  
1693 No. 58 from Tonkin B 46 Lin Sanguan KH, 2: 1566-7 
1694 No. 8 from Shacheng*** B 44 Lin Kongteng KH, 2: 1621 
1695 No. 52 from Guangdong B 46 Lin Sanguan KH, 2: 1762-3 
1696 No.18 from Wenzhou B 43 He Longfu KH, 2: 1778 
1698 No. 6 from Wenzhou B 45 He Longfu KH, 3: 1960 
1706 No. 27 from Nanjing C N/A Lin Yuteng KH, 3: 2581 
1708 No. 102 from Tonkin C 46 Lin Yuteng KH, 3: 2581 
Note*: Ship No. is the way the junk was registered in Nagasaki.  
Note**: Number of crew members includes both Chinese and Tonkinese. 
Note***: Shacheng (沙埕) is located in present Fuding city (福鼎市), Fujian 
province. 
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The Value of Capital Shipped From Nagasaki to Tonkin in Taels      
Another way to measure the size of a junk is to examine how much capital a 
Chinese junk transported from Nagasaki to Tonkin. Both Chinese and Dutch 
merchants brought Japanese silver, and later copper, to Tonkin. There was nothing 
else that they could use to buy silk in the silk-producing villages in northern 
Vietnam.607 Hence, silver comprised most of the cargoes of Chinese junks and Dutch 
ships leaving Nagasaki for Tonkin. As has been pointed out in Chapter Six, local 
Japanese elites participated in Zhiyan’s venture by investing their capital in his junks 
as well.  
 
Another point to note is that every person on a Chinese junk was a merchant in 
the sense that every crew member conducted trade on their own account whenever the 
opportunity arose during a voyage. Wei Zhiyan was the owner, investor and chief 
merchant of his junks. Traveling merchants (C. ke shang 客商), who carried their 
own goods or consignment cargoes, were often invited to share the cargo 
compartments of a junk.608 Furthermore, each crew member of a Chinese junk, from 
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the senior officer in charge of navigating the junk to the lowest ranked ordinary sailor, 
was permitted to bring along a certain amount of cargo onboard and to conduct trade 
during a voyage. While servants of the VOC received a fixed salary in regular 
intervals, crew members of a Chinese junk received little or no salary for their 
services on a Chinese junk, which was one of the factors that lowered operation costs 
of Chinese junks.609 Jennifer Wayne Cushman suggested that merchandise shipped 
by the crew accounted for one-fifth to one-third of the total capacity of the junk.610 
On a Dutch ship, private handlings by crew members were considered “illegal” and 
were strictly prohibited, although that did not stop the Dutch factors from conducting 







                                                                                                                                            
zhou bian min zu (Han culture and peripheries) (Taipei: Institute of History and 
Philology, Academia Sinica, 2003), 131-9. 
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Table 6.4 Value of Capital in Taels Imported into Tonkin by Chinese Junks, 
1633-1683 (Annual Averages of Five Year Periods) 
 
No. of Chinese Junks 
That Arrived in 
Tonkin 
from Nagasaki 
Value of Capital 
Imported into Tonkin 
Average Value of 
Capital 
per Junk 
1633-1635 2 160,000 80,000 
1636-1640 1 35,000 35,000 
1641-1645 N/A N/A N/A 
1646-1650 3 200,000 66,667 
1651-1655 4 412,000 103,000 
1656-1660 2 120,000 60,000 
1661-1665 1 200,000 200,000 
1666-1670 3 388,300 129,433 
1671-1675 2 140,000 70,000 
1676-1680 2 90,000 45,000 
1681-1685 3 355,000 118,333 
Total 23 2,100,300 91,317 
Sources: See Appendix C, in which the annual data and sources are provided.  
 
 
Table 6.4 shows the amount of Japanese silver that Chinese junks exported to 
Tonkin from 1633 to 1683. Extant data covers twenty out of the fifty-one-year period. 
The table shows the value of capital in taels that Chinese junks reportedly carried 
when they departed from Nagasaki or, alternatively, when they arrived in Tonkin. The 
data presents information on twenty-three Chinese junks that traded between Tonkin 
and Nagasaki. The value of capital that a Chinese junk brought from Japan to Tonkin 
fluctuated in an inconsistent manner, varying from 35,000 taels in 1637 up to 300,000 
taels in 1668.612 On average, a junk transported capital worth 90,000 taels for each 
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voyage and Chinese junks exported 110,000 taels of capital, mostly in the form of 
silver, per year from Japan to Tonkin. Most likely the figures presented in Table 6.3 
did not include the value of merchandize and capital that each crew member brought 
onboard for their personal business dealings. Assuming that at least one-fifth of the 
cargo compartment was reserved for their cargoes, Chinese junks would have carried 
more capital than Table 6.4 indicates. 
 
Table 6.4 presents another set of data on the value of capital that the VOC 
invested in the Tonkin market. Data is extant for forty-six out of fifty-one years from 
1633 to 1683. During this period, an average of 2.3 Dutch ships appeared in Tonkin 
every year and one Dutch ship imported an average of 40,000 taels of capital into 
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Table 6.5 Value of Capital in Taels Invested in Tonkin by the VOC, 1637-1683 
Annual Averages of Five-Year Periods 
 
No. of Dutch Ships 
That Arrived 
in Tonkin 
Value of Capital 
Imported into Tonkin 
Average Value of 
Capital per Ship 
1636-1640 11 459,331 41,757 
1641-1645 27 579,741 21,472 
1646-1650 7 534,110 76,301 
1651-1655 9 494,089 54,899 
1656-1660 7 295,869 42,267 
1661-1665 14 580,789 41,485 
1666-1670 11 637,315 57,938 
1671-1675 12 393,790 32,816 
1676-1680 8 249,482 31,185 
1681-1685 3 141,615 47,205 
Total 109 4,366,131 40,056 
Source: Modified from Hoang, Silk for Silver, 225-9 (Appendix 3 and 4). Dutch 
guilders were converted into taels.  
Note: Figures for the 1641-1645 period include naval vessels dispatched from Batavia 
to Tonkin for a coordinated attack against Cochinchina in alliance with the Trinh 
Lord.  
 
A comparison of Table 6.4 and 6.5 shows clearly that Chinese junks arriving in 
Tonkin from Nagasaki carried a larger capital than Dutch ships did. This observation 
is in line with the Dutch factors’ comments that Chinese merchants operated their 
business with lower freight costs than the VOC.614 These general trends are also 
evident when we scrutinize the ten-year period from 1650-1659.  
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Table 6.6 The Wei Brothers vs. the VOC on the Tonkin Market, 1650-1659 
 
The Wei Brothers The VOC 
A B (taels) C (catties) D E (taels) F (catties) 
1650    1 70,000 57,852 
1651 1  45,500 2 110,000  
1652 1 77,000 64,500 2 230,000 65,250 
1653 1 100,000  1  50,296 
1654 1 160,000-170,000 51,000 2 40,000 28,031 
1655 1 70,000  1  0 
1656 1 70,000-80,000 52,650 1 50,000 44,323 
1657 1  41,350 1 90,000 14,190 
1658 1 40,000-50,000 51,500 0  0 
1659 1   1 100,000 33,477 
Total 9 532,000 306,500 12 690,000 293,419 
Ave. 0.9 88,667 51,083 1.2 98,571 41,917 
Notes:  
A. Number of junks operated by the Wei brothers between Tonkin and Nagasaki 
B. Value of silver imported by the Wei brothers from Nagasaki into Tonkin.   
C. Volume of Tonkinese raw silk exported by the Wei brothers from Tonkin to 
Nagasaki. 
D. Number of VOC ships that arrived in Nagasaki from Tonkin.  
E. Value of silver imported by the VOC ships from Nagasaki into Tonkin.  
F. Volume of Tonkinese raw silk exported by the VOC from Tonkin to Nagasaki.  
Sources: For the VOC, adopted from Hoang, Silk for Silver, 129 (Table 1); 228 
(Appendix 4). For the Wei brothers, see Chapter Three and Appendix A.  
 
 
The 1650s was a critical period for the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade. During this period, 
Chinese merchants and the Dutch factors fiercely competed against each other in 
purchasing raw silk on the Tonkin market. During the 1650s, most Chinese junks 
operating the Tonkin-Nagasaki route were identified as the Wei brothers’ junks.  
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Table 6.6 is a comparison between the Wei brothers and the VOC on the Tonkin 
market, in terms of the value of capital imported from Nagasaki to Tonkin as well as 
the volume of raw silk exported from Tonkin to Nagasaki. Until the mid-1650s, silver 
occupied approximately 95 percent of the Dutch annual import to Tonkin, and silk 
products, including both raw silk and silken textile, comprised more than 85 percent 
of Tonkinese exports to Japan.615 Although no equivalent data is available for the 
Wei brothers, there is no doubt that the staple of their trade between Tonkin and 
Nagasaki was the exchange of Japanese silver for Tonkinese silk products, mainly 
raw silk.  
 
From 1650 to 1659, the VOC invested 98,571 taels of silver on average in the 
Tonkin market annually. They imported around 99,000 taels of Japanese silver into 
the Tonkin market every year. On their way from Tonkin to Nagasaki, each ship 
exported about 40,000 catties of raw silk. On the other hand, the Wei brothers 
operated only one junk during this decade. Their junk exported 89,000 taels of 
Japanese silver to Nagasaki and brought back 51,000 catties of Tonkinese raw silk to 
Nagasaki every year (Table 6.6). The Wei brothers’ financial standing in the Tonkin 
market was comparable to the VOC’s and they competed with one another in the 
Tonkin market. In some years during the 1660s, Wei Zhiyan clearly outperformed the 
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Dutch factors. In 1660, for instance, Zhiyan did much better than the Dutch factors in 
the Tonkin market. He amassed raw silk and silk pieces goods with an estimated 
value of 180,000 taels ready for export to Japan. The VOC managed to spend only 
4,224 taels on purchasing local items out of 22,727 taels invested in the market that 
year.616 At the same time, both Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show a plunge in Tonkinese 
raw silk exports during the 1656-1660 period, reflecting the devastating economic 
situation in Tonkin during the Trinh’s fifth and longest military campaign against the 
Nguyen from 1655 to 1660. In the middle of this economic depression in northern 
Vietnam, the VOC shifted its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to Bengal. It was 
a strategic and critical decision for the VOC to avoid severe competition on the weak 
Tonkin market and to be able to sustain their Japan trade. Despite the differences in 
trade due to the war and the subsequent economic depression, the Wei brothers 
persevered during these years and in fact turned a profit.  
 
Sale Value of Cargoes Imported from Tonkin to Nagasaki  
On their outbound journey from Tonkin, Chinese junks were fitted out with raw 
silk, silk piece goods and other products from Tonkin.617 When Chinese junks sailed 
into Nagasaki, the VOC factors were keen to know the value and contents of their 
                                                 
616
 DN, 30 October 1660, NF J 74; Hoang, Silk for Silver, 111.  
 
617
 For information on other Tonkinese products for export, see Hoang, Silk for 
Silver, 165-85.  
 
 246
ladings. However, the Dutch were contained in the artificial island of deshima and 
were not allowed to contact local people or Chinese merchants in person. Therefore, 
the official Japanese interpreters of the Dutch language (J. Oranda tsūji 阿蘭陀通詞) 
were asked to gather commercial information on Chinese junks and to inform the 
Dutch. It is difficult to assess the credibility of the information collected in such a 
manner because, first of all, even the Dutch merchants did not necessarily trust the 
information given by the oranda tsūji.618 Secondly, we do not know if cargoes were 
actually sold at their reported value. Sometimes imported items failed to fetch as good 
a price as initially expected. In 1667, for example, Japanese merchants estimated that 
Wei Zhiyan brought cargoes that were expected to be sold at 420,000 taels in total. In 
the end, the cargoes were actually sold for a total of 300,000 taels.619 Nonetheless, 
since available quantitative data on the value and contents of Chinese junks is so 
scarce, it is useful to pay attention to the Dutch reports.  
 
With respect to the sale value of Tonkinese raw silk in Nagasaki, it can be 
calculated in accordance with the volume of raw silk put on sale as well as the prices 
at which these items were sold. In 1654, Itchien’s junk returned to Nagasaki on 18 
August. Reportedly, it brought 51,000 catties of Tonkinese raw silk.620 According to 
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the Dutch factors stationed at Nagasaki, the Tonkinese silk that the Chinese junks 
brought to Nagasaki that year was sold to Japanese merchants at 2.04 and 2.48 taels 
per catty.621 Based on these figures, Itchien clearly outdid the VOC that year. His 
shipment of Tonkinese raw silk was sold at an estimated 100,000-130,000 taels while 
the Dutch only sold Tonkinese silk at Nagasaki for a total of 75,000 taels in the same 
year.622  
 
During the 1660s, the VOC exerted all their efforts to expand its trade in 
Tonkin.623 Yet, their efforts failed and Chinese merchants outperformed the VOC for 
most of this decade. In 1660, while Zhiyan’s junk returned to Nagasaki with cargoes 
value at 180,000 taels, the VOC failed to send a ship from Tonkin to Japan.624 In 
1667, Zhiyan imported 67,750 catties of Tonkinese raw silk into Japan. It fetched the 
price of 3.0 taels per catty at Nagasaki, thus bringing their total sales for that year to 
203,000 taels.625 The Dutch shipment of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki yielded only 
85,429 taels that year.626 In 1668, Zhiyan’s junk returned to Nagasaki with cargoes 
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reportedly worth up to 280,000 taels.627 The Dutch sale of Tonkinese raw silk at 
Nagasaki was worth 123,429 taels that year.628 Given that Tonkinese silk usually 
comprised more than 85 percent of the total cargoes, the sizes of the Dutch shipments 
were much smaller than Zhiyan’s shipment and thus yielded less sales.  
 
From the 1670s onwards, the VOC exported Tonkinese raw silk on an irregular 
basis.629 In 1675, the VOC exported 42,000 taels worth of cargoes from Tonkin to 
Japan, while Lin Yuteng’s junk brought lading worth 200,000 taels from Tonkin to 
Nagasaki.630 In 1682, two Chinese junks under Zhiyan together brought 114,002 
catties of Tonkinese raw silk to Nagasaki, which was sold at 2.05-2.1 taels per 
catty.631 Their joint sales amounted to 230,000-240,000 taels, supporting the 
argument of this chapter that Chinese undertakings in Tonkinese raw silk export to 
Japan remained strong in the 1670s and the early 1680s.   
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Profit         
Having discussed the value of capital that Chinese junks invested in Tonkin and 
the volume of Tonkinese raw silk they exported to Nagasaki, let us turn to the issue of 
profit: How much profit could Chinese junk traders make from exporting Tonkinese 
raw silk to Japan? Without comprehensive data on their invested capital, the purchase 
and sale prices of raw silk as well as the costs of their operation, it is impossible to 
assess how much profit Chinese junk operations could make from one return voyage. 
This section looks at a few cases where enough quantitative data is available to make 
some kind of estimate on profit.  
 
In 1654, the arrival of six large Chinese junks, two Dutch ships, one ship from 
Manila and a small vessel from Macao created intense competition on the Tonkin 
market. Silk became extremely dear and raw silk was traded at eight-nine faccar or 
0.11-0.13 taels of silver per tael (37.5g) of raw silk.632 In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw 
silk imported by Chinese junks fetched prices of 2.04 and 2.48 taels per catty or 0.127 
and 0.155 taels of silver per tael of raw silk.633 Profit margins were apparently slim 
that year.      
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In 1680, Yuteng bought raw silk from local silk merchants at the prices of 
seventeen and eighteen facaar in Tonkin, meaning that one tael weight of raw silk 
cost 0.055-0.058 taels of silver. In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw silk fetched 2.1-2.5 taels 
per catty, meaning 0.131-0.134 taels of silver per tael of raw silk.634 Therefore, this 
transaction alone generated a profit margin of more than 120 percent. In 1682, 
Chinese merchants paid silver one tael for sixteen taels of raw silk, which meant that 
1 tael of raw silk cost 0.06 taels of silver. 635In Nagasaki, Tonkinese raw silk was sold 
at 2.1-2.5 taels per catty.636 In other words, one tael of raw silk yielded 0.13-0.16 
taels of silver. The profit margin was between 117 percent and 167 percent. Chinese 
junk shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki achieved reasonable performance from 
the Tonkin-Nagasaki trade in the 1680s when the Dutch trade at Tonkin was in its last 
phases of decline. 
 
Conclusion 
Wei Zhiyan’s Tonkin-Nagasaki business was indeed a well-oiled machine. He 
ran his business with his own junks manned by fewer crew members who carried 
larger capital than a VOC ship usually did. This means his business was more 
profitable and efficient. The late 1650s was the critical decade for the Dutch trade 
                                                 
634
 Appendix D and E.  
 
635
 Appendix D. 
 
636
 Appendix E. 
 251
between Tonkin and Nagasaki, during which time aggressive Chinese economic 
activities on the Tonkin market increasingly outperformed the Dutch. From 1655 to 
1660, silk production in northern Vietnam was affected by a series of wars between 
the Trinh and the Ngyuen. Competition among foreign traders on the Tonkin market 
further intensified due to the shortage of available raw silk. With a sizable amount of 
capital at hand, including Japanese capital invested by the Nagasaki officials, Chinese 
merchants bid against the Dutch and offered higher purchase prices for raw silk than 
the VOC could afford. Chinese maritime traders were able to withstand narrow profit 
margins during this period because their shipping organization did not require large 
profit margins to sustain a large organization, fortresses and naval ships.  
 
Tonkin was a small market whose production capacity of raw silk was limited 
and achieved little visible improvement over the course of the seventeenth century. 
Frequent occurrences of natural disasters and the constant state of war described in 
Chapter One severely affected silk production in northern Vietnam. Tonkin alone was 
not able to fulfill Japanese demand for raw silk. Under these circumstances, the VOC 
was compelled to switch its main supplier of raw silk from Tonkin to Bengal. As a 
result, the Dutch export of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan declined from the 1660s 
onwards. Chinese junks, on the other hand, stayed in business and continued to bring 
substantial amounts of raw silk from Tonkin to Nagasaki until the mid-1680s.  
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Raw silk and silken products were the single most significant export items that 
Tonkin produced during the seventeenth century. Yet, production of raw silk was 
constantly threatened by natural and human made disasters, which made its supply of 
raw silk irregular. Tonkin’s production capacity did not improve or change much 
throughout the seventeenth century. In 1637, Nicholaes Couckebacker optimistically 
estimated that northern Vietnam could deliver 150,000 to 160,000 catties of raw silk 
annually. However, Tonkin never lived up to that expectation. Tonkin managed to 
supply in slight excess of 100,000 catties of raw silk to Japan only during good years 
such as 1651, 1656 and 1665. In 1651 and 1656, Chinese junks and Dutch ships 
together exported the largest volume of Tonkinese raw silk to Japan, amounting to 
over 120,000 catties. In 1665 again, Japan imported around 120,000 catties of raw silk 
from Tonkin. From 1682 onwards, Tonkin suffered a series of natural disasters as 
described in Chapter One. The early 1680s was arguably one of the most difficult 
times for the people of northern Vietnam during the seventeenth century. As a result, 
commercial transactions in Tonkin almost came to a complete halt.  
 
It was the Qing conquest of Taiwan and subsequent liberation of Chinese 
overseas commerce that entirely changed the conditions for maritime trade in the East 
and South China seas. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, soon after the Qing 
liberated Chinese maritime commerce, Ningbo reemerged as a center for trade with 
Japan. The year 1692 can be effectively considered as the end of direct Chinese junk 
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shipping between Tonkin and Nagasaki. In 1693, Chinese merchants found raw silk 
too expensive in Tonkin, presumably due to the expensive prices of copper on the 
Tonkin market, the currency used to purchase silk in Tonkin. They bought only a 
small quantity of piece goods in Tonkin and sailed up to Ningbo where they procured 
Chinese raw silk and silken fabrics for Japan.637 From 1693 to 1724, Lin Yuteng and 
other Chinese junk traders operated a triangular trade between Ningbo, Tonkin and 
Nagasaki. The last such ship was recorded in Nagasaki in 1724, marking the end of 
early modern trade between northern Vietnam and Japan.638 Once Chinese raw silk 
found an outlet for overseas trade, Tonkin lost its role as the alternative supplier of 
raw silk to the Japan market and dropped out from the maritime commercial circuits 
of East and Southeast Asia. 
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Detailed and up-to-date knowledge about the market, including the security situation 
at trading ports, gave a competitive edge in long-distance seaborne commerce. The 
best way to gather intelligence was through networks of people with a basis of 
cooperation. It was through human interactions that information was transmitted, trust 
was built, deals were negotiated, and eventually trade was conducted both within and 
despite the formalities. Since business transactions occurred in the arena of direct 
human contacts, mercantile activities did not exist in isolation from other aspects of 
merchants’ lives. Business negotiations could be mediated through a variety of 
commonalities, including native place affiliation, religious institutions and shared 
culture. All of these exerted a certain amounts of influence on the way trade was 
organized. 
 
Exploring the Wei brothers’ activities, this thesis illustrated that Fuqing 
merchants were the dominating force in exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan. As far 
as the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade is concerned, Fuqing merchants outdid and 
outlasted both the Zheng and the VOC. Their contribution to the Sōfukuji literally and 
metaphorically shaped the early days of the monastery. Thriving private trade was 
conducive to the dissemination of Chan Buddhism. It is no coincidence that the 
Sofukuji realized its golden age at the height of the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade. In 
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return, monasteries stimulated trade by providing merchants with a platform for 
interacting with the local officials in a private sphere that was one of the key factors 
for their successful business operation.  
 
When business took place privately and unofficially, cultural capital was indeed 
an important resource for Chinese literati-entrepreneurs in conducting trade. Chinese 
merchants wrote poems, played music and patronized painters. Impressing the local 
elites with their high culture, they were able to build networks within the circle of 
local elites, crucially including the magistrates of Nagasaki. With the means and 
resources to connect with the ruling elite in the private sphere, Chinese merchants 
exerted a certain amount of influence over the conduct of trade and were able quietly 
to subvert the aims of state control. 
 
Timothy Brook’s studies on Buddhist monasteries and the evolution of the 
late-Ming gentry society from the late-sixteenth to the late-seventeenth centuries 
indicate that patronage of Buddhist monasteries was an integral part of gentry life.639 
The Wei brothers’ undertakings, such as their patronage of a Buddhist temple, 
intimate relationships with the magistrates of Nagasaki, and contribution to charity 
and public projects, reveal that they acted upon a code of conduct typical of late-Ming 
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gentry. Given that the Wei brothers were born into this social class, the nature of 
Chinese maritime commerce during the seventeenth century followed a pattern 
embedded in the socio-economic developments of the late-Ming China. Brook 
pointed out that for most men from local gentry families, their utmost concern was 
economic rather than political. While only a few managed to launch a political career, 
the rest had to find a way to survive and for their families to continue to prosper. The 
Wei brothers’ participation in maritime commerce exemplifies one such endeavor. 
Their successful operations in the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade enabled the family to 
weather the turbulent Ming-Qing transition. Furthermore, their cultural assets made it 
possible for generations of the Wei (later Ōga) family to maintain their privileged 
status as cultural elites in Nagasaki even after the Tonkin-Nagasaki silk trade ceased 
to be significant. The revival of Chan Buddhism in southern China, which in large 
part depended on the development of the local gentry class, may also have a maritime 
connection. 
 
The multi-faceted networks of diasporic Chinese provided a backbone to 
seaborne commerce in early modern East and Southeast Asia. The Ming-Qing 
transition in China, changes in foreign and economic policies of Tokugawa Japan, the 
existence of the anti-Qing Zheng regime on the island of Taiwan, as well as civil wars 
in Tonkin, all affected regional commerce and the mercantile activity of Chinese 
maritime traders. Economic, political and social changes that occurred around the rim 
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of the East and South China Seas transcended national boundaries. Chinese traders 
were the agent of this exchange. They were able to play this role effectively and 
efficiently by mobilizing their cultural assets and by networking among people. This 
era of private trade ended when the Qing finally conquered Taiwan in 1683 and, 
subsequently, both Qing China and Tokugawa Japan extended their bureaucratic 
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Appendix A Cargo Lists of Wei Zhiyan’s Junks 
 
Appendix A.1 Cargo List of Itchien’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 27 August 1651 as Reported by the VOC 
  
45,550 catties Tonkin raw silk 
681 pieces  white peling 
445 pieces  black peling  
1,168 pieces sumungijs 
910 pieces choie 
143 pieces hockins 
14 catties musk  
1,100 catties lead 
1,803 pieces     sappanwood  
10 pieces sandalwood  
100 catties camphor  
620 catties various medicines  
170 pieces  raw baa  
  
Source: Note on the incoming cargos by Chinese from 1 November 1650 to 13 




Appendix A.2 Cargo List of Itchien’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 18 August 1654 as Reported by the VOC 
  
51,000 catties  Tonkinese raw silk 
1,203 pieces  Tonkinese peling 
355 pieces  white gilens 
801 pieces sommungis  
195 pieces  damast 
364 pieces  hockins  
313 catties raw baa 
14 pieces fluwelen 
22 pieces Tonkinese cotton 
5 pieces foras 
2,000 catties    sittouw 
1,620 pieces sappanwood 
21 packs medicines 
30 packs ray skin 
100 packs Chinese gold 
  
Source: Note on the commodities brought to Nagasaki by Chinese junks from 28 




Appendix A.3 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 19August 1656 as Reported by the VOC 
  
52,650 catties  Tonkin silk from the Chua 
156 pieces  Tonkinese peling  
185 pieces chioe  
483 pieces somongijs 
269 pieces  gilens 
160 pieces  hochins 
20 pieces  baa 
20 pieces Tonkin cotton 
400 catties cardamom  
5,000 catties Tonkin cinnamon 
1,000 catties  various medicines 
10,000 catties sappanwood  
  





Appendix A.4 Cargo List of Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
as Reported by the VOC on 20 August 1657 
  
41,350 catties  Tonkinese raw silk 
1,350 pieces  pelings 
850 catties     sittouw 
693 pieces  gilens 
34 pieces panghsis 
133 pieces sommungi  
260 pieces  hockins  
38 catties baa 
66 pieces gasen 
574 pieces chioe 
320 pieces chioerony 
4 pieces lijwaten 
10,000 catties sappanwood 
2 pieces fluweel 
9 pieces elephant task 
1,900 catties medicines 
2 catties musk 
1 box small commodities 
2 boxes Chinese books 
10 catties Tonkinese silver 
  
Source: VOC 1223: 580.   
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Appendix A.5 Cargo List of Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 13 September 1658 as Reported by the VOC 
  
51,500 catties  raw silk 
2,157 pieces  Peling 
229 pieces Hockins  
38 pieces sommungs  
127 pieces  Gilens 
80 pieces Chioe 
8 pieces white pluijs 
2,300 catties Sittow 
13 catties Musk 
1,700 catties various medicines  
408 catties elephant task 
7 packs small commodities 
  
Source: Notes on the specification of the commodities brought by thirty-eight 
Chinese junks from China, Siam Cambodia, Quinam, Tonkin and other places in 





Appendix A.6 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from 
Cambodia On 5 August 1663 as Reported by the VOC 
  
39,350 pieces   diverse kinds of deerskin 
782 pieces  caw hide  
1061 catties  buffalo horns  
10,000 catties Cambodian nuts 
12,000 catties brown sugar 
10,000 catties sappanwood  
900 catties wax 
300 catties pepper 
18 pieces  tiger hide  
150 pieces haye skin (a kind of ray skin) 
10 catties  rancheros horns  
60 catties cassomba 
600 pieces roche skin (a kind of ray skin) 
20 catties calimbak 
25,000 catties     namrak 
  





Appendix A.7 Cargo List of Wei Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 25 August 1665 as Reported by the VOC 
  
35,150 catties   raw silk 
838 pieces  peling 
530 pices  hockins  
160 pieces  sommung  
  






Table A.8 Cargo List of Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
On 8 October 1667 as Reported by the VOC 
  
67,750 catties  raw silk 
11,886 pieces  peling 
13,467 pieces  hockins  
3,026 pieces coarse sommungis  
900 pieces black sommungis 
1,034 pieces  
3,870 pieces  gilens 
208 pieces Chinese panics 
60 pieces phelpen 
3,857 pieces  
61 pieces various pluijs 
1,090 pieces baa   
540 pieces       
20 catties naaij zide  
30 catties Musk 
3,050 catties Alum 
20 catties dried alum 
300 catties fragrant woods 
700 catties Licorice 
163 catties Tonkin silver 
  
Source: Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”, 285.  
Note: I have consulted with the two manuscripts to which Nakamura referred to, 
namely Letter from Daniel Six in Nagasaki to Cornelis Valkenier in Tonkin, 6 
November 1667, VOC 1267: 706-7 as well as DN, 8 October 1667, NFJ 80. However, 
I have failed to find the above data in either of them.  
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Appendix A.9 Cargo List of Zhiyan’s Junk Arriving in Nagasaki from Tonkin 
As Reported by the VOC on 21-24 August 1668 
  
450 piculs peling 
 sommungis 
 baas   
 Chinese silk pieces goods 
130 catties musk 
 dried medicines 
  








Appendix A.10 Cargo List of Zhiyan’s Junk Leaving Tonkin for Nagasaki 
As Reported by the EIC on 4 September 1672  
  
50,000 catties  raw silk 
1,000 pieces  broad baas purple 
10,000 pieces  sommungi 
30,000 pieces lyns   
2-300 pieces laas 
1,034 pieces luas or hockin 
great quantity refuse silk 
  
Source: IOR G/12/17, pt. 1: 33r-4v.  
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Appendix B. Volume of Raw Silk Imported into Japan, 1633-1683 
 
Year A B C D E F 
1633 250,000      
1634 250,000 100,000 40% 64,000 0 0% 
1635    120,000   
1636    142,100   
1637     58,241  
1638     64,051  
1639 43,220    68,500  
1640 *82,488 9,350 11%  110,739  
1641 131,755 20,750 16% 110,622 30,351 27% 
1642 60,535  0% 87,585 28,470 33% 
1643 68,746 580 1% 71,914 36,298 50% 
1644 63,682  0% 98,953 61,709 62% 
1645 148,705 1,300 1% 138,175 75,283 54% 
1646 116,125 3,700 3% 91,418 63,933 70% 
1647  40,000  83,843 49,469 59% 
1648 12,887 0 0% 76,926 50,447 66% 
1649 125,141 26,500 21% 69,972 55,152 79% 
1650 183,280 39,800 22% 103,647 57,825 56% 
1651 *187,545 120,827 64%  0  
1652 187,500  0% 120,943 65,206 54% 
1653 222,170 30,700 14% 151,133 50,296 33% 
1654 139,631 51,850 37% 80,588 28,031 35% 
1655 174,822 20,800 12% 81,077 0 0% 
1656 211,620 79,000 37% 185,495 44,323 24% 
1657 115,883 42,300 37% 124,389 14,190 11% 
1658 147,100 55,870 38% 144,683 0 0% 
1659 245,123 2,250 1% 161,747 33,477 21% 
1660 259,821  0% 146,749 0  
1661 208,788 41,000 20%    
1662 102,680 0 0%    
1663 47,275 450 1%    
1664 112,598  0%    
1665 232,645 70,300 30% 277,051 49,202 18% 
1666 16,000 0 0% 127,082 36,854 29% 
1667  67,750  63,276  0% 
1668    221,359 51,740 23% 
1669  35,000  179,175 57,665 32% 
1670    168,398  0% 
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1671 50,000   120,031  0% 
1672  50,000  223,244 34,447 15% 
1673    211,812 44,393 21% 
1674 220,000 60,000 27%    
1675  70,000     
1676 133,283  0%    
1677    172,425   
1678       
1679    121,059   
1680 *189,814 89,065 47%     
1681       
1682 170,254 114,002 67%    
1683 9,749 676 7%    
A: Total volume of raw silk imported by Chinese junks including Chinese, Cochin 
Chinese, Cambodian, Bengali and Tonkinese silk.  
B: Volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported by Chinese junks.  
C: Share of Tonkinese silk (B/A) 
D: Total volume of raw silk, including Chinese, Bengali, Persian and Tonkinese, 
imported by the VOC ships. 
E: Volume of Tonkinese raw silk imported by the VOC ships.  
Source: A: For 1639, Nagazumi, Hirado oranda shōkan no nikki, Vol. 4, 296; for the 
rest, Yamawaki, Kinu to momen no edojidai, 29-30. *Corrected by the author in 
reference to Nagazumi, Tōsen ushutsu nyūhin sūryō ichiran, 330-49. 
B: For 1633 and 1634, Iwao, Shingan shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū, 301 & 315; for 
1647, DN, 6 & 9 August 1647, NFJ61; for the rest, Nagazumi, Tōsen ushutsu nyūhin 
sūryō ichiran, 330-49. 
C: Share of Tonkinese raw silk (B/A) 
D: For 1635 and 1636, GM, 1: 514, 589; for the rest, Yamawaki, “Oranda higashi 
indo gaisha”, 76-7. 
E: For 1637, 1638 and 1640, Nagazumi, “17 seiki chūki no nihon tonkin bōeki”, 35 
(Table 4); for 1639, Hoang, Silk for Silver, 148; for the rest, Yamawaki, Kinu to 
momen no edojidai, 29-30. 
F: Share of Tonkinese silk (E/D)  
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Appendix C. Estimated Capital in Taels  
Imported into Tonkin by Chinese Junks, 1637-1683 
 
Year Trader(s) Value (taels) Item Sources 
1633 1 junk 80,000 Silver Nagazumi, Vol. 3, 70 
1634 1 junk 80,000 Silver Iwao, 314 
1637 1 junk 35,000 Silver Nagazumi, Vol. 4, 23  
1647 2 junks 80,000 Silver GM, 2: 325 
1648 1 junk 120,000 Silver Hoang, 153 
1652 Itchien 77,000 Silver DN, 12 March 1652, NFJ65 
1653 Itchien 100,000 Silver DN, 23 March 1653, NFJ66 
1654 Itchien 160,000-170,000 Silver DN, 3 August 1654, NFJ67 
1655 Zhiyan 70,000 Silver DN, 18 July 1656, NFJ69  
1656 Zhiyan 70,000-80,000 Silver Nakamura, 381-2 
1658 Zhiyan 40,000-50,000 Silver DN, 16 April 1658, NFJ71 
1664 Zhiyan 200,000 Silver DB, 1664: 549 
1667 Yuteng 66,800 Silver TKN, 1: 62 
1668 Zhiyan 300,000 Silver DN, 24-5 January 1668, NFJ81 
1670 Zhiyan 21,000-22,000 Copper  DN, 21 January 1670, NFJ83 
1673 Zhiyan 50,000 Copper Nakamura, 386 
1674 Zhiyan 80,000-100,000 Copper IOR, G/12/17, pt.2: 105v-106v 
1679 2 junks 90,000 Silver, copper  GM, 4: 381 
1681 Zhiyan 150,000 Silver, copper IOR, G/12/17, pt. 6: 285r 
1683 2 junks 205,000 Silver IOR, G/12/17, pt. 8: 310r  
Sources: Hoang, Silk for Silver; Nakamura, “Tonkin daihakushu”; Nagazumi, Hirado 
oranda shōkan no nikki; Iwao, Shinban shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū.  
Note: Name of chief merchant indicates one junk. When name of chief merchant is 




Appendix D. Purchase Price (in facar) of Tonkinese Raw Silk in Tonkin 
 
Year Purchase Price  Seller Buyer Source 
1637 15 The Chua Portuguese Nagazumi, 33 
 16-17, 18-20 merchants Portuguese Nagazumi, 33 
 15 The Chua Dutch Hoang, 146 
 16 Merchants Dutch Hoang, 146 
 17 Mandarins Dutch Hoang, 146 
1639 15 The Chua Dutch Nagazumi, 33 
1643 17.4 Ave. Dutch Nagazumi, 33 
1652 (1st)11, 11.5 Merchants Dutch Kurihara, 16 
1653 (2nd, 3rd)11, 11.5 Merchants Dutch Kurihara, 16 
 (1st)8 Merchants Chinese Kurihara, 16 
1654 (1st)8, 8.5, 9 Merchants  Nakamura, 381 
1658 (1st)11  9, 9.5* Merchants Zhiyan Nakamura, 382 
 (2nd)11, 12 Merchants Zhiyan Nakamura, 382 
1659 (1st)8 Merchants Zhiyan Nakamura, 382 
1664 8, 8.5, 9 Merchants Zhiyan Nakamura, 384 
1665 (1st)13 Merchants  Nakamura, 384 
1675 15 The Chua Dutch IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r 
 14 The Chua Yuteng IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r 
 13 The Chua English IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 144r 
1676 15.5 Merchants Chinese IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 148r 
1677 9.5-14 Merchants Chinese IOR, G/12/17, pt.3: 198r 
1680 (1st)17, (2nd)18 Merchants Yuteng IOR, G/12/17, pt.6: 273v 
1682 (1st)16, (2nd)17 The Chua Yuteng IOR, G/12/17, pt.7: 284v 
Note: (1st): first-grade or cabessa silk; (2nd): second grade or bariga silk. 
Note*: At the beginning of the summer trading season, first-grade silk could be 
purchased at 11 faccar. After the competitors from Macao arrived, the price rose to 9 








Sale Price (taels per catty) of Tonkinese Raw Silk at Nagasaki 
 
Year Chinese  VOC Portuguese 
1636  2.90 2.94 
1637  1.80 2.03 
1638  2.40 2.46 
1639  2.72  
1643 2.8 2.65, 2.72  
1645 2.9 2.41, 3.31  
1646 2.8 2.23, 2.93  
1650  1.74  
1651  2.77, 2.83, 2.39, 2.25  
1654 2.48, 2.04 2.43  
1668  2.21  
1667 3.0 2.90  
1669 2.95, 3.3   
1680 2.1-2.15   
1682 2.1-2.5   
1683 2.7   
Sources: Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 352-61; Nagazumi, “17 










Appendix G. Governor Generals of the VOC in the Seventeenth Century 
 
Terms Governor Gereral 
  
1636 – 1645 Antonio van Diemen 
1645 – 1650 Cornelis van der Lijn 
1650 – 1653 Carel Reniers 
1653 – 1678 Joan Maetsuyker 
1678 – 1681 Rijcklof van Goens 
1681 – 1684 Cornelis Janszoon Speelman 






1623-1657 Trịnh Tráng 
1657-1682 Trịnh Tạc 
1682-1709 Trịnh Căn 
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1637 – 1641 Carel Hartsinck 
1642 – 1647 Antonio van Brockhorst 
1647 – 1650 Philip Schillemans 
1650 – 1651 Jacob Keijser 
March 1651 – June 1651 Jan de Groot 
1651 – 1653 Jacob Keijser 
1653 – 1656 Louis Isaacszn Baffart 
1657 – 1659 Nicolaas de Voogt 
1660 – 1664 Hendrick Baron 
1664 – 1665 Hendrick Verdonk 
1665 – 1667 Constantijn Ranst 
1667 – 1672 Cornelis Valckenier 
1672 – 1677 Albert Brevinck 
1677 – 1679 Johannes Besselman 
1679 – 1687 Leendert de Moy 




Appendix I.  Abbots of Sofukuji during the Seventeenth Century 
 
Term Chinese   Japanese   
    
1646–  Baizhuo Ruli Hyakusetsu Nyori 百拙如理 
1650 – 1655  Daozhe Chaoyuan Dōsya Chōgen 道者超元 
1655 –   Yinyuan Longqi Ingen Ryuki 隠元隆琦 
1655 – 1657 Daozhe Chaoyuan Dōsya Chōgen 道者超元 
1657 – 1663  Jifei Ruyi Sokuhi Nyoitsu 即非如一 




Appendix J. Magistrates of Nagasaki in the Seventeenth Century 
 
   
1640 – 1642 Tsuge Masatoki 柘植正時 
1642 – 1650 Baba Toshishige 馬場利重 
1642 – 1650 Yamazaki Masanobu 山崎正信 
1650 – 1665 Kurokawa Masanao 黒川正直 
1651 – 1660 Kainoshō Masa 甲斐庄正述 
1660 – 1662 Tsumaki Yorikuma 妻木頼熊 
1662 – 1666 Shimada Tadamasa 島田忠政 
1665 – 1666 Inou Masatomo 稲生正倫 
1666 – 1671 Matsudaira Takami 松平隆見 
1666 – 1672 Kawano Michisada 河野通定 
1671 – 1681 Ushigome Shigeyasu 牛込重恭 
1672 – 1680 Okano Tadaaki 岡野貞明 
1680 – 1693 Kawaguchi Munetsune 川口宗恒 
1681 – 1686 Miyagi Masayoshi 宮城和甫 
1686 – 1687 Ōsawa Mototetsu 大沢基哲 
1687 – 1694 Yamaoka Kagesuke 山岡景助 
1687 – 1696 Miyagi Tomosumi 宮城和澄 
1694 – 1701  Kondō Mochikage 近藤用景 
1695 – 1702  Niwa Nagamori 丹羽長守 
1696 – 1698  Suwa Yoritaka 諏訪頼隆 
   
 
 
